While this latter approach does not explicitly propose a united front, it does imply that ASEAN would gain strategic and political force against China. But the question is whether ASEAN would gain by pinning China as its opponent. The answer is unlikely to be positive. ASEAN should be a fair, neutral and transparent facilitator of peace, rather than an aggressive opponent against China, when it comes to resolving the South China Sea dispute.
A united front may provide short-lived, small-scale benefits to those ASEAN member states involved in the dispute, but it would be detrimental to ASEAN as a whole. Even if a united front was successful and China did not retaliate, would ASEAN really benefit? The answer is likely, no. The ASEAN member states engaged in the dispute may obtain more bargaining power and other political gains, but they may not get much more than this because China is unlikely to be able to succumb to ASEAN’s pressure. In fact, China has little room for further compromise beyond its current policy of ‘setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development’, unless it can manage angry public opinion inside China.
This strategy would leave little to be gained for ASEAN as a whole, as the dispute will continue while the region’s peace and prosperity will be at stake. And if ASEAN unconditionally supports its members, more of these states may take advantage of ASEAN in other disputes, making its foreign policy more volatile and aggressive. ASEAN has to be particularly cautious about being trapped by the economic and military consequences brought about by the actions of individual member states.
Realistically, China would likely respond both politically and economically, and bring about further losses for ASEAN. So far, China has been very supportive of ASEAN in resolving regional issues, including the South China Sea dispute. But China may not maintain its current policy toward ASEAN if the latter were to become China’s opponent. The question then becomes: what might happen then?
First, China would be unlikely to maintain an ASEAN-integrated policy and respect ASEAN’s role in resolving regional issues. ASEAN’s influence on China would diminish and Beijing’s economic and political support for the organisation would weaken.
Second, ASEAN may lose its centrality in promoting regional integration and its role in the region may be marginalised. On the basis of geographic location and economic production networks, China is becoming the focal point of East Asian regional integration. ASEAN’s centrality did not happen by chance and needs to be maintained through great political determination, meaning China’s retreat would be a blow for ASEAN’s position in the region.
Finally, an ASEAN united front may push China to pursue a subregional, China-centred regional integration roadmap, which would dwarf — it not completely undermine — the ASEAN path toward regional integration. From China’s perspective, a Greater Mekong subregional integration plan is more realistic than any other proposed roadmaps, such as ASEAN plus China, ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. The Greater Mekong Subregion is geographically — and now economically — connected. And politically, there is much less conflict between these countries and China (except for the case of Vietnam) than is the case between China and countries outside the sub-region. Further integration of the Greater Mekong Subregion could move faster than ASEAN’s regional integration, which by then may not be relevant to some, if not all, of its member states.
An ASEAN united front would likely create more losses than gains for some ASEAN member states as well. Indonesia would be the biggest loser, as it would be deprived of its leadership among the emerging regional economies. Even among the four countries that have ongoing disputes with China — the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam — the benefits, if any, would be different for each country. For Brunei and Malaysia, in particular, additional benefits from a united front would be minimal, as it has little chance of gaining more than it already has now.
ASEAN should be a neutral, transparent and fair platform for both sides to resolve disputes peacefully, and should not take a biased stand toward its member states. By promoting this first platform, ASEAN has the potential to gain credit from both member states and the international community, and increase its profile in the international arena for its ability to tackle regional affairs. A transparent, neutral and fair ASEAN is certainly in the best interests of China, ASEAN member states and the region.
Xunpeng Shi is an Energy Economist at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.
ASEAN countries are traditionally more economically than politically focused. There is no evidence of an intention to take sides on behalf of their member states over the dispute with China.
In fact, unlike the reports by the mainstream media, the Filipinos themselves have a variety of views on the standoff. Many high profile Filipinos including law makers, retired bankers, NGOs and academics are more angry with their President’s behaviour in the disputes than China.
I agree the observation that ASEAN is traditionally economically focused. However, this tradition could change. This article analyses some of the consequences of such change. I read through your archive about media report on SCS. The bias in the western media did actually blur the dispute itself. This is unfortunate. However, it is a good thing that there are diverse views in the Filippino media and not all are supportive of the President. If this is really the mainstream, which is unlikely, the Philippine government may change its stand in the future.
This article is illogical and threatening:
1. Remember that China really is the aggressor in SCS. The common denominator is violence against neighbors. Others agree on the use of international laws (UNCLOS)to deal with this conflict, except for China clinging on to an arbitrary map.
2. When China is bullying smaller nations bordering on SCS at will (because it can), it’s not plausible to suggest that China will respect the national rights of any Greater Mekong Sub-region neighbors. In fact, that may be its next target after SCS: all they need to do is to find Chinese relics buried in the deep jungle of Cambodia,Laos,Burma, Thailand and these countries will be part of China.
3. The global effect is felt and the world is watching with interest, ready to join in. ASEAN should form a united front and lead because they have legitimate reason to do so: Australia, Japan, India and maybe the USA… are awaiting. China only the language of force.
It is good to have a view from Vietnamese side, which is the largest stakeholder in the SCS dispute. What the Philippines did was actually of less benefit to itself than to Vietnam. It is understandable that some countries (not all, as I said in the article) would like to have a united front not only among ASEAN but also with other regional and global powers. That kind of “Cold War” alignment will distablize the region and is not likely to be in the interests of these powers. ASEAN should in particular avoid that approach as it will be damaging to its economic outwardness and status in regional affairs. Cooperation and negotiation are better than confrontation for ASEAN in the SCC dispute. By the way, your statements, thatt “China only knows the language of force.” and “China really is the a
An interesting but depressing posting. Why is a “united front” by definition an “aggressive alliance”? Isn’t the whole point of a “united front” to lower the threat of “aggression”, especially a military crisis spinning out of control? Isn’t the reason for that concern the pattern to date of China using its paramilitary maritime forces to isolate ASEAN members, one on one, where the preponderance of force is naturally on China’s side?
Clever tactic, perhaps, but surely one which invites a “united front” response…and to my criticism of Dr Shi, surely by definition a “defensive” one? Presumably Dr Shi is not suggesting that ASEAN form an aggressive collective military response!? I think Dr Shi’s binary proposition says more about China’s intentions and tactics than is realized.
Perhaps Dr Shi also has in mind the US “pivot/refocus”, but even a cursory look at the US policy since Sec. St. Clinton’s speech at the Hanoi ARF in 2010 shows that the entire thrust is to reassure the individual ASEAN members that the US supports a diplomatic resolution (individually or collectively) to the maritime resource disputes.
Look how careful Washington has been to evade the more aggressive suggestions of Mutual Defence Treaty intervention on Manila’s behalf in the Scarborough Reef adventure, as just one example.
China has persistently argued that Beijing had no problems with individual ASEAN countries until Mrs Clinton’s dramatic speech. Pure nonsense, as any ASEAN member well knows. Sec State Clinton spoke in response to years of pressure and requests by individual ASEAN members, including but certainly not just The Philippines and Vietnam.
Chris Nelson, Washington, D.C., Editor, The Nelson Report
I’m very happy to see my piece stimulating discussion and it’s good to have Mr Nelson bringing a US perspective.
First , I would to clarify the question of the ‘united front’. Of course, I did not mean in using that phrase an ASEAN military united front, which is impossible and would be a disaster for the region. I also did not mean a ‘United Voice’ on the ongoing ‘Code of Conduct of South China Sea (SCS)’, although I do think that it would have been preferable for ASEAN to be transparent and to engage China at the very beginning. Here the united front represents an ASEAN united stance on the SCS territory dispute.
This kind of non-military united front can still be aggressive, although less seriously so than a military alliance. In particular, at this stage, some ASEAN members are aggressive, and a united front would be aggressive unless ASEAN can hold those members back. That is very unlikely. The recent Cambodia-Thailand border dispute shows how weak ASEAN is in managing relations among its members. A united front is most probably going to be driven by the most aggressive members and thus become collectively aggressive. This is a scenario about which I am particularly worried.
A second point that I should clarify is that the trend in ASEAN thus far has been to encourage complementarity of interests. Many ASEAN countries are very cautious about the emergence of a global power contest in its backyard, and about ASEAN getting dragged into regional conflict. ASEAN is traditionally economics and business oriented and thus will benefit from a stable, secure and prosperous region.
Let me turn now to Mr. Nelson’s comments.
Can the ASEAN united front be non-aggressive? As implied above, I doubt that a non-aggressive united front is sustainable. If it is genuinely non-aggressive, how can it be helpful in ‘lowering the threat of” (China’s) “aggression”? Unless the united front can create pressure, it will not be effective. If ASEAN is going to work as a dialogue forum, as I suggested in the essay, such a united front would not be necessary. A non-aggressive united front, is probably not what the Philippines and Vietnam want. The assumption of a defensive united front is also not valid since the recent tensions in SCS were initiate by one or two ASEAN members, rather than China.
It sounds like the US is passively involved in the SCS issues. It would be interesting to know what some ASEAN members have complained to the US about. Is it ‘freedom navigation’, which is at the centre of expressed US interests? If yes, it would be not sensible for the world’s leader give lots of attention to what are business as usual issues. If not, what has the US heard? And why did the US not speak out?
I am also interested to know what the US’s interest is in SCS’s energy resources, which are widely believed to be the key factor that triggered the sharp contestation recently. Do US oil companies have any interests in these disputes?
In the reality, the US’s interest in the SCS is interpreted, probably by both sides of the contest, as a part of the strategic shift of focus back to East Asia. This interpretation encourages a Chinese view that its legitimate interests are being pushed back. This also encourages the aggressive actions of those ASEAN members who feel more confidence in confronting China with a potential backup. The US, although it claims to be innocence in this, is suspect as it is more actively engaging with those ASEAN members during the tensions, it is also more frequently talking about SCS (although the focus is on freedom of navigation), and it will be a beneficiary over either China or ASEAN members or both, whatever the outcome.
If the US does not intend to have a strategic shift back to East Asia on account of China, as is popularly believed, the US had better revert to its posture of two years ago, to avoid sending ambiguous signals . Otherwise, whatever it says will be not be believed by China and its SCS protagonists. In which case the US’ image in the SCS dispute would be anything other than a fair mediator. If the US is innocent and truly misunderstood, it needs to clarify not only by what is saying, but also by what it is doing.