However, in December 2008, when Chinese oceanographic surveying ships traveled through Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands, Chinese maritime authorities issued a public statement that said: ‘When conflicts arise over territorial claims, what will be important is a past record of ‘effective control.’  We will establish effective jurisdiction.’

If China were to become really serious about building up a past record of effective control and repeatedly violated Japanese territorial waters, a military confrontation could arise one day with the Japanese government who would stop such intrusions.

Even Japan’s pacifist Constitution could not negate that possibility.

The first stage has concluded with the release of the trawler captain. But a different reality now lies in front of Japan.

If there are any weaknesses in Japan’s defense of its territories, they must be addressed and corrected.

The next step would be to change the fundamental stance of Japanese diplomacy.

While maintaining its position on territorial issues, Japan must take steps to use every conceivable diplomatic measure to prevent a military confrontation.

The structure is the same as the one facing Japanese diplomats before World War II. They staked their lives on their efforts, knowing that diplomatic failure would lead to war.

For that purpose, all responsible politicians should refrain from making comments with a martial tone while those politicians and government officials in charge should make every effort to work on the following four issues.

The first is to use every available channel to make China understand that ‘any policy to physically open up a door to effective control will bring about the worst result of military confrontation.’

The second concerns the persistent stance of the Japanese government that ‘no territorial issue’ exists over the Senkaku Islands.

That term was continually used by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko toward Japan about the Northern Territories during the waning days of the Cold War. Japanese of that time, including myself, felt anger and a sense of humiliation whenever he said that.

Japan’s actual policy is a surprisingly flexible one that keeps Japanese from landing on the Senkaku Islands in order not to antagonise the Chinese.

However, because Japan also insists on saying that ‘no territorial issue exists,’ the government has been unable to gain the understanding of even Chinese with pro-Japanese sentiments.

This might not be a problem during ordinary times. But when diplomacy is being played out with the possibility of a military confrontation looming, Japan must not force China to experience ‘the humiliation of Gromyko.’

Diplomatic efforts are now needed in which the two nations can frankly say what they want without any prior conditions.

The third issue concerns the Japan-US alliance. There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are covered by Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, which obligates the United States to defend Japan. However, if Japan does not make every diplomatic effort available, it cannot expect to be able to ask Americans to shed their blood on behalf of Japan.

The last issue is that, fortunately, international opinion is now on the side of Japan.

Japan should explain the calm and rational stance it is taking throughout the incident at every available opportunity.

Kazuhiko Togo is a former director-general of the Treaties Bureau at the Foreign Ministry. He currently heads the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University.

This article was first published here at the Asahi Shimbun.