Although the suppression of concepts such as civil society appears to limit the Chinese people’s political autonomy, popular nationalist sentiment is a constant force that presents an ongoing challenge to the government and particularly to its propaganda system as the process of reform continues.

How the Chinese government decides to respond to domestic nationalism has implications not only for relations between the government and the Chinese people, but also for relations between China and other states. There are debates about whether Chinese nationalism poses a threat to world order or to individual countries. Whether Chinese nationalism constitutes a threat is uncertain. It depends upon a number of conditions and their interaction in particular situations. The traditional metaphor of the ruler being like a boat and the people like the water can be used to describe five possible future scenarios in which Chinese nationalism is likely to impact on Chinese foreign policy.

The first is benevolent Chinese nationalism. Just as river water is beneficial for irrigation and daily use, Chinese nationalism can be generous with a cosmopolitan outlook.

Tony Blair’s call for the cancellation of African debt has not been successful in the West, but the Chinese government has cancelled debt in order to improve and increase its international status and national prestige (of course it has also done so from considerations of national interest). In his trip to eight African countries in February 2007 President Hu Jintao cancelled Cameroon’s debt, Sudan’s $19 million debt, $15 million of Liberian debt, and Mozambique’s $15 million debt. In the future, China will continue to spend more money to ‘buy’ its international reputation through new public diplomacy efforts.

Second is controlled nationalism. In the way that a riverbank needs to be strengthened with stones and sand bags in order to control flooding, Chinese popular nationalism has been subject to constant official monitoring and scrutiny. Suisheng Zhao argues that although the party-state exploits popular nationalism ‘when doing so suits its purposes’, it has ‘practised pragmatic nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence’.

In the future, the Chinese government is likely to exercise more control over popular nationalism to prevent it undermining the Chinese official national strategy. Beijing will adopt tougher control and punishment of any unfriendly or insulting language towards Islam or Muslim countries, but is relatively relaxed in its control of popular anti-American opinion.

Third is expanded nationalism. As water sometimes flows into new areas and creates new rivers and streams, Chinese nationalism has expanded in new directions. One example is the protection of Chinese citizens and businesses abroad. In recent years this issue has become a matter of international status and national pride that has the potential to influence China’s military policies.

The Chinese navy has joined in international efforts to patrol the Gulf of Aden and reduce the threat of Somali piracy in that region in 2009. International incidents such as political violence and natural disasters have resulted in the Chinese authorities taking steps to evacuate their nationals from the danger areas in the same way that wealthier developed countries attempt to protect their citizens in such situations.

During the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East the government took steps to evacuate Chinese citizens from countries such as Egypt and Libya, providing a stark contrast with the situation facing large numbers of Bangladeshi refugees who were unable to return home. It is possible that the idea that China can and should dispatch ships or aircraft, including military vehicles, to evacuate its people from foreign lands could evolve into greater Chinese acceptance of the idea that the country’s interests lie not only within its own territory but also extend beyond its borders.

This could in turn result in a more positive attitude towards Chinese intervention to protect its own people in situations where the sanctity of state sovereignty would previously have been paramount, which may have important implications, particularly for Southeast Asian countries that contain large numbers of Chinese nationals.

Fourth is aggressive nationalism. Two completely different power transitions are taking place. At home Xi Jinping is likely to succeed Hu Jintao as the next President of China and General Secretary of the CCP, and abroad the power of China is continually rising at a time of the relative decline of US power. This will affect the development of Chinese official nationalism, which is likely to be a strong current that flows more aggressively.

With more confidence and resources provided by the rise of China, China’s new leadership is likely to defend China’s core national interests in a much tougher manner. It is expected that Xi will adopt a hardline policy towards US arms sales to Taiwan in the near future to gain legitimacy and consolidate his power. Xi expressed strong criticism of the US’s democracy promotion program in China when he delivered a public speech in Mexico in 2008.

Fifth is explosive nationalism in economic crisis. Chinese popular nationalism might explode in a violent form if China’s economy slows down and suffers a serious crisis. When economic crisis strikes in Western liberal societies, immigrants often become a target of nationalist discontent. In China the US is more likely to be the focus of nationalist anger. In the worst situation, Chinese public anger might explode out of control so that the ‘boat of the CCP’ itself would be swamped by the surging waters of popular nationalism.

The question of which scenario is more likely to occur remains because the outcome depends upon many factors and their interaction. But it is clear that, as the process of reform continues, nationalism is likely to exercise a major influence on China’s foreign policies in a number of different ways and to have an impact that is felt well beyond its effects on China’s domestic political system.

Baogang He is Professor and Chair in International Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, Deakin University, Melbourne.

Kingsley Edney is a PhD candidate in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne.

This article was published in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Governing China’.