Since 2008, the Chinese Embassy in India began issuing a loose ‘staple’ visa, instead of a regular one, to Indians hailing from Indian-occupied Kashmir (IoK) and Arunachal Pradesh (to demonstrate that they belong to disputed areas), and in August 2010 refused a visa to a military general then stationed in the IoK. These measures annoyed India, which termed them a new twist in China’s Kashmir policy that challenged India’s sovereignty over those territories. India, in protest, cancelled imminent military talks with China. China’s continued ‘special’ relations with Pakistani and Chinese companies involved in projects in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) added to India’s concerns.

An important complication to Sino-Indian relations from the Indian side was India’s toughened stance on the border issue. Contributing to the row are Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s early-2008 visit to Arunachal Pradesh (territory which China too lays claim), the increased activities of Tibetans in India, and provocative statements by some Indian officials. On top of all this was India’s deepening engagement with the US at a strategic level, with the visit of President Obama in November 2010. These developments prompted Premier Wen to fix a date for a visit at a very short notice.

While in India, Wen adopted a ‘charm offensive’ to assuage some of India’s concerns. He kept smiling, recited Indian poetry and language, showered praise on Mahatma Gandhi, and reassured India that the world was big enough for both India and China to grow. Wen brought with him a delegation of 400 people, one of the largest ever sent to any country. The two countries signed 48 commercial contracts worth US$16 billion. They established a hotline between the two Prime Ministers and committed to increasing their trade to US$100 billion by 2015. Analysts even believe that this  target could be achieved at an earlier date.

The downside of India’s visit was that not only did some of the old issues remain unaddressed but a few new issues emerged. India was unhappy at China’s refusal to discuss terrorism which India considered emanated from Pakistan — wishing to put pressure on Islamabad — and Beijing’s refraining from condemning the 11/26 or the Mumbai attacks. Although India received China’s reassurance on issues regarding the ‘staple’ visa, the border dispute, and India’s ambitious quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, these issues remained unresolved during the visit.

There was also a new development with potential to affect their relations. Apparently in a tit-for-tat response over other issues, India refused to include, in the joint statement, standard support for the One China policy and Tibet. It was the first time since the 1990s that India took this stance. Although it did not signal a policy shift, India linked its sensitivities (IoK and Arunachal Pradesh) with China’s sensitivities (One China policy and Tibet) through this move.

India’s growing clout, world recognition and burgeoning ties with the West (with whom it shares a goal of pegging China back) have led it to become more assertive toward China. Earlier, New Delhi showed this determination by defying Beijing’s protest and participating in the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo where Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was granted the award in absentia.

From India, Wen flew directly to Pakistan where he received an exceptionally warm welcome. The two countries signed dozens of agreements and MoUs (memorandum of understanding) worth US$35 billion — the largest deal that Pakistan has ever signed with another country. Interestingly, there were no defence deals — regarded as the bedrock of Sino-Pakistan relations.

What attracted the notice of Pakistani legislators and the public was Wen’s address to the Pakistani Parliament. He declared that terrorism should not be linked with a specific country or religion and that the world must recognise Pakistan’s sacrifices. In the context of Obama’s visit to India (bypassing Pakistan, Washington’s frontline ally in the War on Terror) and an increasing pressure to ‘do more’, many quarters in Pakistan are becoming cynical about the alliance with the US. Wen’s remarks, therefore, received wide applause.

Another notable development was that during his three day stay in Pakistan Wen did not mention once the Kashmir dispute which continues to be the pillar of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Whether it was due to a tacit agreement, or because Islamabad had recognised China’s neutrality on this issue was fait accompli, Pakistan remained silent, and analysts are in disagreement over whether or not Wen’s refusal to talk about the Kashmir dispute was contrary to Pakistan’s wishes. Furthermore, Wen’s address on terrorism, against India’s wishes, clearly conveyed to India and Pakistan China’s disassociation from their bilateral disputes — a policy which China has been pursuing since the 1990s.

In sum, the joint statements in both countries showed the consensuses that China has achieved with India and Pakistan on major issues. Thus, by balancing the impact of Obama’s visit to India and assuaging some of India’s more immediate concerns, China’s visit to India has halted, for the time being, the deteriorating trend in Sino-Indian relations; although a complete normalisation of relations is far from the horizon. At the same time, the tour further consolidated the China-Pakistan entente shifting its focus to elevating economic cooperation.

Ghulam Ali is a PhD candidate at Monash University, Australia.