The Mongolian parliament is currently debating an updated foreign policy vision, so this particular point may well shift significantly in the coming weeks/months. Up until now the dominant stated theme of Mongolian foreign policy has been the so-called ‘third neighbour’ policy; that is, attempts by successive Mongolian administrations to build closer ties with partners other than Russia and China, its dominant neighbours.
The most prominent third neighbours have been Canada, the EU (as a whole or individual countries, especially Germany and the UK, though they are both currently involved in an extradition case involving Mongolia’s spy chief, Khurts), Japan, South Korea and the US (built to some extent on the Bush administration’s gratitude for the deployment of Mongolian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan). Mongolia has also pursued strong relations with India, Kazakhstan and Turkey.
This third neighbour policy has met with some success, far from the ‘geopolitical nightmare for its leaders’ that Li describes. Japan and Korea are clearly very engaged in Mongolia (beyond the Mongolian invasion of sumo ranks, and the large number of Mongolians working in industrial jobs in Korea). Canada’s first resident ambassador, Anna Biolik, took up her post in 2008 and has since been succeeded by Greg Goldhawk. The US-Mongolia relationship seems to have weathered the transition to the Obama administration.
Much of what Li describes in his essay could be interpreted as an investment policy based on this third neighbour precept. It is thus quite rational as long as one accepts the aims of the third neighbour policy.
Given that Li’s post focuses on the Oyu Tolgoi project in particular, it may not be surprising, given parliament’s involvement in that decision, that the eventual investment agreement for that project involves third neighbours Australia, Canada and the UK.
Sticking with a focus on economics, as Li mentions, China has been the largest investor in Mongolia for over ten years casting doubt on his assertion of irrational and imprudent resentment against Chinese investment in Mongolia.
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia has indeed been stirred up by populist politicians in this period, but it is not clear that it is on the rise, rather than representing an on-going undercurrent. Li implies an upsurge of anti-Chinese sentiment with terms such as ‘rapidly capturing’ or ‘increased fear a hundred-fold,’ yet there is scant evidence that this is really a sudden increase in hostility.
The fact that Chinese corporations will quite naturally be the biggest customers of any natural resource projects that are developed in Mongolia does not imply that there are incentives for the Mongolian government that these projects should also be Chinese-owned. The government has no obvious interest in creating integrated supply chains for Chinese corporations. In representing the interests of the Mongolian people, the government may be much better off in keeping initial production of raw materials separate from their sales in order to create opportunities to levy taxes and enforce environmental regulation.
As to Mongolian decisions regarding railroad construction, Li might enjoy reading Asia Pacific Memo #11 on ‘Broad Gauge versus Narrow Gauge: The Politics of Dimension in Mongolia’s Railroad System’ by Jargalsaikhan Mendee or my own discussion of shifts in the political landscape in Mongolia just this month.
I would, finally, take issue with Li’s use of the term ‘racism.’ Without getting into a fruitless discussion of the racial origins or make-up of different populations, it would seem more appropriate for the anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia to be referred to as just that, ‘anti-Chinese sentiment,’ or perhaps xenophobia, rather than ‘racism,’ as Li implies.
Julian Dierkes holds the Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia where he also coordinates the Program on Inner Asia.
The difficulty with “anti-Chinese sentiment” as a term is in the ambiguity of the word “Chinese” in English. In English, the term might imply animosity towards Chinese ‘nationals,’ but let us ignore political correctness and admit that “anti-Chinese sentiment” in Mongolia, South Korea, and some other countries in the region, is largely targeted towards the Han people — within China or otherwise. And let us not pretend that only majority populations are able to discriminate, either.
On the other hand, even in close proximity, anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan is directed very much against the PRC itself, and has seemingly very little to do with ethnicity.
Granted, the term ‘racism’ is awkward because the groups in question are all of the Asiatic “race.” And it fails as a blanket term on the account of Japan, India and others. But certainly, this “anti-Chinese sentiment” should not be used as a euphemism for what really is antagonising a group of people based on their ethnic background.
And let’s face it. If these attitudes were held by a Caucasian population against an African population, we would not be denouncing it simply as “xenophobia.”
Jess’s response is too simplistic to capture the nuances of the situation. In Mongolia, at least, hostility is not only directed at Han Chinese, it is also directed at the Manchus (who the Mongolians see as responsible for depriving their country of its independence — indeed, Mongolians are not necessarily aware that the Manchus hardly exist as a meaningful ethnic group any more!) and, in a much more contradictory way, towards the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia are seen as neither fish nor fowl — neither true Mongols, nor true Chinese. Feelings of ethnic solidarity dispose Mongolians to look kindly on them as ‘co-ethnics’. The realisation that these co-ethnics identify themselves as ‘Chinese’ can lead to the opposite reaction, that of violent rejection. Many Mongolians will tell you the Inner Mongolians are not Mongols at all.
Behind this is the historical situation that China occupies and its aggressive assimilation of the territory of quite distinct ethnic groups (Tibetans, Mongols, Turkic peoples in Xinjiang). Given that it is this situation that the ethnic groups of these areas are reacting against, it is not really appropriate to accuse surrounding countries of discrimination against Han Chinese. It is the occupation of these vast territories by China that is at the root of the problem.
No doubt this perception will be rejected by Chinese (Han or otherwise) who insist on the territorial integrity of China and China’s inalienable right to occupy these territories, but given anti-Chinese riots in Tibet and Xinjiang, and strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia, the inescapable conclusion is that China is meeting strong resistance in its efforts, not that people are unfairly discriminating against the Han Chinese.
Let me provide a completely different perspective on this:
Mongolian history and the third neighbour policy is not something new we created; it was a maneuver to avoid Mongolia from being singled out in the Central Asian Region. It can be described like the nuclear free zone – another initiative in geopolitics, but one which had weaker expression than the third neighbour policy. The third neighbour policy and its development was favoured by a few happy coincidences. When we started this policy and promoting it internationally, our neighbours were undergoing transitions in their economic and political policy and they were paying little attention Mongolia. This vacuum was filled by foreign aid organisations – christian churches and missionaries are one clear example – as well as mining and oil companies funded by frontier or angel investors, who were seeking to double or triple their fortune. The more funds that poured into Mongolia from third countries, the more positive were the sentiments raised within the community. A well-timed, excellent call on third neighbour policy created a favourable environment for Mongolia to choose its partners in building the economy, infrastructure and energy.
It’s accurate to say that in the period from the 1990s to 2005, Chinese investment was small and scattered across many fields, leeching the environment and the economy rather than creating good workplaces and economic progress. Since 2005, especially during the world recession in 2008, China’s emerging power, its successful overcoming the recession and extensive spending by the Chinese Government allowed its business community to spare funds for investment in mineral rich Mongolia – especially southern Gobi.
As for the racism, I don’t call it racism. The attitude of Mongolians toward China and Chinese goes back much before Jesus Christ, and the Roman Empire and results naturally from two different spirits or philosophies of living, surviving and and creating communities each of which have served Mongolia and China well but differently. Therefore, it has longer roots than explained here. I think it does not necessarily involve antagonistic feelings – it is just a difference in ways of thinking/spirit.
But as much as Mongolians get accustomed into the urban life and its comforts, to that extent these differences are loosing their meaning also.
I would like to add another perspective to this article. Julian Dierkes identifies anti-Chinese sentiment as an undercurrent. It’s only recent articles on the Internet dealing with Nazi-style groups that have drawn attention to anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia, as though it were something new. In fact, it has been there all along, fostered by the Russians and populist politicians, among others.
More importantly, outside commentators have missed the huge surge in young Mongolians studying Chinese in the past year or two. This will not necessarily lead to a love affair with China, but it will help increase Mongolians’ familiarity with the culture of their southern neighbour and contribute in the long-term to greater understanding and, it is hoped, better attitudes to China. Given that the leader of one of the Nazi-style groups murdered his daughter’s boyfriend because he had studied in China, the upsurge in people studying Chinese is an encouraging trend. It contradicts the superficial impression of Nazi-style groups as the dominant trend in Mongolia.