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Inter-Korean relations nosedive over secret talks disclosure

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In Brief

Pyongyang’s angry disclosure in early June of secret talks about a summit with Seoul, with accusations of bribes offered and threats to publish transcripts, marks a new nadir in inter-Korean ties.

North Korea has signalled unambiguously that it wants no further truck with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, increasingly a lame duck now that his term of office is two-thirds over.

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In December 2012 South Koreans will elect a new leader (the ROK constitution mandates but a single five-year presidential term). Even if Lee’s conservative Grand National Party (GNP) retains power, his frankly disastrous policy of cold-shouldering the North unless and until it surrenders its nuclear arsenal – pigs might fly sooner – will certainly be reviewed by the next occupant of the Blue House in Seoul.

During the ‘sunshine’ decade (1998-2007) it was South Korea who mainly rivalled China as a source of succour for the North. From 2008 Lee Myung-bak chose to end that policy, and inter-Korean relations have gone from bad to worse. Now they have hit a new low. On June 1 Pyongyang chose to reveal, in detail, what had long been suspected: that despite harsh words in public, behind the scenes the two Koreas were holding secret talks in a bid to find a way forward from last year’s two Northern attacks: the sinking of the corvette Cheonan in March, which Pyongyang still denies, and shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November.

The North claimed that since April the South had begged for talks, which were eventually held in Beijing from May 9. It named the main South Korean officials involved: Kim Chun-sig of the Ministry of Unification’s (MOU) Policy Office; Hong Chang-hwa, a director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS); and Kim Tae-hyo, President Lee’s security advisor. All three switched off their mobile phones and went to ground as soon as the story broke in Seoul, to much embarrassment all round.

The North’s version, attributed to a spokesman for its National Defence Commission (NDC) – the DPRK’s top executive body – was typically irate in tone. Inter alia it accused ‘the Lee Myung-bak group of traitors’ of being ‘master hands at fabrications as they cook up lies and deny what they have done and hooligans who renege on the promises made to the nation like a pair of old shoes.’ Besides the insults, it went into detail on both the niceties of discussion and what the South was allegedly seeking. By this account, Seoul wanted a form of words, which it could present as an apology for the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong, even if Pyongyang would deny making any such apology. This would clear the way for a three stage summit meeting: first at the border village of Panmunjom in late June, then in Pyongyang in late August, and finally after quite a gap in Seoul in March next year when South Korea will host the second global Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).

Clearly it would be a huge coup if Kim Jong-il could be persuaded not only to come South at all, as he has never done, but to do so for the NSS – where, presumably, he would renounce nuclear weapons and promise to be a good boy in the future, in exchange for a very fat cheque. The whole idea is so ludicrous that one can only marvel at the Lee administration’s endless capacity for fantasy and self-deception in its Nordpolitik. Nothing whatever in DPRK policy suggests there was the remotest chance of Kim Jong-il doing anything of the kind. Why on earth would he choose to boost a lame duck Southern president, when a year and a half from now the next incumbent of the Blue House will undoubtedly prove more accommodating?

It is unclear what prompted Pyongyang to play ball at all, or to then do the dirty and spill the beans. The latter ran to a second instalment on June 9 in response to Seoul’s reaction, which did not deny the talks but claimed that it was the North that had begged for them. This time the NDC threatened to publish taped transcripts of the talks to prove its version was correct.

It amplified a reference in its earlier statement to the South offering ‘enveloped money’; the ROK did admit having offered to pay the North’s board and lodging for preliminary talks.

All this was fascinating in its way, yet deeply depressing. Betraying diplomatic secrets, if less serious than a physical attack, is no less corrosive of trust. As so often, North Korea seemed all too ready to sacrifice longer-term confidence-building for the sake of a short-term, indeed ephemeral, tactical jab. Any satisfaction Kim Jong-il may have gained from seeing the Blue House all a-fluster must be weighed against the universal deploring in Seoul, including by the liberal opposition, of the nasty and despicable breach of protocol involved. If the opposition Democratic Party (DP) regains power in 2013 and wants to resume some version of the ‘sunshine’ approach, how can it now trust the North not to betray it in turn?

What this shows – indeed, the NDC said it directly – is that the North will no longer deal with Lee Myung-bak. One should never say never in Korea, but this suggests that inter-Korean ties will mark time for the next 18 months until Lee’s successor – he cannot stand again – is elected at the end of 2012.

Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs.

A longer version of this article first appeared in, and is used with the kind permission of, NewNations.com.

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