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Institutional architecture in Asia: Challenges for the US and Russia

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  • Gary Hawke

    New Zealand Institute of Economic Research

In Brief

The decision by ASEAN to invite the US and Russia to participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS) from 2011 was widely interpreted by many commentators as a positive response to a US desire to join the EAS as part of its strategy to re-engage with Asia. But until recently, the nature of the US participation was not clear. The Hanoi meetings clarified some aspects of how the governments of the Asia Pacific will interact: the US and Russia are invited to join all activities, and the existing agenda of the EAS will remain unchanged. Reaching this decision was not simple. Implementing it will be even more difficult.

The first difficulty is revealed in the precise wording of various statements from Hanoi. They all express concern to maintain ‘ASEAN centrality’.

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ASEAN has been a remarkably successful region and institution, both politically and economically, but it is concerned about ensuring it maintains a voice in international affairs. Its regional affairs attract the interest of several major powers – all of China, India, Japan, Korea and the US, with Russia being significant in a few specific areas. The image of ‘ASEAN in the driver’s seat’ provokes thoughts of a driver whose employment will last precisely as long as three diverse passengers are content, but the more important point is that while East Asian economic integration would be greatly facilitated by readier agreement among China, Japan and Korea, that agreement also carries for ASEAN the possibility of marginalisation in regional affairs.

Additionally, the range of the current agenda of Asian economic integration is not widely appreciated, and it is certainly different from standard Washington views of trade liberalisation. It will be hard for US officials who are wedded to the templates of current US trade agreements to join in the intended progression, because progress has been slow in the four areas of tariff nomenclature, customs procedures, rules of origin and economic cooperation.

Furthermore, ASEAN and its partners have established pathways which link trade liberalisation and facilitation with regulatory reform, and economic integration to narrowing development gaps. This is most clearly illustrated in the Comprehensive Asian Development Plan and the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan.

More broadly, the EAS is part of a regional alphabet soup with includes other existing and mutually-reinforcing processes such as the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This range of overlapping institutions and processes is unlikely to diminish in the medium-term future. And while the US is indispensable in traditional security discussions in Asia, it is not indispensable to East Asian integration.

Of course, regional economic developments will proceed in a context of global interdependence, US markets will remain significant, and US officials and institutions will be important parts of the international financial system. However, Asian economic integration can proceed without US participation in many of its core processes.

The US and Russia must be careful. The economic agenda in Asia is about regional integration, not trade. ‘Community building’ is more than rhetoric. It signals an intention to take account of regional interests as decisions are made in individual economies. It is concerned with establishing regional rules and processes that give assurance that cross-border business generates regional economic welfare. While this is very likely to proceed at different paces across different dimensions – tariffs, customs procedures, monetary co-operation and so on – American and Russian leaders and officials have to adapt to this ASEAN led approach to trade and economic integration. If they fail to take heed of this warning, they may find that EAS is slipping away without them.

Gary Hawke is a Senior Fellow at the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Professor Emeritus and former Head of the School of Government at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

An earlier version of this piece was published here by the Asia New Zealand Foundation.

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