But he did not say anything that could be interpreted as going against the Party line. Chinese leaders, especially when visiting Western countries, often refer to similar themes. Wen differs in that he often promotes political reforms at various domestic occasions too — though the Chinese mainstream media rarely give this prominent coverage.

Analysts, both inside and outside China, often look upon Wen as an advocate for political reform. But there is also considerable cynicism regarding his sincerity — a famous commentator published a book describing Wen as the best actor in the country, and his family members are said to have accumulated fortunes. While most people are willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, he is still perceived as a lone voice within the leadership, and he is expected to step down as premier in early 2013. In contrast, President Hu Jintao made an earlier speech on 1 July 2011 about the Chinese Communist Party’s ninetieth anniversary; naturally, the speech made headlines in China. Hu emphasised the challenges and dangers facing the Party, but did not hint at any political reform.

At this stage, the Party regime has no intention to give up its monopoly on political power. It maintains its legitimacy and social stability by sustaining economic growth; ensuring good governance in the absence of democracy; and through its social security net, which covers the entire population. In the past decade and more, the leadership has undertaken neither serious political reform nor significant debate on the issue. Rather, the Chinese authorities’ achievements have guaranteed a significant case of path-dependency. As the Party elite has a vested interest in maintaining this tendency, even though different factions may have various ideological orientations, it is extremely difficulty to reach an adequate consensus to promote major changes. And since the status quo, and various adjustments to it, represent mainstream consensus, it will be hard to overcome this reluctance to engage in major political reform.

Intra-Party democratisation is only acceptable when the Party’s monopoly of political power is not threatened. Such measures demand strong consensus and political will among the central leadership if they are to make an impact before the eighteenth National Congress in 2012. But efforts to impel leading Party cadres to declare their assets has encountered severe resistance despite the fact that the proposal has been discussed for more than a decade with no good reason to argue against it. And an earlier suggestion of making the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection accountable to the Party committee — one level above the agency — instead of the Party committee — at the same level — has not been mentioned in the last year or so. The proposal’s original intention was to give the commission a freer hand to monitor Party leaders at the same local level; it is not difficult to understand why the government did not support this.

The government has opened up a series of channels in recent years to receive complaints and reports on cases of corruption and abuses of power. This is designed to facilitate the articulation of citizens’ grievances, thus reducing levels of dissatisfaction and reducing the incentive to lodge their complaints in Beijing. Meaningful political reform would probably begin in these two areas. Allowing more freedom of the mass media can be gradual and carefully monitored, and some of the investigatory reporting prompting decisive action by the leadership can be highly popular, enhancing the Party’s appeal and status. The same applies to strengthening the role of people’s congresses at the county and prefectural-city levels. These two areas provide the litmus test for genuine political reforms to come.

But the leadership succession process is now reaching a critical phase, and Chinese leaders will try to avoid rocking the boat. Concerns for political stability and the status of the incumbent leadership and the Chinese authorities already show that reforms of any kind will encounter serious resistance from vested interests — a good example being the non-ideological issue of real estate prices in major Chinese cities. The real danger for the fifth-generation leadership is that while it may detect the need to initiate reforms, it will not have the political resolve and support to overcome the resistance. The Party regime will then deteriorate.

Dr Joseph Cheng is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong.