There is broad recognition that international shaming, shunning and sanctions have done little to improve the human rights situation in Burma. Indeed, ample evidence reveals that it has been counter-productive and, at times, directly harmful to the Burmese people. Nonetheless, many human rights activists seem unable to imagine alternatives to the traditional ‘punitive paradigm’ — and governments, too, have been distinctly unwilling to do much more than tinker with existing policies. This is a great shame as another approach has greater potential.

Principled engagement represents a ‘middle way’ between ostracism and the business-as-usual policies of regional governments that human rights activists understandably decry. The hallmark of this approach is direct engagement with the Burmese government, as well as broader societal groups, to improve the practical framework for human rights protection. While relying on non-punitive means, principled engagement combines pressure for reform with positive support, typically through a mix of advocacy, technical cooperation and financial support, as well as programs aimed at empowering local agents of change.

This approach is theoretically attractive for several reasons: First, it addresses key structural challenges of promoting human rights in any country; notably the need to secure local ownership of governance reforms and overcome the cultural and institutional legacy of past repressive practices. Secondly, it provides opportunities to enhance the benefits and lessen the costs of current Western sanctions, as well as regional trade and investment, and thus to build positive synergies between different approaches. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it helps Burma begin reintegration into the international community after half a century of isolation, which has greatly hurt the country and its development prospects.

The effectiveness of principled engagement in practice is harder to assess since relevant programs have been few, and primarily implemented by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations with limited leverage and resources. Nonetheless, the experience, so far, has generally been positive, indicating that this approach has broader potential if it were better supported by key governments.

Despite onerous restrictions by the Burmese government and donors alike, international organisations on the ground have made significant, if limited, contributions to the human rights and welfare of the Burmese people by providing for basic needs, protecting vulnerable groups and promoting improved policies, particularly in the area of health where efforts have been concentrated. They have also started socialising Burmese military and civilian officials into international human rights norms and building the capacity of both the state and society to formulate and execute relevant programs.

Proponents of punitive measures tend to dismiss such achievements as insignificant. And, granted, principled engagement rarely shows major immediate results. It is by nature an incremental, and even slow, approach, since it works within the existing political structures rather than seeking their overthrow. Yet, as Burma’s military leaders are drawn out of their shell and activities on the ground expand and accumulate across sectors, it is certainly possible to imagine international programs becoming catalysts for broader internally-driven reforms.

This is especially likely to happen if more can be done also to improve the structural conditions for human rights by consolidating the embryonic peace in the border areas and reforming the economy to strengthen and spread the benefits of growth, two objectives that also require effective engagement. In the meantime, engaged agencies at least help the general population cope with a bad situation and protect them from the worst excesses of individual abuses of power.

Quicker, more thorough change would obviously be preferable. However, there is no realistic way for Burma to move directly from dictatorship to a rights-abiding regime. If the country’s tortured history shows one thing, it is that direct challenges to the military invariably provoke hostile backlashes and undermine opportunities for change.

Given this sadly predictable outcome, it makes strategic sense to work instead for smaller, more incremental changes that, precisely because they do not threaten the military’s immediate interests, may be able to penetrate the regime and gradually transform the configuration of power and interests to a point where bigger change becomes possible.

As a policy proposal, principled engagement is still ahead of the curve. But without imagination, we are likely to remain stuck in established patterns, no matter how dysfunctional they are known to be. And with important changes underway inside Burma, now is the time for new and bold approaches.

Morten Pedersen is a senior lecturer in politics at UNSW@ADFA, and a former Senior Analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma.