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How will China become ‘democratic’?

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In Brief

No Chinese Communist leader has ever said democracy is a bad thing.

When asked how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would avoid the notorious dynastic cycles of the previous emperors, Mao Zedong proudly said that the CCP had found a miraculous mechanism to keep them away: democracy.

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Deng Xiaoping repeatedly said that the ultimate reform was political reform. Without political reform, there is no way to sustain economic reform. Deng even predicted that China might adopt national presidential elections by 2050 after she overcame gaps in wealth and education between urban dwellers and rural residents. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao at the past four CCP national congresses touted ‘four democracies’ at the grassroots level, namely democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision in official and public affairs.

Nevertheless, it is Premier Wen Jiabao who has in recent years turned the vague rhetoric of adopting democracy into a real action plan-cum-timetable. In Wen’s design, China’s democracy is made up of three components: first, direct elections moving up from villages to towns and to counties; second, restraining government power via independent judiciary oversight; and third, enhancing government accountability through a freer and more autonomous media. Wen’s repeated calls for meaningful political reform have not only fallen on deaf ears within the top echelons of the CCP, but also disillusioned the broad masses, as the latter have not seen any tangible action being taken. Some even label Wen as the best actor in China’s theatre of politics.

If people see Wen as merely being a good actor, many CCP movers and shakers may perceive his utterance on initiating political transformation as an unfathomable threat to the political consensus and a devious plot to influence power transition at the upcoming 18th CCP National Congress. In response Wu Bangguo, who is ranked second in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, seems to have attempted to put the brakes on Wen’s runaway train by making a solemn ‘six nos’ declaration at the recent annual session of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The now infamous ‘six nos’ are no multiple party system, no diversity in ideology, no checks and balances, no two-chamber parliament, no federal republic and no privatisation.

If Wu indeed wanted to shut down Wen’s vision for political reform, he is missing the target by a wide margin because none of the ‘six nos’ are remotely applicable to Wen’s proposals. In fact, if the CCP does have political reform (or democracy with Chinese characteristics) in mind, its engineers do not need to ‘westernise’ anything for now. Although these reform measures do eventually require amending the Constitution and relevant laws, most of them will fall into China’s current legal framework.

In order to implement democratic reform, first, direct village election measures need to be put in place for the election of deputies to town and country people’s congresses. China has about four million elected people’s deputies at five levels (town, county, municipal, provincial and national) and the elections at the town and county levels are direct. Adopting village elections measures at these two levels means free nomination of candidates, unrestricted campaigns by candidates, multiple candidates and secret ballots. These elected local people’s deputies will not only elect township and county magistrates but also deputies at the next higher level. Competitive, open and free elections at these two levels will change the dynamics of China’s politics overnight. Yes, CCP candidates may dominate the process as the system now exists, but it does provide an avenue for non-party candidates to compete free of hassle by the CCP apparatus. This first step needs no major amendments to the Constitution and laws.

Second, is to allow people’s congress deputies at all levels (during the trial period, it may first be limited to the bottom two levels) to use their authority to the fullest extent, as stipulated by the law. Their authority includes electing executive leadership of the government at the same level, approving budgets and expenditure, auditing reports by the judicial and law enforcement branches of government, and voting on all major decisions of government. This requires no change whatsoever to existing law but certainly requires the CCP to cede lower level control and stop manipulating or interfering in the proceedings of people’s congresses. This seems to be the biggest hurdle for an empowered and accountable people’s congress system to take shape.

Third, is for the people’s deputies to be responsible, responsive and respectful to the people who elect them. Their number should be significantly reduced and their representation determined by geography. For example, a Chinese scholar suggests that the NPC cannot function unless its number is cut from the current number of about 3,000 to about 800. No one of the 800 should come from the central government or the military but strictly from the provinces. They must be elected by the provincial legislature (similar to the way that US senators were chosen before the 1920s). This measure does require significant amendment of the laws in China.

These three measures are interconnected and intertwined. No single measure will work unless the other two are in place and enforceable. The first two of the three measures are already stipulated in the law but not even remotely enforced. The real adoption of these measures will have no Western writing on the wall and does not require the CCP to allow other political parties to compete on the same level playing field for now. In other words, these measures are not designed to undermine the supremacy of the CCP, despite their having not been tolerated by the CCP and being perceived by many CCP leaders as potential harbingers of chaos and even civil war.

The adoption of these three measures will not necessarily mean China meets the benchmarks of a real and vibrant democracy, but they would make a meaningful beginning. It is a process that is not drastic and unlikely to trigger radical political activism. These measures are a touchstone as to whether the CCP is taking political reform into serious consideration. They are also a countermeasure against the most powerful and persuasive excuse against democratisation: ordinary Chinese people are not ready to engage in democracy and political stability is paramount. I am hopeful Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo can reach a compromise on this issue with full backing from Hu Jintao. They only have 17 months of their term left to do so.

Yawei Liu is Director of The Carter Center’s China Program and is the Founder and Editor of China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org and www.chinaelectionsblog.net).

5 responses to “How will China become ‘democratic’?”

  1. Centuries of practical experience shows that for stable democracy at least 90% of participating voters must have enough to eat and must be able to read newspapers. China in last decade reached that threshold but there is another concern: new political forces might be focused on more independence from center, even pushing for full independence. Breakup of China would affect lot more people and would be much more messier then breakup of USSR. So, how to ensure that main opposition force will be Kuomintang or something like that and not swarm of small regional parties? Answer that question and democracy might follow shortly…

    • RE: Matosevic

      At the end of every non-democratic regime, there is the possibility of a national split. Welcome to the ultimate legacy of authoritarianism: Fragility by design. Many now successful democratic countries emerged out of huge social disruptions – revolutions even – which offered no guarantees.

      Of course today’s authoritarian regimes offer every guarantee of their own success. Conveniently, one has to topple them to prove them wrong.

      • I don’t feel that revolution is necessary. Although a lot of countries have gone through that process, China is quite different. China is trying to achieve democracy gradually by developing its economy first. When people get rich and educated, they are less likely to resort to violence. South Korea, Japan and Singapore are some models which China could follow.

  2. While I enjoyed subject article it did not address the simple problems involved in reaching the outcome of a Democracy within the Confucian philosophy. Just as the United States is a Republic constructed under Judeo Christian philosophy, so then must the form of government in other countries conform to the underlying moral philosophy.

    There are impediments to China’s being able to reach that state of being. The two major ones relate to the size and influence of the Communist Party and of the People’s Liberation Army. Each are huge bureaucracies (the latter with a monopoly of weapons.) Bureaucracies tend to perpetuate themselves, by force if necessary, rather than to remove their hands from the control levers. We shall see essential progress towards a Democratic objective when at top tier of governance these two elements of national power release power to a third political entity, call it a Party or not.

    • I feel this comment comes closest to dealing with the strategic questions involved, in its mention of both philosophical foundations and the bureaucratic inertia of the CCP and PLA. In fact those two halves meet in the question, do Chinese people need strong central government, in effect, an imperial/mandarin system?
      We ask these questions from the European perspective: what does “need” mean? Does the European system depend on conquest and perpetual war, and do the major wars of the past hundred years reflect the fact that Europe cannot survive in peace: that if it cannot invade others it must invade itself. Israel seems to symbolize that Europe cannot face peace, but must invade something to be normal. And yet Europe has been democratic for most of this current period.
      A long series of questions arise about the origins of law, the nature of human society, and so forth.
      It seems clear that effective government, regardless of laws “on the books” or institutions thereunder, depends on consultation. Markets move information where it is most needed. Chains of command move information to where it is needed. Yet any market can undergo “market failure” and any chain of command can be a means for self-propaganda leading to massive institutional failures.
      The main philosophical difference, “east versus west”, seems to be more than it is. It seems, that is, that European culture believes that truth is a commodity that can be weighed, packaged, bought and sold, placed in a vault for safe-keeping, etc. This is in line with the European idea of God as, in effect, the big guy who knows everything and, if you pray, God will tell you what to do: in so many words. The European idea of truth, that is, is that truth is a set of words which you remember and which tell you what to do: you can carve them on your monuments, your door-posts, your coins, etc. The Asian idea seems to be that truth is beyond human formulation, that if you let the attempt to stand outside reality so as to describe it slip away like a bad dream, you will find yourself acting competently in reality. But if you insist on defining reality, truth, etc., you make war on reality by trying to impose your ideas on top of what is already there but which cannot be put into words. “The ways that the Tao are manifested are manifold.” The Zen concept of nirvana is translated literally as “winking out”, that is, the flame of your desire to describe to yourself (and others?) where you are, what is happening, and what to do must be allowed to go out like a candle flame extinguished by a wind, and only then will you be able to act competently and compassionately with your surroundings (and yourself). “‘What?’ is the sound of one hand clapping.” The question and the answer are inextricably linked even before the answer is “found”. Hindu thought speaks of the “law of dependent origination” whereby your explanation for anything is only really an explanation of your attempt to explain things. “Thou are that” means that your explanation for “that” is also and only your justification for what you are doing about or to that thing.
      But I find on two grounds that east and west do meet. Inside western religious tradition is always found the “mystical” element whereby you realize that you cannot stand outside reality to analyze it before reentering it to act effectively. “There is no place to stand on.” European wars all may have their roots in dissatisfaction with this realization, given that they all promise to bring liberation and law to their victims, but you can’t give what you don’t have, and so far, Europe has not exported law or democracy to anywhere yet: guite the contrary.
      Secondly, the only discernible element in western intellectual tradition is the idea of the adversarial process, the purification of ideas by vigorous debate. J.S. Mill said free discussion is like an antiseptic that kills bad ideas like they were germs. Pope John XXIII said the Catholic Church had to “open its windows”, hence the Second Vatican Council of the 1960’s.
      China has had good reason not to engage in serious national (continental?) debate before now, when it was constantly under European attack. Now the west seems to be finished as a legal idea, and so China can now afford to open its own windows and let the fresh air in.

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