The introductory assessment of the ‘security situation’ section notes that the ‘international balance of power is changing,’ that ‘international strategic competition centring on international order, comprehensive national strength and geopolitics has intensified,’ and that ‘international military competition remains fierce.’  Despite this sense of turbulence, and as was the case in 2008, the 2010 paper assesses that ‘the Asia Pacific security situation is generally stable.’ But the additional observation in the 2008 paper, namely, ‘that China’s security situation has improved steadily’ does not appear in 2010. One possible reason is that the 2010 paper reports that ‘suspicion about China, interference and countering moves against China from the outside are on the increase.’  The same sentiment in the 2008 paper was expressed more cryptically and, arguably, with less feeling as ‘China also faces strategic manoeuvres and containment from the outside.’

Some new language on Taiwan is of note. Both the 2008 and 2010 papers speak fairly positively about the state of cross-Strait relations, but the latter adds, with not a little rhetorical flourish, ‘The two sides of the Taiwan Straits are destined to ultimate reunification in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is the responsibility of the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits to work hand in hand to end the history of hostility, and to avoid repeating the history of armed conflict between fellow countrymen.’ This proposition is open to more than one interpretation, and that would not have been an accident.

The section on defence expenditure confirms the status quo in terms of transparency. The 2010 paper does not appear to break any new ground and continues to stress the modesty of China’s defence budget in terms of its share of GDP (around 1.4 per cent) and of central government expenditures (around 6.5 per cent). It notes that the growth of the defence budget in 2010 was restricted to 7.5 per cent to accommodate more urgent needs elsewhere, such as in agriculture, education and health. The drafters of the document have to strike a tricky balance between modesty on the expenditure front and the very positive account (which occupies the bulk the middle of the document) of what the various arms of the PLA have accomplished in terms of modernisation and capability enhancement. The apparent reality is that the PLA has enjoyed average annual real growth in its funding of some 10 per cent over the past 20 years. Owing to the spectacular growth of GDP, this is quite consistent with the military expenditure data that China chooses to focus on in these white papers. It is hard, however, to think of another example over the last century of a major power increasing its military outlays that fast for that long.

The 2010 Defence White Paper is a streamlined and more tightly drafted document but still a cautious, ambiguous statement that reveals little more than the ankles of the body it seeks to characterise. The impression conveyed, compared to the papers of 2008 and 2006, is that of a China somewhat more confident and assured about itself and its strategic circumstances.

Ron Huisken is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.