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American constraints on the US-South Korea alliance

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In Brief

President Lee Myung-bak’s October trip to the US represents an ostensible high point in the US-ROK alliance.

But there are cracks in the relationship, primarily on the American side.

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Despite Lee’s speech before Congress, Americans know little about Korea compared to allies like Canada, Britain, or Israel. Americans usually see Korea’s geopolitics through the prism of North Korea and the ‘axis of evil’. The Tea Party movement especially takes a rigidly ideological and neoconservative view of South Korea as the ‘frontline of freedom,’ yet Sarah Palin notoriously needed to be taught why there are two Koreas. But ideological commitment is not in-depth public knowledge or cultural interest.

This ideologically-driven connection with the US should be of concern to South Koreans. The US is flirting with national insolvency, and this will dramatically impact all its alliances — especially with the very exposed ROK. The US is now borrowing 40 cents of every dollar it spends; the deficit is US$1.5 trillion (160 per cent of South Korea’s entire GDP); the debt is almost US$10 trillion; the IMF predicts America’s debt-to-GDP ratio will exceed 100 per cent by the end of the decade; and integrated US national security spending tops US$1.2 trillion, 25 per cent of the budget and 7 per cent of GDP. These are mind-boggling figures that all but mandate some manner of US retrenchment from its current global footprint.

Unless the US citizenry is willing to accept a noticeably lower standard of living, including major cuts in social welfare programs, then the burden of fixing America’s finances will include defence cuts. ‘Empire’ is very expensive, and soon American voters will be forced to choose between it and the welfare state — between guns and butter. Ron Paul is already voicing this issue in the Republican primary.

The recent Libyan conflict should be instructive of war in the age of austerity and budget constraints. US public opinion was hesitant for yet another conflict, so Obama provided only air support and deferred leadership to NATO. And consider what Robert Gates said before he left office: ‘any future defence secretary who recommends sending a big US army into Asia or Africa again should have his head examined’.

So America is unlikely to fight large land wars for awhile. This is especially pertinent to the Koreans, as North Korea is a far more capable opponent than Gaddafi or the Taliban. If the US were to suffer from another financial crisis akin to 2008, it is quite possible that Washington could only provide air power in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Or, what if China, which funds so much of US borrowing now, suddenly pulls the plug as US involvement in a war on its border deepens?

Finally, a hard truth for South Koreans is that they need the US a lot more than the US needs them — which means that the resolutely un-discussed relative decline of US power is the real story behind Lee’s visit to Washington.

Unlike the US, South Korea exists within a particularly difficult geopolitical context. It is surrounded by large neighbours who have occasionally bullied it, and bordered by an unpredictable rogue tyranny. Given that weak, encircled countries as diverse as Poland, Paraguay, and Zaire have seen themselves plundered and divided in the past, the US alliance is a good way for South Korea to get some leverage in its tight space. But this will fade, not just as American power recedes from Asia under massive budgetary pressure, but because Seoul is no longer central to Washington’s security. The Cold War is over. Today, a North Korean defeat of South Korea, while a local tragedy, would not dramatically impact American security. This ‘asymmetric dependence’ is the reason behind Lee’s visit, Korea’s willingness to go to Iraq, and Koreans’ astonishing interest in English and the US. While the American public does in fact obsess over Israeli security, small as it is (and far more US congressmen have visited Israel than South Korea), the ROK alliance has weaker, more ideological and less tribal roots in US public  opinion.

None of this means the alliance will break soon, but the strong elite consensus for its existence should not be mistaken for a deep American popular commitment (p 6 here). America’s political and financial dysfunction will soon force a painful reprioritisation of US foreign policy. Commitments like Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Korea and others will be scrutinised, and no amount of Korean-American friendship will undo a US$10 trillion debt.

Robert E. Kelly is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Pusan National University. More of his work can be found at his website, Asian Security Blog.

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