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Calls for a Sino-Mongolia strategic partnership

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In Brief

The Chinese Foreign Minister’s brief visit to Mongolia on 24 February, like the Chinese Premier’s visit last June, did not trigger any negative public debate or protests in the streets of Ulaanbaatar.

Rather, an op-ed by well-known columnist Baabar on the repression and marginalization of Chinese ethnic minorities during the communist era received wide attention.

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During this visit, Mongolian leaders called for a Sino-Mongolian Strategic Partnership — an unthinkable prospect a decade ago.

Mongolia’s political leaders and people are changing their attitudes toward the Chinese. And although they make for great headlines abroad, sporadic incidents of xenophobia and racism against Chinese are not indicative of the wider public sentiment.

Even after centuries of distrust, China was a normal neighbour of Mongolia in the 1950s; bilateral trade and all types of exchanges flourished, characterized by a process of learning. This learning came to a 30-year standstill when China became a ‘declared enemy’ of Mongolia.

Another phase of cooperation and learning started in 1989, when Mongolia–China relations were normalized. At this time, Mongolians became increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure and the Chinese market.

While Russia imposed visa requirements on Mongolians, and the safety of passengers and goods going through Russia was problematic, China granted visa waivers for Mongolian travellers and made its air, rail and sea ports accessible. Some might argue that this was Chinese soft power in play, but, above all else, these policies were based on economic practicality.

By the Mongolian Embassy’s account, 350,000–370,000 Mongolians travel to China annually. This includes travel to Inner Mongolia or Beijing for medical diagnosis and treatment, as Seoul and Tokyo are costly. The number of Mongolian students in China is also on the rise, and Chinese language schools and training programs are abundant back home. And while China desires to increase its border trading posts with Mongolia, Moscow wants to close its posts. All these factors contribute to the learning between Mongolia and China, and a growth in bilateral trade and Chinese investment.

This learning process for Mongolians has two palpable implications.

It impels Mongolian political leaders to realize the ‘China factor’ in developing its economy and integrating with East Asia — thus calls for a strategic partnership.

It assuages Mongolian misperceptions of China as a threat, something constructed by the Soviets in the 1960s.

How much are the Chinese learning about Mongolia, one might ask? Is the Chinese government simply trying to make Mongolia a showcase of China’s benevolence and respect for the sovereignty of its smaller neighbours? This was highlighted when China concluded a border treaty with Mongolia while fighting against India in 1964. It was reiterated by Hu Jintao at the beginning of his first foreign visit to Ulaanbaatar. Whichever way, there is a change in the quality of Mongolia’s relations with China.

Mendee Jargalsaikhan is a graduate student at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.

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