Their chances for prosperity can be increased by harnessing the potential of these rivers for irrigation and power, by controlling their perils (such as floods), and managing them in the face of increasing demands and threats to supplies from climate change.
A set of climatic and social changes has transformed the context for cooperation over the Himalayan rivers. Previous negotiations engaged rivers on the assumption that these waterways had stable futures, that social interaction with the rivers was guided by the demands of agrarian economies and that transboundary negotiations could be approached through traditional diplomacy. At the beginning of the 21st century, these three assumptions have changed. Glacial melting and climate change have undermined the assumption that these rivers hold a stable future. The rapid growth of industrial economies in India and China will change the predominant social demands on the rivers from those of agrarian societies to those of industrial ones, and will insert China as a possible major player in the discussion. Government diplomacy is expanding to include commercial actors and is deepening through the rise of civil-society interactions.
While in the 1990s, several international agreements, particularly between India and Nepal, established important precedents for cooperation over water, the potential for reduced conflict and greatly improved regional development has only partly been realised. One aspect of this slow progress was the lack of an institutional framework for overall evaluation and facilitating implementation. More recently, a wave of hydroelectric projects in the Himalayan valleys of India, Pakistan and Nepal has raised concerns. Foreign capital, including from China, adds to the complexity of the situation. China’s own hydroelectric projects on the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra have potentially important implications for Bangladesh and India.
One possible path to best manage the rivers would be a new regulatory body that encompasses all the nations with stakes in the Himalayan rivers. This body would incorporate a mix of expertise and interests — including a panel of technical experts, experienced diplomats from each country and representatives of key interest groups. A new water regulatory institution could serve as a knowledge clearing house and source of technical information for a range of water issues. It could also monitor the health of river basins, the progress of various projects and adherence to international agreements. Potentially, some level of enforcement authority could be assigned to this body by member nations, though issues of sovereignty will always be delicate. At the very least, violators or non-performers could be named and shamed if such an institution were to increase disclosure and transparency, and provide a centralised source of the resulting information.
From India’s perspective, China’s presence in such a body would unavoidably change the strategic balance of South Asian river discussions, reducing India’s bargaining power or ability to act relatively unilaterally as a result of its dominant position in South Asia. Yet China’s ability to drastically affect water supplies throughout South Asia, particularly as the impacts of climate change become more severe, means that its inclusion is necessary and potentially valuable to all parties. The participation of both Chinese and Indians in the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), including senior politicians and technical experts, indicates that cooperation between the two giants in this sphere is feasible.
What interests would sustain such a regulatory authority? First, a new basis for Himalayan cooperation would make possible new water and environmental management initiatives, both small and large scale. In other words, there are benefits to be gained. Second, the challenges of climate change and glacial melting generate uncertainties which will be hard to respond to without such an institution. That is, the costs of not cooperating are likely to be substantial, and this will rapidly and increasingly become apparent.
The history of managing the Mekong basin, from the control of colonial powers to a Mekong River Commission that does not include major upstream nations (China and Myanmar), indicates some of the problems with traditional nationalist approaches to multilateral cooperation, as well as the limitations of investment-oriented multilateral institutions. Of course, there is no ideal or easy solution to these trade-offs and the success of any institution depends on the specifics of design and implementation. Therefore, in addition to ICIMOD, the Mekong River Commission could also provide a starting point for thinking about the appropriate institutional design. The importance and urgency of the problem requires some institutional innovation, and design and implementation can only occur once the idea has been firmly placed on the agenda of policy makers in the countries at risk from future water shortages and crises.
Ben Crow is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
Nirvikar Singh is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
I don’t think using climate issues in an attempt to create an institution to control the two civilizations of Asia in their own backyards is going to work for two obvious reasons. First, the issue of “water” in Himalayas and the Mekong has military implications in the current hegemonic challenge planning and objectives. Because the height of the Himalayas for the control of the ‘Sea Line of Communication,’ and the Mekong river for objectives in Southeast Asia, the issue thus is no longer ordinary. Second, in dealing with India and China, one needs the knowledge of ‘high-context culture’ in which behavioral and environmental nuances are an important means of conveying information.
The issue of climate change is serious beyond the game of being named and shamed. While the Japanese companies are polluting rivers around Asia, the Japanese government attempts to create the image of the Kyoto Protocol. For example, thirteen Japanese companies at Map Ta Put industrial complex in Thailand have ignored the hazardous waste disposal and the emission of carbon from industrial use of fossil fuels issue. The damage of the Japanese companies violation of environmental regulations has led to the Thai government ordered the closing of the operation of those companies. These examples have important implications for the broader domain of climate change at its core.
Ultimately, what is at stake here is the contribution of every country in the world to lessen the impact of climate change. Currently the Obama Administration imposes 30 per cent tariffs on Chinese solar panels. While American solar panels are too costly for Americans, the lower pricd Chinese solar panels are being blocked from American consumers. Since the solution to the environmental threat and country policy is linked, every country should take the lead in a worldwide effort to replace wrong policy with a strategy for clean energy, energy efficiency, and conservation.