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China’s India war: How the Chinese saw the 1962 conflict

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In Brief

Malcolm Fraser recently cautioned against viewing the development of China’s military without considering the broader context in which it takes place.

This warning is appropriately applied to past experience as well.

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The Chinese leadership was slow to appreciate the seriousness of the challenge presented to it by India’s border policy during the Nehru government. Soon after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 its government recognised border settlement to be a problem involving all its numerous neighbours. China’s strategy for dealing with it was to accept the border alignments with which history had left it and negotiate, where necessary, to formalise and confirm them in the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and mutual accommodation’.

This meant that India should be allowed to retain the territory in its north-east up to what the British had named the ‘McMahon Line’, when the British seized it from Tibet, just before and during WWII in their final foray of imperialist expansion. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai gave assurances to that effect in his several meetings and exchanges with Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s, and Beijing, foreseeing no territorial dispute with India, expected cordial relations to continue.

But by the late 1950s India began accusing China of ‘aggression’ because of friction on the borders caused by Indian territorial claims. And in August 1959 an armed clash at a point called Longju on the McMahon Line set off an outburst of anger against China, not only in India but in the West generally and, critically, in Moscow. The Chinese leadership found itself being reprimanded over the Longju incident by the visiting Nikita Krushchev (the minutes of that meeting are in Cold War International History Project Vol. 12/13 [Fall/Winter 2001], pp 264–67). ‘Why did you have to kill people on your border with India?’, he demanded. Mao Zedong replied, defensively, ‘They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for twelve hours’.  Krushchev retorted, ‘Nobody was killed among the Chinese, only among the Indians’. Zhou Enlai came in: ‘What are we supposed to do if they attack us first? We can’t [just] fire in the air! You will see for yourself later that the McMahon Line with India will be maintained and the border conflict will end’.

The Chinese failed to grasp the truth behind the border friction and beneath the casuistical wording in the Indian government’s diplomatic communications. Nehru and his government had decided that India should never agree to negotiate its borders but would if necessary impose them. The Longju clash was not accidental but reflected the basic Indian approach to border disputes: territory claimed by India should automatically become Indian territory. This approach made conflict ultimately inevitable.

Still, and for at least a year thereafter, the Chinese leadership failed to appreciate the gravity of the problem created by India’s aggressive and unyielding approach to the border dispute. And by mid-1961 India’s attempted implementation of its territorial claims turned the border areas into conflict zones. Beijing’s urgent calls for diplomatic negotiations were being flouted and Indian troops were continuing to press forward in the western sector. Beijing decided there should be no retreat under Indian pressure. Since India was rejecting China’s calls for peaceful coexistence, Mao quipped, it should be confronted with ‘armed coexistence’.

The summer of 1962 saw the Indians begin to press forward in the McMahon Line sector as well as in the west. But Mao was still not ready to admit that his policy of ‘armed coexistence’ was failing to deter India. He reasserted his orders: the army must ‘undertake a long period of armed coexistence’. On 8 September the Chinese extended their tactic of containment to the recently established Dhola post, north of the McMahon Line at its western extremity. An outnumbering Chinese force (about 60 troops) was ordered to invest the little Indian post, use threats to induce its withdrawal if possible, and block its further advance.

Misreading that move as a deliberate provocation Nehru gave orders that the Chinese must be repelled. The Indian Army was ordered to attack the Chinese troops threatening Dhola post and drive them off the territory there claimed by India.  Moreover Nehru publicly proclaimed his order as soon as he issued it.

Beijing took Nehru’s action as a radical escalation in Indian policy, in effect a declaration of war. On 3 October Beijing sent its final diplomatic warning and plea for immediate, unconditional negotiations: India instantly rejected it. Mao conceded: ‘It seems armed coexistence won’t work … Nehru really wants to use force’. Zhou Enlai commented that ‘We don’t want a war with India … but Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us only with war’. Mao agreed: ‘If someone doesn’t attack me, I won’t attack him. If someone attacks me, I will certainly attack him!’

Thus the Chinese leadership decided to take up India’s challenge to war, and the 1962 conflict began. A snippet of history indicative of, as Malcolm Fraser put it, the ‘unsettled’ nature of China’s surroundings — and worth remembering in judging China’s actions.

Neville Maxwell is Visiting Fellow at the Contemporary China Centre, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, The Australian National University. A full version of this article is available here on the China India Border Dispute blog.

10 responses to “China’s India war: How the Chinese saw the 1962 conflict”

  1. I have yet to read a more ridiculous piece on the Indo-China conflict. Even the Chinese have not made the claims made by this author!
    The McMohan line was decided in 1914 and signed between British ruled India and Tibet. China, which tenously claimed suzerainity over Tibet dilly-dallied on signing the treaty but de facto accepted the border as demarcated by the line. All this happened way before World war II which the author believes is when the border was drawn up ! The Chinese invaded Tibet in 1949 as is well known and started an oppressive rule which culminated in revolts and massacres in Lhasa and Khampa which prompted Tibetans to flee to India.
    Aksai Chin was part of the princely state of Kashmir since 1834, when the Dogra rulers of kashmir annexed it from the Namgyal dynastry when it conquered Ladakh and Aksai Chin. Aksai CHin as part of India is thus a established fact from 1834.
    The conflict with India started when Chinese in the 1950s surreptiously built a road through Aksai Chin to link Sinkiang. The frozen desert was virtually unpopulated and also undefended by any Indian troops. In fact the whole Indo-Tibet border till then was traditionally left under protected as few expected any attacks or incursions from that side.
    When India protested the take-over of Aksai Chin and asked the Chinese to vacate the territory, they refused. That’s when Nehru started sending armed patrols to the rest of the border to enforce the fact that this was the border. China contested the patrols in places and clashes broke out. In 1959, the Dalai Lama had crossed over with about 100,000 other Tibetans and sought refuge in India from a rampaging Chinese army which went around exterminating Tibetans by the tens of thousands.
    Obviously this was not something which the Chinese leadership appreciated. India did not give refuge to Tibetans because it wanted to take on China but because historically, culturally and in terms of religious affinty the two people were as close as say Canadians are to Americans. It was natural that Nehru had to give these people refuge or else he would have been voted out of power!
    China decided that it was now time to teach India a lesson for a) giving refuge to the Dalai Lama – their most serious threat and b) because India was not willing to accept Aksai Chin as part of China.
    Which is why they launched a sudden attack in pre-winter 1962. The attack could not be logistically supported in deep winter when the mountain passes linking India with Tibet are snowed out and hence the Chinese withdrew in the Bomdilla sector where they had made progress. (They were held in Ladakh, Sikkim and in eastern NEFA.
    The author seems to paint the Chinese as some kind of do-gooders who strolled over the Himalayas merely because the unreliable Indians were troubling them!
    Is Australia so much in awe of China that its strategists have now started writing pieces to white wash the Chinese?

    • Indians are the agressor. It is common knowledge in Assam. The fact is India was pursuing a forward policy under Nehru. China was just reacting. If China wanted Indian territory, they wouldn’t have withdrawn on their own from Assam and South Tibet. Its common knowledge in Assam they just ran back home instead of facing the Chinese army. Unarmed Assamese farmers acted more bravely and faced the armed Chinese instead of running away. Still we have no ill feeling towards the Chinese. Perhaps China can help us get rid of the Indians from our land.

  2. There seems to be a slight anomaly in Neville’s piece, regarding the McMahon line in India’s northeast (southeast Tibet).
    He suggests that the PRC has been committed from the very beginning to the concept of the McMahon line. However, this line is recognised on no Chinese map of which I am aware. The Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is included in its entirety on all Chinese maps.

  3. I enjoyed reading Maxwell’s fairy tale about how poor old peace-loving China did everything possible to avoid confrontation with Big Bad India. His completely biased take on history and lack of consideration of the Indian perpective was amusing. In fact, as the previous commenter suggests, China did not even share a border with India until only a few years before the war in 1962. The border arose out of the invasion of Tibet by Maxwell’s peace-loving China, massacring hundreds of thousands of Tibetans in the process during the 1950s. Perhaps, according to Maxwell, even China’s military intrusions deep into the Indian state of Sikkim over the last few years are further examples of India’s agression against China?

    The EAS should seek greater objectivity from its contributers and avoid the slippery slide towards becoming seen as just a mouthpiece for Beijing apologists.

    • Unfortunately for JK and Jayanta Roy, EVERY Western intelligence agency, despite their deep hatred of the Chinese people, are on the Chinese side on this one.

      That’s right, China didn’t share a border with “India”, because India never existed as a unified state, ever, in all of history, until the British decided it to be so.

      Make room for the reasonable Indian voices, and don’t start yet another conflict with your posturing, jingoist bluster.

      • You are writing as if China was already a powerful empire by then. But consider history. Check the maps of the Mauryan empire , the Gupta empire , Mughals had all of India including Afghanistan. So the notion of the nation state existed. If you read Indian scriptures (the Hindu epics) they detail every corner of our country. It’s just that don’t know how to read history or understand ancient languages. Before you comment on these things ensure that you read on the subject.

      • The reply by “THE TRUTH” seems as if he represents entire western world or has exclusive inputs from intelligence agencies there , as replied by Manoj India was already unified to a larger extent even before British came here.

        I think others got Mr. Maxwell wrong even if he is historically way offset but still he is just presenting the Chinese view of the events that lead to infamous 1962 war between two powerful south Asian neighbors.

        Just hope before writing further Mr. Maxwell will go through history or at least try and understand other side of the events.

      • neither did most of the states today. there may be no empire by the name of unified India but if we are dwelling into history then I say leave the rest and just start from the Mauryan empire or take Mughal Empire are you suggesting we should just claim every piece of land which were ever under the rule of any Indian king should we stake our next claim on most of Afghanistan and parts of Iran too.Chinese problem was they in order to create an identity took the cover of history and defined their action by “being” the descendants of powerful chinese dynasties of the past.Your attitude towards Tibet is interesting “That’s right, China didn’t share a border with “India”, because India never existed as a unified state, ever, in all of history” tell me if you will why exactly China not share a border with India or Bitish India except that off-course India appeared magically in the 1900s…. because there was a well defined (historically as well as geographically) Tibetan nation in between. just to compare California belonged to Mexico . By your logic I’m free to claim the North-South American continent as there was nothing of the sort just over 500 years ago and if you really know history(highly doubtful) then you will know the native American population migrated from South and South-east Asia some 7000 years ago there is a probability that I have long lost family in the native American tribe somewhere. How far back in history do you want to go being from India I DO have that luxury. Unless off-course you now believe world was created 10000 years ago by god and evolution and climate change is a myth and sun is there because some1 said “let there be light”.

        • ‘Tibet is a part of China’ is a well-accepted concept, even by the Indian government. Tibet is considered a colony under the Chinese emperor ruling since Qing dynasty. The selection of Tibet local leaders, Dalai Lama and Penchen Lama, are authorized by the Chinese emperor for centuries. It may be an arguable topic that whether Tibet was a free nation or a dominion. But as ‘Tibet is a part of China’ is well-established, Tibetan border is part of Chinese border.

  4. The claim was not tenuous. Tibet was legally a Chinese territory and that was recognized internationally.

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