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Reversing course in Japan’s Asia-Pacific relations

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In Brief

We now know, courtesy of Wikileaks, that the assessment of Japan’s DPJ, at the highest levels of the US government, was that it was ‘completely different’ from the LDP.

At first, this appeared to be the case. It was not just the Futenma debacle, although that was bad enough.

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The Hatoyama government’s apparent reneging on an earlier US base realignment agreement was taken as a signal that the new DPJ administration not only wanted to put greater distance between itself and the United States but also desired to reduce the American military presence in Japan.

There were other clear differences too. In its 2009 election manifesto, the DPJ said that it would ‘Make the greatest possible effort to develop relations of mutual trust with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries’.

Newly appointed Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya said that Asia should be at the center of Japan’s foreign policy, while former Prime Minister Hatoyama argued that the era of US-led globalism was ending and being replaced by multipolarity as China rose to become one of the leading economies, with expanding military power.

The shift in Japan’s Asia-Pacific relations was more nuanced than stark. It was essentially a question of rebalancing Japan’s relations between the US and Asia. Under the LDP, Japan’s foreign and security policies were strongly aligned with those of the United States, and its relations with Asia, particularly in security affairs, were conducted through the prism of the US alliance. The DPJ, on the other hand, wanted Japan to reconnect strongly to Asia as an independent actor. Staking a claim to greater autonomy in foreign relations also extended to a more ‘equal’ relationship with the United States. Hatoyama’s East Asian Community idea was supposed to be the vehicle through which this rebalancing exercise took place as well as providing an opportunity for Japan to play a regional leadership role.

Japan’s defence ‘normalisation’ also stalled. There was no more talk of ratcheting up Japan’s regional and international security role as a contributing partner to the alliance, or of constitutional revision to permit Japan to participate in collective defence. The DPJ government withdrew support for ‘globalisation’ of the alliance – the buzzword of the Bush-Koizumi era – which was ‘code’ for token Japanese military support for US global strategic objectives and deployments around the globe.

Moreover, there was no more talk, as there was under the LDP, of building a nuclear defence to North Korea. Discussion of Japan’s potential nuclearisation was replaced by talk of government action to push the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

The last six months have seen a reversal of a number of these policy positions. The weakening of the US-Japan relationship is now being replaced by a strengthening of the alliance in a number of different spheres.

First, the Kan administration has adopted Hatoyama’s flip-flop on Futenma and committed itself to implementing the original base agreement with the United States. Even more importantly, it has made a new, threat-based assessment of its relationship with China, subtly distancing itself diplomatically from China while now visibly drawing closer to its alliance partner, a move triggered largely by the Senkaku Islands dispute and more lately by North Korean attacks on South Korea. High levels of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence did not prove, in practice, to be a barrier to a barrage of hostile Chinese action against Japan.

In the trade sphere also, Japan is focusing on the TPP, which will encompass the United States as a major player, but not China, rather than prioritising some version of an East Asian FTA where China’s participation is mandatory.

As part of the input into the government’s five-year National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), the newly appointed DPJ ‘Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era’ articulated a defence doctrine that provides a sophisticated justification for closer Japanese security relations with the United States. Its ‘Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era’ was published in late August, about a week or so before the flare-up in Sino-Japanese relations. It is a very forward-looking document that anticipates just such a contingency in Japan’s southwestern islands. It reiterates the importance of US forces in Japan to the security of the nation and emphasises the geographical and strategic importance of Okinawa, although concedes the imbalance in Okinawa’s security burden. The report recommends that Japan ‘ceaselessly deliberate’ on areas where Japan and the United States can cooperate in missile defence, and participate in reinforcing the network of US allies, partners and friends in areas such as security cooperation.

The council’s report also proposes a revamping of Japan’s defence posture by replacing the old Basic Defense Force (BDF) Concept, which incorporates the idea of ‘static deterrence’, with the notion of ‘dynamic deterrence’, which ‘hinges on response capabilities to various contingencies’. To achieve ‘dynamic deterrence’ in remote island areas, for example, the report proposes the deployment of new units, as well as, amongst other things, improving Japan’s rapid deployment capability, conducting exercises and ‘reinforcing aerial/surface/underwater/coastal surveillance operations, and strengthening joint and combined operations with the U.S.’ The council also envisages ‘more realistic and active cooperation’ with the United States in dealing with ‘contingencies in areas surrounding Japan’, advocating the provision of weapons and ammunition to US forces and expanding the areas in which the SDF can operate. It anticipates, in other words, an expansion in US-Japan defence cooperation in regional contingencies.

It is difficult to conclude that the council’s predecessor appointed by the LDP would have produced a document that is significantly different from this one. The council sees no inherent contradiction between the concept of Japan as a peace-loving state and recommendations for participation in multi-layered security cooperation with other US allies such as Australia and South Korea. It also makes recommendations about an incremental expansion in Japan’s military role. These are trends that became well established in the LDP era. There are also references to shared or common values with other democracies (big themes under the Abe and Aso administrations) and an expressed desire to expand security cooperation with India – an initiative that was launched during the Abe administration.

The most striking departure from existing policy was the proposal for ending the de facto prohibition on Japanese arms exports so that Japan could participate in the joint development of weapons systems, hence the stir this created in the Japanese media.

Traditionally, the value of such advisory council reports is that they have provided a pointer to future directions in Japanese security and defence policy. Cautious governments have not necessarily accepted all their recommendations right away, but have adopted more radical proposals later when public and international opinion has become more favourable. In short, these proposals have a political function in helping to mould the national defence consensus.

The newly released NDPG reflects council input, revealing that the DPJ government will focus on building defence capabilities to deal with China’s maritime expansion in the East China Sea and in particular the threat it poses to Japan’s remote South Western islands. The guidelines have adopted the concept of a ‘dynamic defence force’ to supercede the BDF concept in order to promote ‘timely and active operations’. In practice this means beefing up Japan’s rapid deployment capability as well as locating forces where they are most likely to be needed. For example, Japan will permanently station a military presence in the South Western islands, including possibly the most western island of Yonaguni near Taiwan, which lies just south of the Senkakus.

Under the NDPG, Japan will also ‘deepen and expand’ the alliance with the United States in the new security environment, including cooperation in missile defence, and all kinds of operational coordination including cooperation in ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’, although exactly what advances in US-Japan defence cooperation are anticipated are not specified. The concept of ‘multi-layered security cooperation’ also gets a run, with the NDPG anticipating strengthened security links with Australia, South Korea, India and ASEAN.

However, the Kan administration baulked at a review of the ban on weapons exports. This proposal was ditched because it has the greatest potential to be politically destabilising in an environment where the Kan administration has to do Diet deals with opposition parties, including the Social Democratic Party, in order to pass legislation.

Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor of Politics at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy.

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