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The tragedy of US-China high politics

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In Brief

Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States went relatively smoothly and was touted by both sides as a success, despite yielding no breakthroughs.

The relations between the two powers, often billed as ‘the most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century’, remain quite difficult, even precarious.

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US-China disagreements are, of course, many and diverse. That said, one can argue that not all of them are of equal importance. Distinction between low politics and high politics is still very much relevant in this case. Many of the current, and most visible, differences between Washington and Beijing belong to the low politics dimension, involving trade/currency disputes, as well as human rights issues. However high-profile and contentious they might appear, those bilateral problems are not insurmountable. The US used to have serious economic quarrels with Western Europe and especially Japan, but eventually those disagreements were successfully worked out.

Human rights and a lack of democracy in China are actually not major problems, either. For all its democracy-promotion rhetoric, the US counts among its friends some thoroughly undemocratic regimes, such as ones in the Middle East. Neither does China view its human rights reputation as a crucial area that should be defended at any cost. Top Chinese leaders themselves occasionally admit that they have to improve their human rights performance, as Mr Hu did during his recent US trip.

The essence of low politics is mostly money that, after some haggling, can be relatively easily distributed and shared among the interested parties. High politics is basically about the distribution of power, and sharing political power is much more difficult than sharing economic assets. It is the realm of high politics that really matters between the US and China. Specifically, it means that Beijing seeks some sort of pre-eminence in East Asia, while the US is bent on denying China the opportunity to carve out a sphere of influence in the region.

In order to buy China off, the US is even willing to go as far as offering Beijing an equal standing in the proposed G2 global governance condominium. Yet China, for all its status sensitivity, is not buying into the proposal. Beijing knows that, regardless of Washington’s investiture, it is on course for getting a superpower rank anyway. Instead, China wants concrete geopolitical concessions from Washington. First and foremost, it wants America to remove its de facto extended deterrence shield that is currently protecting Taiwan. Second, it seeks recognition of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea as areas of China’s special security interests. In other words, Beijing does not want to see US aircraft carriers plowing its coastal waters. Third, it pursues an end to what the Chinese refer to as the ‘strategic encirclement’ of China (by American assets), a policy the Americans themselves refer to as ‘hedging’.

In fact, China’s demands are not unreasonable. After all, Taiwan is internationally recognised as an inalienable part of the PRC, and China has legitimate grounds to worry about strategic security in its own neighbourhood. America is unlikely to make those concessions. The most prevalent geopolitical thinking in the US still holds that the possibility of any single power dominating Asia is unacceptable. It is assumed that any regional hegemony in Asia will pose a direct threat to the US. Then there is the Munich analogy deeply ingrained in the Western political mentality. It implies that any substantial concessions to a powerful challenger would only make the situation worse. Just like British and French leaders’ giving in to Hitler’s claims to Sudetenland eventually led to war, the argument goes, Beijing would be encouraged down the path of expansionism if it is allowed to retake Taiwan.

In all probability, such a line of thinking is misguided. China held suzerainty over much of East Asia in the past, but it never attempted to conquer other parts of the world. And it is hard to believe that Beijing would try to do so even if it reunifies with Taiwan and achieves primacy in the Western Pacific. Indeed, it might well be that the West projects onto China its own mentality of pursuing absolute power and dominance.

This means that America faces a fundamental dilemma regarding China. It basically has two options. The first is to make a grand bargain with Beijing, recognising Chinese claims over Taiwan and the Western Pacific in the hope that China would behave as a responsible regional hegemon. This move is very likely to remove the main issues of contention between the two great powers and pave the way for their true partnership in global affairs. We can only speak in terms of likelihood. There is no 100 per cent guarantee that such a bargain would actually ensure peace and stability. Besides, as noted earlier, American policymakers would have to profoundly change their geopolitical mindset to embrace that approach.

And that is why the other option looks more likely and, indeed, is being vigorously exercised by America. It aims at preventing China’s rise as a dominant East Asian power and may lead to a head-on, and very dangerous, confrontation. In fact, a US-China standoff would be even more perilous than that between the US and the Soviet Union. The USSR, particularly in its latter days, was essentially a status quo power, whereas China is clearly not satisfied with the present geopolitical realities.

So long as this logic of China containment is in operation, no summits, however pompous, will produce breakthroughs in US-China relations. To paraphrase the famous words of John Mearsheimer, in this apparently insoluble dilemma between the two strategic options lies the real tragedy of US-China politics.

Artyom Lukin is an Associate Professor at the Vladivostok Institute of International Relations, Far Eastern National University, Russia.

6 responses to “The tragedy of US-China high politics”

  1. I don’t think a confrontation with China would be “very dangerous” at all. They have no second strike capabilities. They are still dependent on the GPS navigation system and in the event of serious military conflict we would shut them out of it leaving them largely blind. Under NATO an attack on one member is an attack on all. The combined nucleur capabilties of France, Great Briton, and the United States would utterly destroy China. Not to mention the proven effectiveness of our AEGIS missile defense systems would render their 30-odd nucleur missiles useless. The only advantage China has in terms of miltary is manpower and in the attempt to neutralize their nucleur capabilities a ground invasion would be pointless. There would be no self-restraint in a war with a nucleur power. The United States would definitely throw everything they had at China.

  2. I also disagree with the notion that the US should stop protecting Taiwan. The author seems to assume the PRC should simply be allowed to march in and take over Taiwan–which is what they would certainly attempt if the US were to stop protecting that island. Has the author thought that scenario through? There would be a war. It is so strange that people who study the topic do not clearly see that the CCP is an aggressor who does not mean well for anyone or anything except its own power. That said, the US does not exactly seem to wish to ‘contain’ the PRC, but simply make sure their aggression doesn’t get out of hand.

  3. The statement about the West projecting certain mentalities onto China is very true. Post-Mao, China cared very little for Africa other than as a source of mineral wealth. It conducted the same resources-for-infrastructure deals that it had with Japan and the USSR, and thought not much of it. Bring in Western media reports on China industrialising Africa, and you now have a China that’s very much willing to sponsor African development.

  4. I think the statement that China held suzerainty over much of East Asia in the past, but it never attempted to conquer other parts of the world is a little odd and is part of a narrative that one hears: that the Chinese Empire was never expansive. This narrative is simply incorrect. All Empires expand as a consequence of security concerns on their periphery. One only has to look at Chinese Imperial adventures in Mongolia, Tibet, Vietnam to see this is untrue. The Great Wall of China is, after all, deep inside Chinese territory…

  5. Maybe it can’t help to exclude the role of Taiwan from this sort of high politics argument between two great powers. But Taiwanese themselves think they are Taiwanese not Chinese. Besides, Taiwan is already de facto an independent country. They have their own national flag, government, and military; they even they use slightly different characters and language. The U.S. should help to protect Taiwan.
    I agree with John. China did not expand toward east and south because it was simply not profitable for them. Now, the time is different. China seeks maritime expansion to pursue resources and hegemonic status. If China wants to continue economic growth, It will spread sphere of influence over the East Asian region.

  6. Well Damon, ‘nucleur’ warheads are one thing, but if China knew what it was doing it’d simply lob tens of thousands of missiles at the US and let you play the game of which one carries a nuclear load. China has the technology and more than enough manpower to mass-manufacture ‘nucleur’ weapons.

    Focus on graduating from the 7th grade and leave your opinions at the door.

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