Based on the numbers, President Ma will be able to govern with both a clear majority of popular support and legislative freedom over the next four years. Beijing and Washington were also visibly relieved by the KMT’s success, as Tsai’s appointment may have created a new source of instability in East Asia that neither the US nor China was keen to face — given the current state of their own domestic politics. In autumn 2012, China will undergo a leadership succession during the 18th Party Congress, and in November, the US will face its own presidential elections.

The election campaign and results in Taiwan highlight two emerging dynamics. First, figures from Taiwan’s Central Election Commission reveal that although President Ma won, the total number of votes he received dropped by more than 767,000 compared to 2008, when he received 58.45 per cent of the total vote. Conversely, votes for the DPP’s presidential candidate increased by 648,000, a growth of 4.05 per cent. The KMT coalition also lost 18 seats in the Legislative Yuan, a significant portion of its majority, while the opposition DPP coalition gained 16 seats. These gains signify that the KMT’s second term may not be as smooth as the first; President Ma will likely be constrained by increased opposition in the legislature, and this is likely to limit how much he can offer Beijing in enhanced cross-strait relations.

Second, the voting landscape looks to be evolving beyond the generational colour-coded political divisions, which have traditionally divided Taiwanese society into Pan-Blue (pro-unification) and Pan-Green (pro-independence) camps. This was illustrated by the addition of James Soong’s orange-coloured People First Party, which focused on campaigning in the ‘neglected’ central provinces and to Taiwan’s rapidly aging population. Moreover, socio-economic concerns dominated the campaign more so than in previous elections. Consequently, the issue of cross-strait relations became inseparable from the question of Taiwan’s economic security.

Ma’s economic policies — in particular the 2010 signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement — were juxtaposed with Taiwan’s slow economic growth, regressive taxation system, declining public investment, reduced job opportunities for new graduates, and a widening income gap between rich and poor. On the one hand, Ma argued that Taiwan’s future prosperity and greater regional stability both required a reduction in cross-strait tensions — and this would be achieved by promoting pragmatic economic and socio-cultural ties with the mainland. On the other hand, Tsai argued that further integration should be approached with caution; that it will lead Taiwan down the path of becoming a Chinese ‘special administrative zone’ and threaten its de facto independence.

As such, Ma’s slipping popularity and the increased public concern over his cross-strait economic policies suggest that many Taiwanese remain suspicious of Ma’s ties with mainland China. So while the election may not have reconfigured cross-strait relations, the risk remains that Beijing could become impatient with its limited influence over Taiwan’s democratic government, especially with the re-election of a pro-China KMT-dominant legislature.

Ma’s victory has almost certainly raised Beijing’s expectations; China’s leaders may pressure Ma to begin formally discussing Taiwan’s political future, and among other measures, Beijing may call upon Taiwan to halt the purchase of arms from the US and phase out its military ties with Washington. Rather than stabilising the cross-strait status quo, the KMT’s election victory may usher in a new period of instability — not one in which Taiwan calls for de jure independence and recognition as a sovereign nation — but one in which China may intensify its demands on Taiwan.

Sheryn Lee is Project Officer and Research Assistant at the Languages of Security in the Asia-Pacific project, and Research Assistant at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.