Secondly, it will aim to continue development of its nuclear weapons and missiles. Thirdly, the North Korean government has advocated rehabilitating the economy and improving people’s livelihoods. But here it is in fact running after two hares: the military and the civilian population. Finally, North Korea’s utmost foreign policy objective is to establish better relations with the US, particularly via the conclusion of a peace agreement. But for the moment, North Korea is seeking to strengthen relations with China.

These strategic objectives are geared toward North Korea joining the ranks of powerful nations in 2012, to commemorate the centenary of the birth of eternal president Kim Il-sung. This requires extracting economic assistance from the outside world. There are three main tactical means that North Korea is likely to use for this.

The first tactical objective is to draw the US into dialogue, primarily through a combination of hard-line stances and soft postures. This is a form of brinksmanship policy. Secondly, North Korea is seeking to undermine solidarity among Japan, the US and South Korea while leaning towards China in the hope of receiving diplomatic and economic assistance. Thirdly, by continuing to appeal to latent ethnic Korean sentiments, North Korea will attempt to elicit economic assistance from South Korea.

Given these strategic and tactical objectives, how should the international community deal with North Korea?

North Korea’s recent behaviour is a repeat of its conventional pattern of combining hard-line stances (military provocations) with a willingness to engage in dialogue. The former are exemplified by nuclear weapons and missile testing, exchanges of fire in the Yellow Sea, the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist at Kumgangsan, the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan, the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island and other such incidents. On the other hand, North Korea has shown a greater willingness to engage in dialogue with South Korea, in particular since the start of the new year, suggesting renewed North-South Red Cross talks, discussions on making Kumgangsan available for tourism once more, and talks between North and South Korean authorities. North Korea has also sought out rapprochement with the US, inviting visits by experts on Korean issues and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, who has close ties with North Korea.

North Korea appears to believe that the successes it has achieved so far stem from a mixture of hard and soft postures. North Korean actions accord with its strategic and tactical objectives, and its apparent willingness to engage in dialogue cannot be taken at face value.

North Korea’s apparent willingness to engage in dialogue must go beyond talk and be accompanied by concrete actions; and its future behaviour bears close watching.

Steps that might be taken in this regard are 1) solidifying unity among Japan, the US and South Korea, endeavoring to coordinate policies and actions 2) bilaterally or multilaterally urging China more strongly to exercise its influence with North Korea, and 3) having North Korea plainly demonstrate its willingness by, at the very least, suspending uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction (reprocessing), allowing verification of these activities by the IAEA, suspending nuclear testing, freezing ballistic missile launches, and reopening investigations into the kidnapping of Japanese citizens.

In democratic countries, unlike in dictatorships, policies are often influenced by public opinion and public sentiment, but a persistent and consistent approach to North Korea is essential.

Ambassador Tetsuya Endo is currently Senior Adjunct Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and was formerly Vice Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.