Yoshihara’s analysis is measured and balanced but, for my money, Canberra and Washington would be well advised to discount the thrust of his policy advice. The core issue, of course, is China: what does a harmonious East Asia actually mean to the elite in China’s security community and how might China deploy its increasingly formidable assets of power and influence to achieve its vision of harmony?

In the final analysis, Yoshihara is persuaded that the US should opt for a string of bases and facilities in the East Asian littoral beyond the range of current and prospective future Chinese conventional military capabilities. This is what makes Australia attractive. Moreover, bases and facilities in Australia would have a sense of permanence or strategic depth that is lacking with alternative, or rather supplementary, locations like Guam and Diego Garcia. Yoshihara acknowledges that Australia’s attractiveness is qualified by its distance from the regions of primary strategic interest. Indeed, occasional surges in US military interest in Australia in the past (by the US Marine Corps, for example) have foundered on the question of costs and the poor response time given the distances to places of probable interest. Yoshihara’s contention, however, is that the China factor has changed the balance of costs and benefits.

My principle concern with Yoshihara’s prescription goes to an issue beyond the scope of his analysis. Specifically, his recommendations risk conveying what at this time would be precisely the wrong political signals. If Washington conveys the impression that it is circling the wagons and building a fall-back perimeter beyond the reach of projected Chinese military power it will set off reassessments by allies and friends within the perimeter that will prove very difficult to contain. The H W Bush and Clinton administrations discovered this when the US simultaneously left its bases in the Philippines in 1992 and announced major reductions in its forward-deployed forces as a post-Cold War peace dividend. The Clinton administration drew a line under the drawdown, insisting that the US would retain about 100,000 military personnel forward-deployed in East Asia to meet all its security commitments, but it still took several years to fully restore regional confidence in the US commitment.

This response seems quite unnecessary at the present time. It is true that China’s power and influence appears to be surging relentlessly. It is also true that China’s power is not an illusion, and although the appearance may be ahead of the reality the reality will catch up. Finally, there is no doubt that US freedom of manoeuvre will be sharply constrained for some years by the depth of its economic difficulties.

Despite this, the US, China and the other regional states have scarcely begun to test the opportunities to adjust the rules of the game in East Asia to suit the interests of all. Admittedly, the longer term trends in US–China relations are not particularly encouraging, but it remains the case that the US has a fistful of friends in the broader Asian region that want it to remain comprehensively engaged. China does not have such partners. Nor is it displaying any strong signs of having learnt how to nurture international relationships characterised by genuine and broad rapport. China may discover that it cannot separate its international persona from the shadow of its arrangements for internal governance.

The key point is that we still have the opportunity to try and establish the peace and stability of East Asia securely on a new and broader power structure. A re-casting of the US presence in East Asia along the lines indicated by Yoshihara, that is, changes that would convey a sense of a China-driven watershed in US thinking about its posture toward Asia, could see this opportunity evaporate. Conversely, adjustments to the US posture that addressed whatever imperatives it may see but still projected a sense of ‘business as usual’ and of responsiveness to the interests of its allies and friends could be sensible. If any such US proposals are directed at Australia, our government should give them positive consideration and be confident of strong public support in doing so. Among other things, most of ASEAN would, with varying degrees of discretion, see this as enhancing the value of Australia as a neighbour. And if things do not turn out well, Australia’s willingness to host American military forces will be among the few certainties in international affairs.

Ron Huisken is Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, Australian National University.