The mysterious visit turned out to be rather hollow, as neither country announced any concrete or palpable progress in denuclearisation or economic reform. This has led many pundits to wonder what kind of relationship China and North Korea have.
Kim’s visit demonstrated that China and North Korea aim at restoring their special friendship and solidarity. By hosting Kim three times in a row without paying a return visit, the Chinese leadership sent a clear signal to the international community that China had extraordinary influence over North Korea unequalled by any other country. North Korea, sanctioned and isolated, had every reason to show off its strong ties with China, especially to South Korea and the US, which have sought to roll back North Korea’s nuclear programs.
Despite claims by the two countries that their relationship had been strengthened, Kim’s visit revealed that China and North Korea had different policy priorities. By demonstrating that North Korea was serious about returning to the Six-Party Talks, China intended to urge South Korea and the US to change their containment policy regarding North Korea. But while the official Chinese media alleged that Kim had reaffirmed his support for denuclearisation on the peninsula and an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, North Korean media reports made one wonder whether North Korea was really committed to denuclearisation at all.
China also pressed its wayward ally to take on Chinese-style economic reforms and opening-up, which the Chinese leadership argued would increase the resiliency of the North Korean regime. China’s intention became clear when Premier Wen Jiabao unprecedentedly revealed during a summit meeting in Japan that Kim had visited China to study its model of economic development. There is no clear signal that North Korea was ready to follow China’s advice on the economic front either. Kim was more interested in circumventing a series of economic sanctions imposed by the UN after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009, and by South Korea after the Cheonan incident in the spring of 2010, by getting economic help from China.
Kim’s visit demonstrated that China and North Korea had different purposes for maintaining ties. By propping up the North Korean regime, China attempted to turn North Korea into a strategic card to play in its strategic game on the Korean peninsula. But while requesting assistance from China, North Korea maintained its insistence on pursuing its own priorities. Moreover, North Korea seemed to be more interested in building a relationship with the US, making it difficult for China to exert influence over the North. The special relationship between the two countries, therefore, is one of convenience.
Given this divergence between China and North Korea, will the relationship experience a drastic decline? Despite the above perspective, there are ample reasons to expect the two countries will keep trying to maintain close relations with each other for the time being. Economically, China and North Korea have common interests in maintaining cooperation. China is interested in securing an East Sea port as well as mineral resources and a low wage work force from North Korea. For North Korea, China is the only source available for help in terms of aid, capital, and technology. In addition, and probably more importantly, the countries’ strategic interests coincide. North Korea needs political and diplomatic support and protection from China. China, for its part, can exploit its ties with the North in reclaiming influence on the Korean peninsula. The special relationship of convenience between the two countries is likely to last, even if confusion and upheaval occur occasionally along the way.
Jae Cheol Kim is Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea.