India might be expected to balance China’s power, but Indian leaders, and arguably Lee, would prefer a different Asia — one where overly aggressive competition does not erode the gains of economic growth and integration of the last few decades.

Indeed, one of the anomalies of balance-of-power theory in the post-Cold War period is the absence of a countervailing bloc of Asian states standing up to China — just as there is no counterweight to the United States globally. A US presence in the Pacific has filled the gap and reduced the need for Asian states to co-operate strategically. However, if China is really going to be a threat of Soviet proportions, where are the antecedents to an Asian NATO?

India’s political leaders, who should be at the centre of a coalition to counter China, have repeatedly shown no appetite to confront China. Politically, India may have more in common with Japan, Singapore, and Australia, including fretting over a Chinese rise; however, China is India’s biggest merchandise trading partner, ahead even of the United States. Although this measure of trade dependence on China excludes the enormously important export of services, this somewhat unexpected outcome of India’s economic liberalisation cannot be ignored. Conversely, Japan is not among India’s top-ten trade partners. Australia is much farther down the list. Singapore and UAE, by virtue of being the two trading hubs at the east and west ends of the Indian Ocean, rank higher in India’s trade numbers.

On the other hand, and notwithstanding its growing naval diplomacy in the region, India had a salutary lesson a few years ago when its navy sought aggressive ownership of patrolling the Straits of Malacca. The Indonesian government objected angrily to the Indian Navy wanting to act as the pre-eminent regional force; India backed off.

Given the asymmetry in India’s political and economic ties in Asia, the country’s best chance might be promotion of a new liberal order based on economic integration where it participates alongside China, Japan and others. The region’s other states prefer an open liberal order as well.  Singapore’s Lee may be a leading voice calling for greater Indian presence in Southeast Asia, but the Singaporean government has consistently worked toward inviting the world into the region, believing that free trade and interdependence provided the best security.

Arguing against realist positions taken by Aaron Friedberg (Asia was ‘ripe for rivalry’) and David Kang (the return of an older Asian order of Chinese hegemonic stability), Amitav Acharya has argued that Southeast Asia is likely to develop a liberal integrationist order based on free trade and minimal democratic norms. There is no reason to imagine why Acharya’s liberal vision cannot widen to include Asia’s major states such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India.

The trouble is that Asia’s leaders have not articulated an indigenous vision for a liberal continent with international organisations that draws China in. The region needs an energy agency; an institution to coordinate economic policies such as interest rates (the Asian Development Bank is too narrowly constructed); agreement on disaster management co-operation; and a body to consider climate change from an Asian perspective.

India’s current political leadership would like to see the rise of a liberal Asian order that brings together the continent’s major states, but they do not want to get too far ahead of the region. During the Cold War, Asian states rejected India’s approach of nonalignment.

Today, India’s tradition of liberalism, diversity, strategic restraint, and cultural appeal are consistent with what Asian states themselves want. However, Indian leaders feel more comfortable campaigning for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council than for regional organisations. India needs to shed its inhibitions and go beyond the naval diplomacy while the region’s leaders must stop punting the issue and consider seriously the prospect of a new Asian order.

Sunil Dasgupta is a lecturer and director of the political science program at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution.