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Strategic objectives for the US-Japan alliance

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In Brief

The US–Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement released on 21 June 2011 in Washington was titled ‘Toward a Deeper and Broader US–Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership’. It lists US–Japan security objectives for future joint defence cooperation. This statement successfully paves the way for the US–Japan leaders’ summit meeting later this year.

There are two central pillars contained within the 24 objectives listed.

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First, the rise of China is explicitly addressed. The US and Japan reaffirm their endorsement of China’s ‘responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity’ while encouraging ‘openness and transparency’ regarding China’s ongoing military modernisation. However, without mentioning any specific country, the statement ‘discourage[s] the pursuit and acquisition of military capabilities that could destabilise the regional security environment’ — reflecting Tokyo’s and Washington’s shared concerns about the intentions of the People’s Liberation Army’s development of anti-access and area denial capabilities.

The issue of maritime safety and security is also addressed with the inclusion of ‘defending the principle of freedom of navigation’. The global commons, including space and cyberspace, is again reiterated as a shared interest. Similarly, promoting ‘dialogue on the diversification of supplies of critical resources and materials, including energy and rare earths’, the export of which was suspended by China last September after the Japanese Coast Guard detained ‘a captain’ of an illegal Chinese fishing boat near the Senkaku Islands, was also reaffirmed.

Second, it is clear that the new direction for the alliance is geared towards creating a regional security architecture throughout the Asia-Pacific. This new objective is emphasised through trilateral cooperation with Australia and the Republic of Korea, and trilateral dialogue with India is also mentioned. Security cooperation between Japan, the US and ASEAN is another area for potential joint cooperation. Tokyo and Washington clearly have shared interests in bilateral and mini-lateral security cooperation with ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Japanese and US ‘governance and capacity building’ assistance to ASEAN members is an important avenue to further develop closer relations.

In addition to these Asia Pacific objectives, the new list of Common Strategic Objectives also has much to say on the potential for US–Japan global cooperation. Upon close examination, these objectives are an effort by Japan as an internationally responsible state to look outward, not inward. The task ahead for Japan is to overcome domestic constraints, specifically domestic legal and political sensitivities regarding Japanese military missions overseas. Potential NATO–Japan cooperation, mentioned in the 2007 Common Strategic Objectives, is not included in this statement. There does remain a lot of scope regarding future Japan–NATO global security cooperation, and this should be considered by both Japan and the US as another avenue for Japanese defence collaboration with third parties.

In the section of the US–Japan joint statement entitled ‘Strengthening of Alliance Security and Defense Cooperation’, both governments reaffirmed further study on joint planning for Japanese defence and regional security contingencies. In editorials the Nikkei and Yomiuri, two major Japanese newspapers, support this position and urge both parties to implement these proposals. Obviously Japan and the US need to prepare during peacetime for detailed, scenario-based security challenges within Northeast Asia, including contingencies other than on the Korean peninsula. Thus ‘in order to deter and respond proactively, rapidly and seamlessly to various situations in the region’ there is an emphasis upon bilateral training, exercises, shared use of facilities, and cooperation on information sharing and ‘joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities’. Both sides reaffirm the establishment of a ‘bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis’. This is pertinent to the continued uncertainty regarding North Korea, and in a time when the US is attempting to move towards a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

Implementation of these objectives is key, but without strong political leadership in Japan it is exceedingly difficult to expect an increase in defence spending or a change in the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which prevents the right of collective self-defence. There is, however, much that can be done at the administrative and professional military level. This includes sharing strategic thinking and further developing a strong security and economic partnership in this era of change within the established international order.

First, both governments can enhance their deterrence posture, based upon different scenarios.

Second, developing a regional security architecture with the increase of trilateral and ‘between spokes’ partnerships should be welcomed as a strategic advantage for all parties concerned, and especially for Japan and the US.

Third, even though Japan should review its Official Development Assistance policy and budget, both countries can jointly explore different policies to secure their energy needs while continuing to secure the common global sea lines of communication.

Fourth, it is expected that Japan will be very assertive in putting itself forward as a host for a global and regional centre for natural disaster responses. The joint statement affirms the importance of establishing a regional logistics hub of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As the joint US–Japan responses to the Indian Ocean December 2004 tsunami and Operation Tomodachi after the Japanese March 11 disasters demonstrate, both governments have the resources, expertise and operational capability to effectively respond to large scale regional disasters.

Finally, it is crucial that an effective mechanism be found pertaining to the ‘China question’ in which all three countries can proactively address topics of cooperation and areas of concern with the end goal of building mutual trust. An official US–Japan–China trilateral dialogue is one option, but this suggestion is not yet clear, and probably not enough. Tokyo and Washington need to enhance their bilateral meetings and then prepare their communication strategy first before jointly engaging with China. US–Japan alliance coordination is a crucial component of this equation.

With limited financial resources available for both the US and Japan, it is now time to think seriously about the difficult choices within the Common Strategic Objectives and where to allocate finite resources. Clearly it is time for fresh and new thinking and simply relying on past Japan–US alliance performance is no longer a solution to the new regional and global challenges that both countries face.

Ryo Sahashi is Associate Professor of International Politics at Kanagawa University. An earlier version of this piece was originally published here in the Asia Pacific Bulletin No. 125 by the East-West Center.

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