Beijing’s frustration with developments at the time derived more from Washington’s willingness to bend international non-proliferation norms and reinstate India as a country in good standing in the international nuclear regime, Gupta suggests. That the US-India civil nuclear agreement materialised barely a couple of weeks after Premier Wen’s departure from New Delhi in 2005 added to the feeling that China had been caught diplomatically flat-footed as well as betrayed by India’s transactional approach to US ties. Beijing chose to respond, significantly, by putting pressure on questions over territory to signal its disaffection. In a pattern, Gupta notes, that has seen China calibrate its stance on outstanding territorial issues to the tenor of its overall bilateral relationship and perceptions of friendliness or hostility — it was swift to pursue its claims inflexibly on the ground and at the negotiating table.
The next few years saw retreat from the Quad idea. Abe lost power in Japan. The new Hatoyama government in Japan sought a different course with China. The Obama administration in Washington and the Rudd government in Australia were inclined to a more nuanced approach to how India might counter-balance the growing power of China and its particular characteristics. But underneath the surface, the Quad idea was not dead — in hibernation perhaps, but not dead. In pol-mil circles, it offered the promise of continuity for the established order of regional power, a comfortable reassuring retreat to an augmented familiar security framework. It also offered, however thinly, the moral fig leaf that rationalised a strategy of Chinese containment, whatever that might mean. Come the troubles with China of 2010, mutations of Quad-type thinking came out of the closet once more, not in public diplomacy but privately, pushing the idea at the margins of circles of influence in India and in the putative Quad constituency. It remains, active, purposeful, but below the radar. But India, and China, not unexpectedly, have moved on.
To those in Washington, Tokyo or Canberra, who incline to the Quad strategy, not as a contingency but as some kind of in-your-face alternative to Chinese engagement, politically and militarily, as well as economically, it is well to reflect upon the independent evolution and challenges of India’s relationship with China. These are two powers, with common borders, each their own vulnerabilities, inexorably growing economic complementary, shared interests and objectives in global governance and the need to deal with each other’s growing power in its own Asian space. Engaging with China bilaterally is an imperative for India, not an option. The challenge for New Delhi is – and it has always been – to factor calculation of national self-interest (and security) into dealings with China without foreclosing the potential of a resurgent Asia with China and India at its core. Third-country strategic partners are a useful adjunct in this process … but an adjunct at best, and relegated in most part to narrow aspects of the security realm. India’s self-image as an aspiring great power and a peer of China demand that the burden (and instruments) for managing and engaging China will rest primarily on its own capabilities. And it will have to discharge this self-imposed obligation in its own time frame, not at the whim of others.
Gupta’s careful analysis of China-India affairs reminds us once again, should we need reminding, that as India and China face these realities, whatever the baggage in the history of their relationship, India can afford to be nobody’s pawn in dealing with China or rely on the dream of appeal to distant American power to solve its problems with its neighbour. And China will have every reason to treat India with increasing care and appropriate respect.
I disagree with this analysis.
History teaches us that two continental powers with a common border will generally only live in peace where one is subservient to the other. Otherwise they will inevitably be in some degree of conflict. Think of France-Germany, Russia-Poland, Russia-Finland, Germany-Poland, Austro-Hangary and Italy, etc.
The reasons for this are many and varied, but revolve around the porosity of land borders, and the basis of “otherness” at the core of national identity.
In the case of India and China, their economies may be somewhat complementary, but they are more naturally in competition. They have similar needs for resources, are trying to exploit similar markets. On the political and social front, however, they are fundamentally different, and this makes ot harder to find common ground.
China and India will be rivals in the future and not allies. Even the conclusion of this article tacitly acknowledges the underlying and characteristic tension in the relationship.
I have seen more than a few India-China round tables, and walked away with the overwhelming feeling the government officials were struggling desperately to find something to say to dress up a relationship that had little substance. More importantly, I have seen little come from them in real terms.
William O’Chee asserts future conflict between continental powers India and China is inevitable because of European historical logic so dictates. This is no certainty.
The Himalayan mountain ranges serve as a barrier preventing conflict by physically redirecting their respective trade and sphere of influences into separate regions.
Historically, China has been intent to preserve its interpretation of territorial integrity.
The Tibetan uprising, Indian Forward Policy, the McMahon Line and the Eastern Line of Control as well as encirclement by Russian allies precipitated the Sino – Indian border war of 1960.
I suggest the 1960 border war is unusual because it represented a “Territorial border adjustment” post eclipse of the British Raj.
The Himalayan mountain range remains as a physical barrier for direct land war.
Both India and China will compete for resources worldwide, markets in the ASEAN region as well as the buffer states Bangladesh, Burma and Nepal.
The modern land trade routes consisting of railways, roads and pipelines will encourage collaboration because major conflict is simply too expensive.
It seems the era of sea power based empires has passed because China, India, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Eurasian oils states as well as European nation states Germany and France live on the same land mass. Furthermore, the Middle East oil states lie close by as well.
China and India will possess strong navies to protect their supply lines.
In summary, direct conflict between China and India is not pre-ordained.
William O’Chee’s assertion that war between India and China is more likely should an apocalyptic climate change cause cataclysmic water shortages in China becomes an existential threat.
Such a threat may cause China to divert water from the Yalong Tsangpo River in southwestern Tibet for irrigation within Chinese territory at the expense of India.
The Yalong Tsangpo is the head waters for India’s Brahmaputra which is the lifeline for millions on the sub continent.
Such an apocalyptic scenario is unlikely and China is a rational state.
It is difficult to see, Bill, exactly what it is with which you disagree. Nobody suggests that there there are not profound bases of rivalry between China and India.But the question posed here is whether either India or China can expect to, or will want to, manage these rivalries, across the range of relevant issues and consistently with their broad national economic and political ambitions, other than significantly within a bilateral framework.