The most urgent issue has been the deepening nuclear emergency unfolding at the 40-year-old Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex, 240 kilometres northeast of Tokyo. The earthquake knocked out the primary and backup power generators to the complex’s cooling system, and the fuel rods in the four plants have overheated resulting in several explosions and fires. A 20-kilometre exclusion zone has been ordered and those located within 30 kilometres have been ordered to remain indoors. While authorities have stressed that the radiation emissions pose no serious public hazard, the uncontrolled release of radiation is ominous and causing anxiety among the public. Radiation has already contaminated food and water near the plant. Officials in Tokyo have also issued notice that water from taps in Tokyo should not be given to infants due to the radioactivity detected in Tokyo water plants.

This has triggered international alarm, not only toward the Fukushima nuclear complex but toward nuclear power in general. It is still uncertain how the fast-moving nuclear crisis will be resolved, but the negative public opinion toward nuclear energy will be hard to erase. The plant may be 40 years old and nuclear power technology may have become safer since the days of Chernobyl, but from the perception of those following the news on this disaster, it is clearly not safe enough.

Nuclear energy proponents have argued that had the backup power generators been situated elsewhere, and therefore not damaged by the tsunami, none of this would be happening. It is true: infrastructure resilience and adequate redundant safety systems are important requisites for nuclear safety. But the problem with this argument is that it fails to address concerns about the severity and irreversibility of the consequences of a nuclear disaster when one does occur.

In July 2006, the main power supply to the Forsmark-1 reactor in Sweden was interrupted. Two of the four backup generators failed to start but fortunately, two were sufficient to ensure that the cooling system continued to function. The Fukushima complex was not so fortunate. A simple problem of power failure triggered this chain of events. While less catastrophic than Chernobyl, one still cannot deny the seriousness of this current nuclear crisis. On the International Nuclear and Radiological “Event” Scale of 1 to 7 whereby 7 is considered a Major Accident (such as Chernobyl), Japan’s nuclear safety agency initially rated the disaster as Level 4 (Accident with Local Consequences) but has since raised it to Level 5 (Accident with Wider Consequences).

This emergency has revealed the hidden costs associated with nuclear energy. It does not appear to be as cheap or as clean as one would think if we factor in the associated costs of food safety and investment flight, as well as the clean up and social costs to be assumed by the public in the event of an accident.

Costs aside, safety issues remain the primary concern. Generally, the public does not fully understand the technicalities associated with nuclear power issues, such as the measurement of microsievert of radiation per hour, becquerels per kilogram, peak ground acceleration in anti-earthquake design, and the difference between a ‘boiling water reactor’ like that in the Fukushima nuclear plant compared to the more modern ‘pressurised water reactor’ with its separate cooling systems used in South Korea.

At the end of the day, the public relies on the government and nuclear safety experts to ensure that nuclear power operating near their community is safe and that contingency plans are in place in case of an accident. Following this emergency, it will be more difficult for governments and the nuclear industry to convince the public of the benefits and safety of nuclear power, or that they can be sufficiently prepared for the unexpected.

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster occurred in the distant past in a remote place. In contrast, the unfolding Fukushima emergency occurred in one of the world’s most advanced countries with regards to technology, infrastructure and expertise. This is a reminder that no country or system can be completely immune to mishaps. In Asia, where a number of nuclear reactors are under construction, or in the planning or proposal stages, there is a burgeoning sentiment for the need to re-evaluate the benefits, risks and safety of nuclear power in this region. As this incident has shown, one failure can lead to catastrophe and many are wondering if it is more trouble than it is worth.

Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore have expressed interest in nuclear energy as part of their energy diversification strategy. But the current situation in Japan has forced a rethink on the viability of nuclear power as part of their energy mix. Indeed, the president of the Philippines has already rejected the use of nuclear power due to safety concerns. China, India and South Korea are, on the other hand, likely to continue with their plans to expand nuclear power plants, as they seek to cut carbon emissions and reduce their dependence on oil and gas imports. Japan itself is also unlikely to abandon nuclear power for the same reason and because it is dependent on nuclear power for 30 per cent of its electricity generation. The building of new plants will take place at a slower pace and with modifications based on lessons from this disaster. Beijing has already halted approvals of new nuclear power plants pending changes to safety standards.

As a result, the costs associated with the construction, operation and contingency planning for nuclear plants are likely to go up in Asia. Greater grassroots resistance toward the construction of nuclear plants in local communities can also be anticipated. But a positive consequence might be the spurring of investments in other forms of alternative energies, such as wind, solar and tidal, which are regarded as safer than nuclear.

For the Asian countries that remain keen on building nuclear power plants, there is now even greater impetus to institutionalise regional cooperation for the management of nuclear power, and to integrate multilateral disaster prevention and management mechanisms as part of contingency plans. In today’s world, such contingency planning should apply not only to preparing for natural disasters but security breaches as well — something which again provides further reason to pause for thought.

Christopher Len is currently a Visiting Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore doing research on energy issues in Asia. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden, and is finishing his doctoral thesis at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP), University of Dundee, Scotland.