However, soon after it joined the Association Burma reasserted its sovereignty by continuing to violate human rights. With some of the other member states on a steady path to democracy and Burma proving time and again to be insensitive to its partners’ diplomatic efforts, Thai attempts to put the Burmese political situation on the ASEAN agenda finally proved fruitful in 2003. In 2004 Burma signed on to the ‘road map to reconciliation and democracy’, which stipulates a seven step plan to transition from a dictatorial regime to a democratic state. Two main pillars of the road map are the drafting and implementation of a new constitution and the holding of free and fair elections.

With the road map agreed to ASEAN finally had something of a foot in the door (or perhaps ‘toe’ would be a better quantification). Over the previous years some of the organization’s more critical member states – notably Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (although the latter less so since its own political turmoil started) – publicly voiced their impatience with Burma’s failures to implement points of the road map and stated their concerns about the repercussions of Burma’s behavior on ASEAN’s international standing. In the lead up to this month’s elections ASEAN rhetoric became more and more stern, from individual member states but also from the Association’s Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan. Dr. Pitsuwan in July and August repeatedly stated in public that ASEAN representatives were putting pressure on Burma about the importance of holding free and fair elections, and making clear that the elections were important for Burma’s as well as ASEAN’s credibility as the global community was keeping watch.

In retrospect, these statements were hollow phrases uttered by someone who knew, or at least should have known, better. After all, even in the run-up to the elections Burma kept both its own population and  fellow ASEAN members in the dark about the intended date of the elections, and made very clear its interpretation of free and fair elections would stretch even the broadest of definitions. ASEAN’s efforts to persuade Burma to allow international or ASEAN observers were staunchly ignored, and there was no mention of the freeing of opposition leaders prior to the elections.

In fact, the timing of the elections strongly appears to have been set to just precede the expiration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest, on November 13. Backtracking quickly on his more muscular earlier words, with just a week to go until the elections Dr. Pitsuwan stated that ‘what happens after the elections may be more critical than the polls themselves’. More or less echoing the grouping’s pre-membership expectations, Pitsuwan went on to express his hope that the elections in the end will create more opportunities and room for engagement.

One of the problems for ASEAN is that their options are inherently limited with respect to Burma. The road map to democracy is the strongest and most concrete card ASEAN holds in the way of holding Burma accountable for its internal politics. But this card rests on nothing but thin promises from a regime that has repeatedly proven not to be concerned about upholding its own credibility or showing respect to regional partners. ASEAN thus must rely upon the Burmese junta to take it upon themselves to hold free and fair elections. The same goes for all the mechanisms Burma is part of, such as the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s Commission on Human Rights, which lack any degree of non-compliance mechanism, entirely in line with the high importance attached to non-interference among Southeast Asian countries.

A second problem ASEAN faces is that there is in fact also little scope for informal pressure. Although ASEAN representatives make a point of reiterating their tradition of quiet diplomacy over public statements, ASEAN is divided on the issue of how far to press Burma. Indonesia and the Philippines are the most openly critical of the Burmese regime, followed by Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. But Laos, Cambodia and most notably Vietnam, wish to strictly uphold the non-interference principle and as such do not allow the grouping as a whole to be critical of the Burmese regime. At the moment ASEAN is chaired by Vietnam, who issued a congratulatory statement about Burma’s progress to democracy very shortly after the polls closed in spite of early reports about widespread fraud.

A third factor further complicating ASEAN’s position is the non-critical stance of Burma’s key regional supporter, China. China’s continuous and by and large unconditional support for the Yangon regime not only renders any criticism from ASEAN inconsequential, it also diminishes any incentive for ASEAN to defy Burma. With the regional balance in a precarious state and all parties involved concerned about reasserting their role in the emerging order, ASEAN does not want to be cast as a puppet of its western partners.

But although ASEAN’s hands are arguably tied, ASEAN member states should keep one thing in mind: their more bold statements of this summer hold a certain truth. The reputation of ASEAN is tied to the ‘Burmese case’, and their current attitude is proving ASEAN critics right. That said, the difficulty for ASEAN is that this argument goes two ways; whereas ASEAN stands to alienate its western counterparts by failing to apply sufficient pressure on Burma, it risks alienating China by doing the opposite. In addition, even if it were to defy Chinese pressure and overcome internal disagreements, it is unlikely that Burma would move in response. All things considered and all criticism notwithstanding, ASEAN at the moment is probably doing all it is capable of in nudging Burma into the right direction. However unsatisfactory this may be for those of a more reformist mind.

Fenna Egberink is an independent researcher in the Netherlands.