Still, no common consensus exists over how to identify and prioritise the array of NTS threats facing states in the 21st century; institutions for responding to an expanding security agenda are lacking; and the interdependencies between the traditional and non-traditional realms remain obscure. What is clear is that the shift away from a purely geo-political interpretation of security unites states more than it divides them. China is no exception.
The adoption of China’s new security concept in 1996 acted as a political catalyst for domestic debate on NTS and its relevance to China’s future modernisation and international relations. It is now a common theme in Chinese foreign policy, especially at the regional level. This is an important dimension of China’s rising power and influence in the world that should not be overlooked.
Motivations behind the shift toward NTS are difficult to disentangle, but three particular trends seem apparent. First, by countering the China threat thesis, NTS plays a useful function in legitimising China’s growing power and influence in the world. Second, taking a more functionalist approach toward security allows the Chinese government to develop a region-wide policy of reassurance, manifest in the recent approach toward engaging its neighbouring states in ASEAN. Third, NTS primarily serves China’s development and internal security agenda. Major priorities tend to coalesce around water, food, and energy security with attention also given to the so-called three evil forces on China’s Western frontier — terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.
Climate change is the one global concern that has yet to be securitised in the official Chinese discourse. Contrary to the logic of interdependency, while water, food, energy, and natural disasters are all perceived as security issues, climate change is classified solely as a development issue. This is largely a result of the Chinese concern over maintaining leverage in global climate change negotiations. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility relies upon China’s claim to developing country status rather than responsible stakeholder status.
More broadly, the internally-driven security perspective leads to incompatibilities with the transnational NTS framework on two accounts. First, fear of dissent from within constrains the potential to shift toward greater pluralisation and cooperation with non-state actors. China promotes a state-centric vision in both defining and acting upon NTS priorities. Second, border security underpinned by principles of territorial integrity and national unity severely limits China’s active participation in resolving trans-boundary security problems.
Given these constraints, the question is whether the shift away from a purely militarised understanding of security means that China is likely to play a more active role in international cooperation. Indeed, it may well be the case that China’s role in shaping international norms and rules will become most visible in relation to the NTS realm. A common assumption is that the pursuit of an NTS agenda is more likely to lead to greater cooperation among states by focusing attention upon functional forms of engagement that help to build confidence and trust with positive spill-over effects into the traditional security realm.
However, a positive correlation between non-traditional security and regional cooperation is not guaranteed. The evolving climate change crisis on the Tibetan Plateau provides an important test case. Higher temperatures in this region are leading to the melting of the glaciers that comprise the largest freshwater reserve outside the polar ice caps. Notwithstanding the exaggerated claims exposed in the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report, scientific investigations still confirm an overall trend of glacial retreat (ranging from between 10 to 60 metres per year). Collectively, Asia’s glacier-fed rivers, all flowing from Chinese territory, provide water for up to one quarter of the word’s population. Hundreds of millions of people depend upon the natural storage facilities of the glaciers for drinking water, power generation, and agriculture. In this part of the world, climate security is largely synonymous with water security.
The problem is that regional institutions for dealing with the impacts of climate change do not exist. If this emerging trans-boundary crisis that affects twelve countries in South and East Asia is not addressed, it has the potential to aggravate territorial disputes and elevate the competition for hydropower to dangerous levels. Currently, information sharing between China and India remains limited to the provision of hydrological data on the Brahmaputra during the flood season; delays in issuing flood warnings across borders are common; and the impacts of climate change are still a matter of dispute. Even scientific research is constrained on account of national security concerns. Above all, adherence to the sovereign right to development trumps emerging global norms relating to the equitable sharing of water resources among riparian states.
What we are witnessing in this part of the world is an NTS paradox: climate and water security challenges have the potential to act as a catalyst for new forms of regional cooperation, yet, in reality, the complex and highly politicised nature of these challenges are likely to amplify pre-existing tensions, and ultimately exacerbate rather than alleviate instability. On balance, it would seem that NTS is currently more of a force multiplier, than a force for positive security.
Reversing this dynamic will require far more than joint declarations of intent and ad hoc coalitions; it will require a fundamental shift toward building collective institutions for taking preventative action, mediating conflicts, and managing risks and uncertainties. The most plausible way forward for addressing the security crisis in the Himalayas would be to extend regional cooperation on the basis of a strategic climate partnership between China and India. Their futures as global powers are as much driven by the traditional paradigm of economic growth and military modernisation as by their respective capacities to deal with systemic water, food, and energy problems. For regional partners such as Australia, this is one area where engaging both China and India on a multilateral basis may help to shift security dynamics toward more positive cooperative outcomes.
Katherine Morton is Senior Fellow in the Department of International Relations in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the ANU. She provides a more detailed analysis here.
I find the following characterisation of China’s position on climate in the context of own development needs and responsible stakeholder interesting and amusing.
“Climate change is the one global concern that has yet to be securitised in the official Chinese discourse. Contrary to the logic of interdependency, while water, food, energy, and natural disasters are all perceived as security issues, climate change is classified solely as a development issue. This is largely a result of the Chinese concern over maintaining leverage in global climate change negotiations. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility relies upon China’s claim to developing country status rather than responsible stakeholder status.”
It appears to imply that China is not a responsible stakeholder on the climate change issue. If that is true, it is more likely than not to misrepresent China’s position, or has misinterpreted or misunderstood it.
I think China, by not asking or not strongly asking for equal per capita emission entitlement, indicates that it is a more responsible stakeholder than most if not all industrialised countries on climate change.
There has been an unmentioned underlying and distorted logic internationally on climate change and emissions mitigation, that is, the disregard of the equal rights of everyone irrespective their income living in both developed or developing countries to the atmosphere by high emission countries. Instead of paying appropriate and adequate compensations to citizens/residents in low emission countries for excessive emissions by high emission countries to cause damages to the former’s rights to the atmosphere and cause adverse climate changes, they have dressed up some inadequate and future money as assistance or aid.
Most economics textbook would contain principles on how to deal with negative environment externalities such as pollution. It should not be a too much stretch to one’s imagination to assume that most leaders and officials in industrialised countries have some knowledge of them.
They should have the courage to live up to their obligations to the human kind and to face their responsibilities in paying for the costs of above average per capita emissions which are currently unaccounted for, as if they make sacrifices. What a joke it is.
They should practise what they talk about universal human rights. Where have their attention been to everyone’s right to the atmosphere?
Well, when it comes to climate change topic, it seems it brings up people’s emotions of patriotism. When someone steals your car, you do not go and steal some else’s because yours was stolen. If the developed countries polluted the environment and now they are trying to say hey…look, we had better stop this otherwise the rest of the world is going to die, you can not say, well too bad if we all die because I also need to pollute first just like you did and then I can stop later. or you can not say, well pay me so that I don’t pollute. It should be individuals’ responsibility to know what is good for you and your future, you should not wait to be given some money in order to do the right thing. If that money comes, which I hope it does and will help but don’t preserve the environment for getting money but rather for its own sake and the future of the next generation.