But the more Bangkok’s elite employ the law for political purposes, the more they weaken the monarchical institution. Its usage highlights a sense of desperation, not authority, as the old establishment clearly exploits the law to maintain its position of power.
That many accept the monarchy has a legitimate role to play in Thai political life, and has the right to intervene in times of crisis without sanction, underscores the existence of absolutist elements within the state. In fact, a ‘prerogative state’ now seems to coexist with regular Thai society, in which a handful of elites operate above the rule of law and where democratic accountability is no longer robust.
The lèse-majesté law is used to protect the monarchical institution, but also a much broader system known as the ‘network monarchy’. The law serves to obscure the special prerogatives enjoyed by members of the network monarchy defend them from public scrutiny — so long as their actions are justified by the pretence of safeguarding the monarchy. This process runs parallel with the unending re-sacralisation and re-glorification of the monarchy. The strategy allows political opponents to be accused of disparaging the centuries-old institution and be labelled ‘enemies of the state’.
Interestingly, before the 2006 coup, allegations of lèse-majesté primarily served as an inter-elite means to eliminate one’s enemies. For example, Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party accused the Democrat Party of committing lèse-majesté by exploiting the monarchy in its election campaign. Similarly, Thaksin and Sonthi Limthongkul, a leader of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), also pointed the finger at each other for not respecting the royal institution. After the coup, with the political space much more open — and with the prerogative state coming under threat — the royalists began to target virtually anyone with different political leanings.
Thirty-three charges of lèse-majesté came before the Courts of First Instance in 2005, and the number increased almost fourfold to 126 in 2007. This number jumped to 164 in 2009, and then tripled to 478 cases by 2010.The most dramatic increases came under Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Democrat government. According to one estimate, there may have been hundreds jailed for lèse-majesté in this post-coup period. The dramatic spike in cases seems to have occurred after a pro-elite group — consisting of the PAD, the Democrat Party and the military — urged all Thais to display their absolute and unwavering loyalty to the monarchy. In this line of thinking, treason seems to lurk around every corner, and the lèse-majesté law is a powerful device to silence political dissent.
While objectives like these clearly explain the law’s misuse, the reason for singling out particular enemies is more elusive. As one example, Thailand’s Centre for the Resolution of Emergency Situations drew up a stupefying ‘mind map’ that presented an obscure and convoluted chart supposedly mapping linkages between the monarchy’s enemies — but without any clear explanation.
The chairman of the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand stated that all trials connected to political conflict before and after the 2006 coup should be halted and reviewed. He also suggested the government should reconsider whether to prosecute cases that expand the law’s interpretation too broadly, such as those dealing with a so-called conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy.
The only way for the monarchy to survive in Thailand’s changing political environment is for members of the old establishment to consider reforming, or even abolishing, this anachronistic law. So far, they have failed to acknowledge the devastating effects that come with exploiting it. These reforms could be undertaken in the larger context of amending the current 2007 constitution. This would not be an easy task, and Yingluck Shinawatra’s government may yet prove to be more interested in building a ‘working relationship’ with the palace — rather than challenging it — as a means of securing its own political interests.
Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a Fellow and lead Researcher for Political and Strategic affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the institute of Southeast asian Studies, Singapore.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed’
Reading various scholars in the analysis of the Thai politics, I feel thus far they have ignored the third level of analysis – international politics. In my opinion, by focusing only on individual level and national level of analyses yet failing to incorporate the international politics level which is the decisive factor, I don’t think scholars can explain the “why” factor when the answers to the historical and contemporary Thai political problems are directly link to global politics.
For example, according to Andrew M. Marshall in his article this year, “Thailand’s Moment of Truth,” said that the ex-Prime Minister Luang Thamrong Nawasawat had informed the U.S. Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton in the Memorandum of Conversation, American Embassy, Bangkok, Siam, March 31, 1948, that “In discussing the question of the late King’s death, Thamrong said he did not know whether this tragic incident would ever be cleared up. He said speaking quite confidentially the evidence which was accumulated while he was Prime Minister tended to implicate the present young king, but that he would never have dared to hint by any official action that such was the case.” (2)
Since the death of the current king’s brother, others prominent Allies Forces leaders and members were destroyed one by one. Yet, no scholars have linked or able to research and discuss about the purpose of the Thai lese majesty article 112 and the death of King Ananda.
Another example, Giles Ji Ungpakorn, the gentleman’s picture in this article, is the son of Siam’s Allies Forces leader, a British military official during the World War II, while King Bhumibol’s father was trained in the German military academy. Without bringing the international factor into the Thai politics analysis, it seems we miss the main piece of the puzzle. And yet another example regarding the international politics of the reason why the country’s name was changed from Siam to Thailand, Judith Stowe who served in the British Foreign Service from 1952-1969 and as Head of the Thai and Vietnamese Section of the British Broadcasting Corporation had provided hints about the linkage of the Thai political crises and international politics – the Allies Forces and the Axis Forces – in her book, “Siam Becomes Thailand.”
In explaining the politics of countries in the Asia Pacific region, I don’t think we can ignore the larger framework of international factors. The international politics had been there since the colonial time of the British and the German struggle for influence in the Asia Pacific from the opening door of the Meiji Era to present time. I don’t think we can explain the end of the Thai Chinese King Taksin, the death of King Ananda, and the potent of Article 112 as a political instrument, without combining all three levels of analysis: individual, national, and the Asia Pacific.