Vicious secret police monitor the citizenry, and the state can produce neither the quality nor quantity of goods necessary to satisfy their peoples’ welfare. Each is noticeably poorer than their westernised opposite, creating relentless pressure on the government for change. Disconsolate citizens would push out the regime if given the chance. Democratisation and liberalisation are blocked and borders are sealed off to prevent exodus.
In contrast, the westernised half of each nation was or is a wealthy, functioning democracy. Connected to international technologies, markets and institutions, they have pulled themselves into sustained economic growth.
Internationally, the Western allies support(ed) South Korea and West Germany. Both belong to the American, democratic alliance system and enjoy its widespread moral legitimacy. They sustain(ed) their own defence and outclass the communist half strategically and economically.
North Korea is and East Germany was a client state of communist behemoths. Finding them troublesome and expensive, their patrons regularly debate or debated cutting them loose. The neighbourhood has accommodated the division, as there is little impetus from local outsiders to end the split. Like the French and British on Germany, Japan and Russia are geopolitically unmoved by a mission for Korean unity.
Yet many differences distinguish these two communist states from each.
Once the ‘leading’ economic performer of the east bloc, East Germany was wealthier than North Korea is now, and was heavily subsidised by the USSR throughout most the Cold War period. Less important North Korea never received such big handouts. Its current GDP per capita today is at most US$1,700; East Germany in 1989 was $10,000 (non-adjusted figures).
Worse still, North Korea trails the old East Germany in almost every area: environmental management, infrastructure, labour productivity, health care, education, technology, and, given this substantial lag, the cost of Korean unification will be much higher than that which took place between East and West Germany with the collapse of the Soviet Union. While, over 20 years, West Germany transferred 1.2 trillion euros to the 16 million people of 1989’s East Germany, North Korea’s larger and poorer population of nearly 24.5 million would require much more support.
East Germany and the Soviets misled the world, claiming East Germany was modern and advanced, yet when West Germany finally pulled the lid off, almost everything turned out to be outmoded or unusable: a poor telecommunication system, wretched cars, labour ignorant of computers or basic office devices, World War II infrastructure still unrepaired. North Korea is probably worse.
Hence, South Korea is less capable than West Germany of effecting unification. Aside from the economic challenge, it has weaker political institutions, its mercurial parties change names quickly, and political unresponsiveness engenders a street-protest culture and brawling in the National Assembly. It lacks the state capacity West Germany had in 1989, and faces a greater communist-half burden. Overloading South Korea’s still maturing democracy may leave North Korea in a semi-annexed limbo like the West Bank.
The international situation today is also less conducive to unification. American power peaked in 1989 — the USSR was in decline and China was still far off. Today, a weakening US and a rising China make it harder for the US to support South Korea in any contest with China or North Korea over unification. South Korea will have to do most of the work on its own, allowing China to more easily dictate the terms of unification: such as no US forces north of the DMZ or even on the peninsula at all (the ‘finlandisation’ of Korea).
Back in 1989, East Germany’s patron, the collapsing USSR, could no longer afford the Cold War contest. The USSR sought to retrench geopolitically and restart its economy. Gorbachev abandoned the subsidisation of his eastern bloc albatross. China, however, is not overextended — by contrast it is just beginning international expansion, as result of its rising strength. Tiananmen Square proved China’s willingness to maintain the one-party state, and Gorbachev-style ‘new thinking,’ which helped facilitate German unification, does not seem forthcoming regarding Korean unification. China can indeed carry a client albatross, and, rather than withdrawing, it is projecting its interests into the periphery.
Beijing has more interest in North Korea than Moscow did in East Germany. North Korea borders China; East Germany was two time-zones away from Moscow. North Korea is a buffer between democratic South Korea, Japan and the US. South Korea cannot buy unity from China as West Germany did from the USSR. West Germany threw money at Moscow to abandon East Germany, but South Korea does not have such resources. Despite its OECD and G20 membership, South Korea is decades away from German levels of affluence. Besides, the Chinese scarcely need the money, and they will play a much harder game than the Soviets were able to 20 years ago.
Dr Robert E Kelly is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, South Korea. A longer version of this essay may be found at his website.
Should the two Koreas be unified and given the relationships with the Koreas, why will there be any need for the US to have its troops stayed in Korea at all?
Let’s acknowledge it, China has not stayed its troops in North Korea since the truce in the peninsular and the US has had its troops there.
The former USSR collapsed and the cold war has ended now for over 20 years. The US still has its troops in the peninsular
So how long will US troops stay in there and what its purpose will be and who will they be against?
Whether the Koreas are unified or not, or when they will do so, there is always the question: when will the US withdraw its troops from the peninsular to both symbolically and really actually contribute to a more stable and peaceful Northeast Asia and East Asia?
It is ridiculous for the US to use its military bases in East Asia to conduct spy missions over other countries. Would the US accept others to do the same spy missions using planes or ships around it?
If this is what the US means for China to the rules, is that a just requirement?
You have the military power to project forces to anywhere in the world.
You have military bases bordering others.
You have nuclear arsenals to destroy the world many times over and you have the means to deliver those weapons in very short time to anywhere.
You have much superior technologies in nearly every combat areas.
You have invaded so many countries, for one reason or another, including Iraq that was pre-emptively conducted and is still going on.
You constantly spy on others.
You also bombed China’s embassy.
You harassed China’s ship in international waters.
So still, you want others to follow this rule forever?
Thank you for the comment. I am the author.
As it is, the balance of local forces is running in China’s direction. China is in a stronger position today than the USSR was then; the US today is in a weaker position than it was 20 years ago. SK today is weaker than West Germany was, and NK is far worse off than East Germany was. Nor can SK and the US can ‘buy’ unification in the same way the West Germany did, with tacit US support; China does not need the money.
It will therefore be much easier for China to intervene and push its own terms in a final deal. Those terms will likely include no US forces north of the DMZ, and may include no US forces in Korea at all. It is not clear to me that the ROK is willing to forego the US alliance for unity, as the US partner has well served Korean autonomy in a tough neighborhood. Korea is encircled by much larger powers; so an extra-regional alliance partner helps Korea to not be bullied by the great powers on its doorstep.
I don’t think it is right for me to comment on Sino-US relations here, as it is not the focus of the post. I will only say that I hope China and the US can stumble their way into ‘peaceful coexistence,’ but that I think the likelihood of a confrontation is high.
Thank you again for reading.
I agree with Lincoln. Of course, the late USSR could and China can reach Korea much more easily without foreign bases, but the US would still have bases in Japan (or would it? When will those go?). The US is an empire of bases.
An empire of bases is pretty distinct from our traditional definition of empire – direct political control by outsiders of a foreign territory. I don’t think any East Asian specialist would argue seriously that the US controls SK or Japanese politics. It is also worth noting that SK and Japanese public opinion support retaining USFK and USFJ; even left-leaning governments in thosee countries have not asked the US to leave. If those publics feel a US alliance is in their interests, then China, which regularly touts the centrality of state sovereignty, cannot legitimately argue that US bases should be closed. It is also worth noting that when France pulled out of NATO’s military integration, and the Philippines requested the closing of Clark and Subic Bay bases, the US complied.
Hence, the better question to ask is when will SK and Japan feel comfortable enough to demand the removal of USFK/J. My sense is that NK behavior and China’s informal tolerance of NK shenanigans are the real drivers of the alliances, coupled with Russia’s erraticness, China’s continuing one-party state rule, and Japanese-SK mutual dislike. That is quite a list, so the liklihood of SK and Japanese interest in retaining US forces is very high.
Thank you for reading.
It seems my comment is late, but I drop it anyway. The author doesn’t know subject very deep. I’m from East Germany and I can’t agree with following statements:
1. “a poor telecommunication system” – it’s ridiculous, because GDR had most advanced cinema studio DEFA. Its movies are quite popular even now.
2. “wretched cars” – have you ever tried to ride such car, or it’s just only your opinion, based on photos?
3. “labour ignorant of computers” – People, remember – we are talking about 90’s. In the whole world computers weren’t smart.
Compared to West Germany, East Germany was superior on several parameters, but this is not the subject of discussion. We seek difference between GDR and DPRK. Here I can formulate this difference, based on historical point of view: Border between DPRK and South Korea is totally artificial, while border between GDR and West Germany has been built up on old border existing 1000 years ago between slavic and saxon tribes. Remember this, when “West” media throw pieces of crap on socialist countries.
I lived in Germany for about four years in the 1990s, worked for the Bundestag in that time, and speak German.
1. The entire GDR telephone system was replaced by fiber optic.
2. Trabants were wretched.
3. The computer revolution began in the west in the 70s. MS was founded in 1975