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Diplomatic currents running strong in the South China Sea

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In Brief

Chinese civilian maritime surveillance vessels carried out a number of aggressive activities in parts of the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam in early 2011, raising regional tensions and sparking concern in the US and throughout the region about maritime security. 

This concern now seems largely abated, after diplomatic efforts produced a somewhat unexpected positive development.

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China and ASEAN member states finally agreed on a set of guidelines for implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in July 2011. The final DOC guidelines contained only two changes to the original draft drawn up in 2002, while six points in the original draft remained unchanged. Point two in the first draft initially read: ‘ASEAN will continue its current practice of consulting among themselves before meeting with China’. This was revised to read: ‘Parties to the DOC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in accordance with the spirit of the DOC’. An additional eighth point was included, which states: ‘Progress of the implementation of the agreed activities and projects under the DOC shall be reported annually to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting’.

The squall over territorial disputes in the South China Sea thus seems to have blown out as quickly as it arose. Since the DOC guidelines were adopted, no major incidents have been reported in contested waters. What explains the adoption of the DOC guidelines and this turn to diplomacy?

First, it appears that Chinese leaders realised that assertive action was counterproductive. China’s actions raised the spectre of a new ‘China threat’, caused the Philippines to reinvigorate its alliance with the US and led Vietnam to take largely symbolic actions to upgrade its defence ties with Washington. It also resulted in major expressions of concern by the US and other regional powers at the ASEAN Regional Forum and inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus in 2010. China was equally motivated to enter into discussions with ASEAN states as a gambit to cut out any US involvement in facilitating a resolution of South China Sea issues.

Second, the ASEAN states ceded ground by agreeing to revise point two. ASEAN members are divided in their approach to issues concerning the South China Sea and several members — particularly Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand — do not want to confront China or side with the US. But point two’s alteration is mainly symbolic in any case, as the ASEAN Charter already makes provision for inter-ASEAN discussions.

Following the adoption of the DOC guidelines in July last year, ASEAN senior officials met in Cambodia to prioritise the confidence-building measures outlined in the 2002 DOC. China then hosted the first meeting of the Joint Working Group on the DOC Guidelines. Simultaneously, and on a separate track, ASEAN officials are drawing up a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, which ASEAN hopes will be more binding than the DOC. They are debating whether to include provisions similar to the Soviet–US Incidents at Sea Agreement and whether to open the Code of Conduct to accession by all dialogue partners.

In a separate development, China and Vietnam reached an agreement on principles to guide the settlement of maritime disputes in October 2011. This document is not specifically focused on the South China Sea but reiterates that both sides agree not to use force or the threat of force to settle their territorial disputes.

It seems that China is also gradually clarifying its claims to the South China Sea, an important step if the existing territorial disputes are ever to be resolved.  A foreign ministry spokesperson stated that no country claims the entire South China Sea, which analysts interpreted to mean that China is not claiming all the waters within its nine-dash-line map as territorial waters. China is now focusing on its sovereignty claims to various islands and surrounding waters, thus shifting its position from asserting an ‘historic rights’ claim to a closer alignment with international law. Legal experts view this as a preliminary step, but also argue that China needs to be more precise about what islands and rocks it claims.

Current diplomatic efforts appear tied to ASEAN’s annual cycle of meetings, and it is expected that China will keep a low profile in the run up to the ASEAN and related summits held later in the year. Both sides are likely to work hard to produce a Code of Conduct following these summits, which they hope to unveil in November in Phnom Penh. This document would be an important breakthrough if it can be achieved, as the current round of China–ASEAN diplomacy on implementing confidence-building measures under the DOC will not resolve sovereignty disputes — at best the Code of Conduct will encourage moderation in China’s behaviour and lower tensions.

Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

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