These new skirmishes have centred on the exploration of natural resources in the region, and have resulted in a spree of joint military exercises and verbal muscle flexing from several of the region’s capitals. The Philippines has made multiple reports of Chinese naval vessels trespassing into contested waters, a few of which involved physical encounters between the Chinese vessels and Philippine ships (mostly fishing boats). It has also accused China of planting new installations in contested areas of the SCS and intimidating Philippine oil exploration ships. As a result of these incidents, the Philippines has bumped up military purchases and increased naval and air patrols in the region.
Vietnam and China started off well with four bilateral meetings in the first months of 2011 to discuss their SCS differences. Unfortunately, a unilaterally instated fishing ban by China in early May, subsequent Chinese naval patrols in the region, and an increase of Chinese fishing boats in Vietnamese waters, has produced a relapse. The ominous ‘cable cutting incidents’ which followed — during which the cables of Vietnamese oil exploration ships were cut in encounters with Chinese ships — have further aggravated the situation. China has been quick to remind its neighbours of its ‘indisputable sovereignty over the SCS islands and adjacent waters’. Vietnamese leaders replied with firm statements about their claim to the Paracels and Spratlys, and announcements of live-fire exercises by the Vietnamese navy.
Apprehension in the capitals of Vietnam and the Philippines has led their leaders to seek backing from the US. This has not helped reduce tensions. Vietnam made a joint statement with the US on the importance of freedom of navigation in the SCS on 17 June, to which China responded instantly by repeating that the SCS dispute should remain a matter for the claimants, not outside parties.
Meanwhile, the Philippines has explicitly declared it will request help from the US should it feel threatened by China’s aggressive behaviour. Although China responded with reassurances that it intends to uphold its pledge of non-violence, this message was somewhat nullified by the simultaneous announcement that China’s largest patrol ship, the Haixun 31, was being dispatched to the SCS. Although officially on a mission to maintain peace in the region, the move has caused disquiet among rival claimants. Reports of a three-day military exercise by the Chinese navy near the Spratlys have done little to relieve these concerns.
Amidst deepening frictions among several SCS parties, current ASEAN chair Indonesia has called for a relaxing of tensions. Indonesia does not claim any of the disputed islands involved in the conflict, and lacks the history of maritime clashes with China that Vietnam and the Philippines share. However, its Exclusive Economic Zone overlaps with China’s claim — based on the infamous ‘nine-dotted line’ map — which includes Indonesia’s largest natural gas reserve. When assuming the ASEAN chair in January, Indonesia immediately voiced its concerns that inaction would lead to further escalation of enmities over SCS claims. As a result, progress on further guidelines was made top priority of the Indonesian chairmanship this year.
In the past six months Indonesia has met with several regional representatives, including China, Japan and the Philippines, to discuss the ongoing dispute. After the latest round of verbal hostilities and with more military exercises in the South China Sea imminent, Indonesia, on 17 June, made another statement urging a follow up to the nearly decade-old DoC, emphasising that regional security is at stake.
The current standoff and Indonesia’s diplomatic position makes one wonder whether Indonesia could offer a solution. Could it act as mediator in the SCS dispute? It holds a central position in ASEAN, which encompasses the bulk of the claimants. It maintains good relations with China and enjoys the backing of the US. Up until now, efforts to defuse the dispute have been thwarted by China’s strict emphasis on bilateral negotiations, which reflect its desire to prevent the dispute becoming internationalised. Even ASEAN is refused as a talking partner, as the organisation itself does not hold a claim. Chances are China will decline Indonesian mediation as well, given its preference for bilateral talks. Then again, Indonesia may be ‘neutral’ and inoffensive enough to allow it to take a ceremonial position as mediator. It may also be a good opportunity for China to keep the US out. Similarly, although worries about squandering ASEAN unity with one of the members taking a frontrunner position will no doubt be raised, it could also be considered beneficial for ASEAN as a whole and for the ASEAN claimants’ position to have ‘one of their own’ take the lead.
For Indonesia, taking initiative in the region’s most complex and long-standing dispute would address the prevailing ‘underestimation of Indonesia’s relevance’, as observed by Peter Drysdale, and help it attain the position next to the other Asian giants it so desires. Earlier posts on the East Asia Forum have suggested that Indonesia’s current economic growth and future economic potential, combined with its improved political situation and increased engagement in several world forums, precipitate a larger role for Indonesia in the future. Admittedly, having Indonesia go out on a limb to offer its services and getting the other claimants to consent to negotiations is a stretch. On the other hand, desperate times call for desperate measures, and the current situation in the South China Sea certainly qualifies as an alarming situation indeed.
Fenna Egberink is an independent researcher in the Netherlands.
The hostility against China seemingly emerges out of nowhere. Why and how this happens is important to know if we are to stifle war.
The puzzle of why nations sometimes cooperate with one another and other times engage in cruel conflict is the central concern of those who want to understand international politics. Those more concerned with sources of potential conflict tend to focus on security studies to understand how relations of cooperation and competition take shape across national boundaries.
Structural realism, often associated with Kenneth Waltz, is the most prominent system-oriented theory. From a structural point of view, such factors as the distribution of power, the concentration of national interests on security and international agreements are the central determinants of international politics.
Structural realism should not be confused with interdependence theory –trade for cooperation– or the importance of domestic politics in giving shape to international affairs — public opinions, interest groups, and bureaucratic politics. All such approaches are oriented toward understanding foreign policy rather than thinking of international politics as a global phenomenon.
In the post-Cold War 9/11 world politics, I would argue that the most prominent perspective for studying interantional politics should be centered on structural features of international system. From this point of view, such factors as the distribution of power or the configuration of alliances, the concentration of national interests on security, and the predictability or unpredictability of relations are the central determinants of international politics. Even individual national control over power or capabilities are of much less importance than the distribution of power or the formation of alliance from the systemic perspective.
Importantly, the construction of alliance against China in sea power, territories, and resources in the Asia Pacific is derived from this theory.
Second, in the era of 9/11 hegemonic challenge against the US hegemony, it is not at all a surprise that the challengers are trying to pit the US against China. Only when the top two fight, can the challenger emerge as the new hegemon. Put it differently, in a normal situation peace is desirable but in the hegemonic challenge event, war is wanted. And there is nothing easier than using resources and the issue of territories to form an alliance and create a wanted war.
Third, according to power transition theory, China is in the stage of transitional growth in power. The next stage is the stage of power maturity. While the US hegemonic power is in relative decline and while China’s power is not yet mature. In the calculation of the challengers, this is the time for war! The time for global war to change the territories of the world map. The power transition theory explains that We can now understand why world peace has coincided with periods of unchallenged supremacy of power, whereas the periods of approximate balance have been the periods of wars. China’s desire for peace is thus irrelevant when the challengers want war now.
History has shown the importance of sea power in the maintenance of its supremacy such as the US, UK, Spain and the Netherlands in the past. Hence, the construction of maritime conflict in the South China Sea aims at China’s naval power projection.
Now, no one can eat the cake, and have it, too, and it is late in the day for free riders to attempt to negatively portray China, a strength without which the world would be even more chaos than it is. China is a deterrence against World War III. China’s rise is the creation of the US balance of power; power transition theory explains the emergence of China as a great power of the 21st century for world peace. Great power rivalry or World War III is hinged on the strength of China’s power especially naval power.