The rise of China and India in the period of globalisation that followed the end of the Cold War gave Asians cause for cautious hope that the global economic and political centre of gravity was finally moving toward them. That movement would complete the great shifts that had seen the centre move from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and to the Pacific. The oceans would still remain important, but continental Asia would host the new Athens, the new Rome, the new London, the new New York.
How easily delusions take hold of the eager mind! A mere decade into its apparent arrival, the Asian Century looks increasingly elusive.
In the space of the past few months, simmering tensions between China and India have come to the fore. Asked about China’s reference to Jammu and Kashmir as ‘India-controlled Kashmir’, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh argued that Beijing could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’ — Kashmir and Pakistan — ‘to keep India in low-level equilibrium’.
This is hardly the kind of relationship that Asians would have envisaged between the continent’s two major powers. What makes Sino-Indian discord astonishing is that it is occurring even as the economic relationship between the two Asian giants is burgeoning. Those who believe that free trade contributes decisively to peace must ask themselves a further question: If this is what can occur despite good economic ties, what cannot occur if those ties sour?
Meanwhile, the China-Japan territorial spat grabbed the headlines for a good many days last month. Without going into the merits of the conflicting claims to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, what was noticeable was the almost visceral fury with which Beijing responded to Tokyo’s detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler that had collided with Japanese coast guard vessels.
What began as an incident that could have been settled diplomatically — this being the reason ministries of foreign affairs exist — turned into an exhibition of nationalist fervour.
Admittedly, territorial disputes are politically the most difficult to resolve because they involve space, without which no nation can exist. But what the spat revealed was that Asia’s growing economic influence is yet to be matched by political maturity in handling diplomatic disputes. Without that maturity, Asia’s rise will remain woefully incomplete.
As for the dispute over the South China Sea, this area might well replace the Korean peninsula as Asia’s chief flashpoint. Again, this is not the place to go into the rights and the wrongs of the various parties to the dispute. What bears noting is that the dispute has turned the spotlight on China’s emergence as a heavyweight in regional affairs.
Those who believe that ASEAN utilised the South China Sea issue to give the United States a new foothold in East Asia must ask who set the ball rolling this time around. It was the Chinese declaration of the South China Sea as a ‘core interest’ that alarmed ASEAN countries because it implied that Beijing’s maritime claims had the same national status as its claims over Taiwan and Tibet.
Since sovereignty is by definition absolute and non-negotiable, and can be backed by force to make it credible, did the Chinese declaration mean that Beijing would treat conflicting claims in the South China Sea as challenges to its national sovereignty, to be met with the threat or use of force?
Combine this stance with the worrying candour inherent in China’s statement that there are large countries and small ones, and it is no wonder that ASEAN countries severally, if not jointly, welcomed the return of the US to the region.
The US has declared its ‘national interest’ in ‘freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea’. Though the US did not take a stance on the territorial disputes, its declaration was broad enough to potentially challenge the Chinese position.
All this has led Professor Donald Emmerson, head of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University, to declare that ‘China has come close to deleting the first letter in its heralded ‘charm offensive’ in Southeast Asia.
If that were to occur, it would be bad not only for China but also for the rest of Asia. In Southeast Asia, certainly, which continues to enjoy the fruits of China’s growth, no one has a stake in worsening relations with China; no one wants to derail Asia’s rise.
The Asian Century deserves a chance. Only Asians can give themselves that chance.
Dr K. Kesavapany is Director of the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore and Singapore’s non-resident ambassador to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
An earlier version of this article first appeared in the Straits Times on October 15, 2010.
China will continue to be hawkish at least till the next generation leadership takes over. Up until then one or the other lobby in Beijing will play hawk to sound more Chinese than the rest of the flock. Unfortunately, by the time the new leadership settles down in Beijing (assuming a bloodless transition) it will be too late to mend because rest of Asia would have invested a lot in firearms and bulwarks (bought from the West!). Unfortunately, the Asian century is nowhere in sight, if by that we mean an Asia in which countries do not go out of their way to sabotage fellow Asians.
The Asean countries will soon find their mistake when they try to introduce the U.S. into this area because the only result will be that, ASEAN, a small group, will lose influence over what’s going on here. However,no country, whether the U.S.or Japan or EU, can ignore the reality that China is the biggest power in Asia and they need to talk to China to achieve any goal or to avoid conflict. The ASEAN countries are forcing China to form a de facto G2, not only in global affairs but also in regional affairs. I can not imagine the small countries can maintain their interest in good shape when two huge elephants are dancing or in conflict around the same table.
Vikas Kumar should really explain why he thinks that China has been hawkish towards her neighbours, and what evidence he has to prove that most lobbyists in Beijing are playing a hawkish card. And it seems to me that he thinks that an Asian Century can only be realised if ‘countries do not go out of their way to sabotage fellow Asians.’ The irony is that Europeans were sabotaging each other even when European Century was at its it height.
The India-China dyad is not souring. It had been until October 2009 (from approximately early 2006). But both countries have managed to place a floor beneath and arrest the decline in this relationship … usefully too in the setting of bilateral leaders talks on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Thailand last year.
Relations are now on a slow, improvement track – with many of the unresolved issues from that period of deterioration still hanging fire. But the determination to address them in a constructive manner, and appreciate either parties red lines, is a positive, near-term phenomena. With Premier Wen expected in India this winter, look for ties – going forward – to make a palpable break from their recent unhappy past.
Whether this translates into a vituous cycle, akin to the period between 2001-2005, is too premature to tell. I suspect it won’t. But the bialteral relationship will be back on a rough-and-ready even keel by about this time next year … UNLESS unforseeable circumstances intrude.
Sincerely, Sourabh
Jack bhai, Thanks for joining the discussion. It seems my comment was not clear. Your comment raises three questions. I’ll respond to the second one before taking up the first and third.
2. I did not claim that most lobbyists in Beijing are playing hawk (or even that some will always play hawk). I only said that at least some in Beijing have an incentive to play hawk till a certain period.
1. Evidence regarding the Chinese state’s hawkish position on Asian disputes? Embargo on rare earth exports to Japan in a relatively minor territorial dispute and demanding apology and compensation after the game was over; extreme stand on South China sea, namely, claiming it as a core national interest (when a regional forum is already trying to resolve the issue why sabotage the multilateralism by introducing the demand for bilateral negotiations with comparatively smaller countries, which have genuine stakes but not the firepower to backup the same); sudden change in position on Jammu and Kashmir (imagine the outrage in Beijing if all of a sudden any country stapled the passport of a Tibetan citizen of China or a general posted in Lhasa) and an unwillingness to resolve it through dialogue (I’m aware of the Chinese premier’s forthcoming India visit); blocking development loans for Arunachal Pradesh; uncalled for military build-up across the Himalayas, etc.
3. Unfortunately, my original statement was loosely framed. I do not think “Asians not sabotaging fellow Asians” (AnsfA) is necessary or even sufficient for the Asian Century to become a reality. However, given the current global dominance of the West and the nature of technology, AnsfA is a necessary (but insufficient) element of the set of sufficient (but not necessary) conditions required for the realization of the Asian Century.
True, the Europeans were divided when they ruled the world. But when they were fighting each other there was no possibility of interference from a global power or any non-European regional power. First limitations of transport, communication and military technologies precluded sustainable cross-regional interference. Later when technological progress enabled such interference, for a longtime the Europeans were the only ones who had access to the relevant technologies. Today, Uncle Sam, even under a Gandhian president, is a party to every dispute and has sufficient firepower to assert its claims, genuine or concocted. So, Japan-China or South China Sea disputes are no longer bilateral or even an Asian affair. The losing side takes recourse to Western help. (Thanks to the Chinese state’s myopia India, Japan, and Vietnam are now closer to USA then they were before the recent flare-ups.) Europeans never needed the help of an Asian big brother in a European conflict (for want of space I’m avoiding Ottoman-European relations without damaging the claim). In colonies, local European commanders took help from native states to settle scores with European competitors. But at the end of the day they were still prepared to hold Berlin Conferences to divide the rest of the World. The ease with which they redrew the world map (through mutual agreement) to keep it in sync with the continental balance of power is really remarkable. 21st Century Asia is different, where at least some countries have to necessarily depend on the West even for routine self-defense. This in turn ensures (a) the political initiative rests with the technologically advanced West, which presently controls all the international economic and political institutions, and (b) sufficient Asian support for its incumbency.
Asian countries, like European countries earlier on, have historical issues between some of the members.
While Western European countries have united through the European Union in the middle of the last century and some of the Eastern European countries joined that in the past two decades, Asian countries have not gone through such a process.
Asian countries are more diverse politically and economically.
Now some historical territorial disputes flash up from time to time and countries involved have not found a framework or paradigm to deal with and resolve them.
A potentially difficult issue is that China is big and increasingly more powerful on the one hand, and some others may feel to rely on the support of external powers to deal with China, but China may not like it.
That mentality, however, may further escalate regional tensions from time to time.
What all countries need to realise is that is likely to result a lose-lose outcome to all, possibly spread well over the disputed areas and outweigh the potential benefits from any territorial gains.
What every country should consider is how to achieve a win-win outcome for every country directly involved.
And that is a challenge and requires a new approach from all sides.
Dear Vikas Kumar,
First of all, I can give you a whole list of counter-arguments and facts from the Chinese point of view, of which I assume you might have been aware or be capable of finding out yourself. The main point is this: China does not like to see increasing and intensifying conflicts in her neighbourhood, it’s absolutely not in her interest whatsoever, and all the actions China took and has taken, is basically reactive and passive. (Which is regrettable and harmful to China in the long run, and I’d rather see some pro-active approaches from China) If talking about being hawkish in Asia-Pacific, India, Japan and, of course U.S, are the three typical nations that should be on everyone’s list. For example: India’s seemingly endless and unnecessarily massive military spending (in proportion to her GDP), the country’s media and host of military generals famous of being provocative. Japan’s territorial disputes not only with China, but also with two other nations, namely, South Korea and Russia; and her secretive and also substantial military build-up despite being deeply in debt; For U.S., it seems to be only natural for them to be aggressive and hawkish. And even their definition of ‘dovish’ is the ‘hawkish’ in China’s book.
Secondly, I can only say at this stage, in comparing Asia and Europe in terms of development, there will be a whole lot of elements that must be factored in. However, methodologically speaking, I believe that, using so-called Asian Century, European Century, or even Chinese Century, or American Century, as a logical starting point to build a framework of thought is really unhelpful and unconstructive in analysing 21st century global development. It seems to me to be rather a journalistic inclination. In Asia-Pacific, I rather suggest readers to pay more attention to ‘10+1’, to China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and its subsequent impact on East Asian economy. (E.g. the change in the region’s production structure as China gradually moves up the value chain.) Globally, I like to focus on the reality of multipolarity in international relations and the relative but increasing decline of the West in almost all regards. In the end, should one really like to talk about this century belonging to whom, I’d say it’d be a truly global century where every one of us potentially matters.
Jack saheb,
I agree with you that in most cases constructs like X-century is unhelpful. However, ‘(West) European Century’ continues to be a useful starting point for a historical analysis of inter-state competition. Roland Vaubel and Peter Bernholz (Ed. 2004) is a good example of its heuristic value. (But they do not directly use the phrase ‘(West) European Century’.)
I’ll end with a brief comment on “India’s seemingly endless and unnecessarily massive military spending (in proportion to her GDP)” and its “provocative” “military generals”. With millions starving, India should not spend even a penny on defence. In any case, India spends 2.5% of its GDP in comparison to 4.3% of GDP spent by China. Add to this the fact that whatever India spends has to be published. If it isn’t then a few years down the line heads start rolling whereas the Chinese state has sufficient scope to keep part of its expenditure unaudited. Also, India maintains 1.1/1000 (active) troops compared to China’s 1.7/1000. Indian military generals can speak only when they are asked to and can be kicked out of office whenever the civilian government feels like (recall an admiral was dismissed shortly after he said he does not agree with the central government’s political orientation). Very soon three ex-chiefs and a number of serving officers are going to receive whiplashes in public. India is not Pakistan. Being provocative can hurt promotions, very severely.
For expenditure see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html
For active armed personnel see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_troops (Right now I do not have a more appropriate reference.)
Dear Vikas Kumar,
I do not intend to walk further into the debate on India Vs China even though I disagree with you on your rough comparison between China and India on military stats. Due to word limitation I cannot expand on why China has military spending about 4.5% of her GDP and it’s not even enough from my point of view. And as for the active armed personnel and ‘unaudited’ military expenditure, they are quite answerable as well. Anyway, it will lead to a whole new subject. The most important thing is that most Chinese do not consider India as a competitor and believe two nations should defy many ill-willed to come together and cooperate on as many issues as possible. However, the West and so many Western-influenced innocent Indians seem to like to see the so-called ‘race’ between China and India, mainly because it is the Western style system Vs the Chinese style system on display, and the reputation and credibility of the West is potentially at stake. Most of them are never tired talking about China as a threat, an enemy or a bogyman. This is the general impression I get from watching both Western and Indian media and academic circle.
For example see: http://www.economist.com/node/16846256
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2010/06/100621_doc_tiger_dragon_china_india.shtml
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8258715.stm
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-and-space/Indias-China-Syndrome.html
http://www.hindustantimes.com/What-is-China-s-problem-with-India/Article1-596154.aspx
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-deploys-new-CSS-5-missiles-on-border-with-India/articleshow/6324105.cms
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-may-attack-india-soon-mulayam-in-ls/708638/
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Chinas-power-play/articleshow/6520389.cms
http://csis.org/event/asian-strategic-outlook-view-india
http://csis.org/event/chinas-impact-indian-foreign-policy-and-security-strategy
Whatever your comment may insinuate, (something about the Indian system and the Chinese system), my suggestion to my Indian friends is: 1. Start across-the-aboard land reform as soon as possible and root out whatever remains in the Caste system to truly emancipate most Indians. 2. Focus on infrastructure and manufacturing sector to absorb huge untapped human resource. 3. be open-minded.
All in all, it’s not so much Indian’s fault that India seriously lacks capabilities in mobilization and organization (necessary elements for industrialization and urbanization to take place), but because of the success of British grand project of de-industrialization of its colonies. (see Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, 3 vols. (1979) by Fernand Braudel and his other related works ,and see Immanuel Wallerstein’s works on colonialism)
Jack Bhai, Like many others, I would love to know why China needs to spend at least one twentieth of its GDP on defense. Particularly, because other countries are advised to have lean defense budgets. What are its special circumstances? I have not seen anything in print that credibly justifies Chinese defense spending. I will end this dialogue with the observation that sooner than later street corner nationalism will peak in China, which in turn will trigger a domino reaction in other East Asian countries. And this is not good for regional cooperation. Vikas
Vikas,
The special circumstance are: the size of China’s geographical domain: its land mass and sea area; China as the second largest economy and still growing, its consequent economic interests exponentially extend to almost all corner of the world. So PLA, PLAAF and PLAN need to meet these ever-inceasing demands to protect Chinese interests. Anyway, I’m not sure if you’ve read enough.
As for your observation, let us watch and see. I’m quite optimistic.
Jack bhai, If the “special circumstance” argument is entirely based on factors like area, population, size of economy, and level and spread of international trade then it will support very high levels of defense spending in a number of countries: Indonesia, China, Japan, Brazil, USA, India, and Russia. I’m presuming that you think the special circumstances are jointly sufficient. Otherwise one has to include South Korea, Germany, Pakistan, France, UK, Taiwan, major oil producers, Australia, South Africa, Kazakhstan, etc. In any case, instead of building large armies major countries should invest in global institutions.