As has been widely reported, Japan is a rapidly aging and low birth society. But, the demographic profile differs significantly by region. That uneven distribution means that the tsunami’s impact has not been indiscriminate, but demographically biased against the elderly.
Despite the macro-trends, urban Japan remains youth oriented and dynamic. Young adults have long left the countryside for the capital or the regional centres. As such, Tokyo remains a young and vibrant city, and finding good childcare remains a challenge as the 20-somethings and 30-somethings concentrate here with their only child. This scarcity and cost, of course, only exacerbates the tendency to have fewer children.
The same demographic profile — more young adults and comparatively fewer children and elderly — is also true for Japan’s regional centres, namely Sapporo, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Hiroshima and Fukuoka.
The key point regarding the disasters is that while Tokyo and Sendai shook fiercely during the earthquake, the amount of destruction and death in these densely populated urban areas was surprisingly limited given that a 9.0 quake is effectively off the scales for planning purposes. This is a testament to the architectural design of Japan, but it also reinforces the point that the damage and destruction was caused overwhelmingly by the tsunami. And, the tsunami did not hit any urban areas, but rather the sparsely populated small coastal villages of northeastern Japan.
Japan’s small coastal villages have undergone a significant greying ‘sea change’ over the past few decades with the hollowing out of the coast by the white-collar and industrial baby boomers and their children. This has left the baby boomers’ elderly parents and their agriculture and fishing siblings as the remaining residents of the coastal villages. One demographic positive of this is that farm families are comparatively fertile and these prefectures have had better than the national average in birth rates.
When the tsunami hit that very rural coast, however, it was ruthless. It captured all those in its path, but some demographic groups were better placed for eluding that path than others. The school-age children produced by the slightly better fertility rates could largely be saved by institutional planning. In the window between the earthquake, tsunami warning and coming of the wave, the schools were able to make a relatively orderly removal of children to designated higher ground. Some of their parents were okay as well, able to jump into the family car and speed up the valleys. Unlike their urban cousins, rural Japan has wide automobile ownership and disproportionately superior road infrastructure due to pork barrelling particularly during the long economic stagnation.
The elderly and infirm, however, were largely not able to rely on either Japanese institutionalised disaster preparation or individual mobility. Disproportionately the elderly were living alone in
the proverbial ‘grandmother’s house,’ which had been preserved when the baby boomers and youth moved away.
This demographic truth of a disproportionate impact on the elderly will have consequences for the rebuilding of Japan. If the government moves too quickly to rebuild infrastructure it will over-capitalise. For example, it will build more schools, post-offices, streets and plumbing than needed by the replacement demographic. Acting too quickly, it is foreseeable Japanese urban planners might use the most common template — that of an outer-suburb ‘bed-town’ or what we might call ‘nappy valley.’ It is very unlikely this is the demographic that will repopulate these areas.
There is an interesting Japan-specific twist on the likely returning demographic. Surviving relatives who live in Sendai and Tokyo will inherit land where families or patriarchs/matriarchs have been lost. Land in Japan and its associated ancestral plots carry obligations of maintenance, creating a hesitancy to sell the property for redevelopment. On the other hand, I foresee few of the former rural residents rebalancing life choices to return to seaside living. This seems particularly true with a heightened awareness of the danger of living on the coast in an area prone to serious earthquakes and tsunamis. Personal financing in Japan is also relatively tight at the moment following consumer reforms over the past decade. This means there is much less liquidity than when much of the lost building was made in the 1960s to 1980s. In short, despite the official zero interest rate, it is very likely that many of the surviving families and small businesses will not seek to or be able to rebuild.
Finally, this demographic story and its implications stand in stark contrast to the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Kobe is one of those regional cities that have both high population density and more than its fair share of people of working age. Kobe is also a vital port to the exporting nation. Moreover, the damage in both lives and destroyed infrastructure was less in the case of Kobe’s earthquake and fires. The urban dwellers in Kobe were also less culturally attached to the land making economically rational sales easier. Thus, immediately following the Kobe disaster people, businesses and the necessary financial partners were ready to return and rebuild, which they did with surprising speed.
Economically, the northeastern coastal towns will recover. The total economic contribution of this area was relatively small, and agriculture and fishing will be quick to return. The demographic make-up that creates a community, however, has been changed forever by the tsunami and that will be seen for the next generation, if not longer.
Kent Anderson is professor and director of the School of Culture, History and Language in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific and holds a joint appointment with the ANU College of Law.
It seems to me that the net effect of an older population is positive for recovery. A key problem for some time will be, as in the past, a shortage of jobs. Older people create jobs. First, their income tends to be from pensions rather than employment and continues to flow; they also have more savings than the young to put into fixing up a house as well as living expenses. Second, frail older people are supported by the public Long Term Care Insurance system, a steady source of employment for careworkers. In many rural areas careworkers have been second only to local government employees in total employment. Relative to younger people, older people will be a steady source of consumer demand to support small business development.
“the tsunami did not hit any urban areas, but rather the sparsely populated small coastal villages of northeastern Japan.”
Would you really call Ishinomaki, a CITY with a population of over 150,000, a sparsely populated small coastal village? Over 2,500 deaths have been confirmed here with a further 2,500+ unaccounted for. As you note, many rural areas suffered enormous damage as a result of the tsunami but so too did heavily populated areas such as Ishinomaki.