by issuing a ‘common position’. However, not only Indonesia but everyone in ASEAN — as well as China and the US — (and all the king’s horses and all the king’s men) would do well to come and help seal the cracks.
For the last 45 years ASEAN has issued a joint communiqué at the end of each of its meetings. There has always been bilateral friction between member states, but this friction is normally smoothed over in meetings. Member states generally agree that ASEAN is more than the sum of its parts, and the joint statement at the end of each meeting reaffirms that the organisation is more important than any single member. Even if it reflects only the lowest common denominator, the communiqué is still a symbolic affirmation of shared strategic interests.
So there is more at stake in recent events than the statement itself. A few sentences acknowledging the recent tensions between Vietnam and the Philippines and China could have sufficed. Thus it is confounding that the chair, Cambodia, was unable to forge even a minimalist consensus, though some speculate that there were promises made to a certain non-member of the ASEAN family — China.
It should come as no surprise that Indonesia’s Natalegawa was doing the troubleshooting after the Phnom Penh summit. Though technically this is the responsibility of the ASEAN Secretary General, Thailand’s Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand and Cambodia’s relations over the Preah Vihear temple remain frayed, so Indonesia would find it easier to approach Cambodia.
By breaking with the established practice of issuing a communiqué, ASEAN sends a message that some members do not recognise the ongoing existence of shared strategic interests. Then, it is right to ask, what is the purpose of ASEAN, and what is the purpose of their being an ASEAN?
ASEAN members do share a significant strategic interest: Southeast Asia’s small and medium powers need to collectively preserve their autonomy against any great power that would dominate the region. For decades this has been ASEAN’s reason for being, and explains why Cambodia’s perceived weakness in the face of Chinese pressure and enticements is so grave. By succumbing to China, Cambodia acts against ASEAN’s most important function.
On the other hand, the Philippines is perceived to be excessively and unabashedly enthusiastic over the prospect of US intervention in the resolution of territorial disputes. US intervention may serve the Philippines’ national interest, but it unnerves many in ASEAN — even those who quietly support a robust US presence.
After all, both the US and China have the potential to dominate Southeast Asia. Moreover, China’s assertiveness is driven by the fear that the US ‘Asian pivot’ is directed against China and that ASEAN will become Washington’s co-conspirator.
If ASEAN cannot speak with one voice, it will struggle to remain relevant. The failure in Phnom Penh not only undermines ASEAN’s ‘centrality’; it calls into question ASEAN’s ability to negotiate with other countries as a collective actor. Disunity couldn’t come at a worse time than when ASEAN is preparing to negotiate with China on a code of conduct for the South China Sea. This coincides with China’s rapid modernisation of its military and growing assertiveness.
Code of conduct negotiations will be a critical opportunity for ASEAN to pursue conflict prevention measures with China. Such measures might include a moratorium on further military expansion, military exclusion zones around disputed land features, agreements on how to deal with fishing activities in areas where there exist overlapping claims, and hotlines between leaders. The outcome of these negotiations could spell the difference between peace and armed conflict in the South China Sea.
ASEAN’s most urgent task is to ensure the effectiveness of any new code — resolving ownership issues is a lesser priority at the moment. If ASEAN members who do not have claims in the South China Sea feel burdened by the negotiations, they might consider abstaining. The claimants (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei) and other interested stakeholders (such as Indonesia and Singapore) should consider establishing a separate framework for code of conduct negotiations with China, one preferably still under ASEAN auspices.
ASEAN fancies itself the foundation of cooperative security architecture in Asia. At the moment, though, that foundation looks decidedly shaky. If ASEAN cannot make a solid show of unity before discussions on a code of conduct begin, it throws away a major opportunity to develop this architecture. If this happens, ASEAN could end up abdicating responsibility for managing its own regional problems to big external powers.
Aileen S. P. Baviera is Professor at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines.
Thank for your article. However, you have only mentioned one part of the story. If you say it is the first time that in the 45 years in its history, that ASEAN can not issue its joint communique, the same can also said that it is the first time that two members of ASEAN have “hijacked” the 45th AMM/PMC/ARF and have decided to take the joint communique as a hostage of its demand to the Chair, Cambodia, to include the phrase “Scarborough Shoal” and ” the Continental Shelf and EEZ” into the South China Sea section of the draft Joint Communique. There are main two reasons in supporting these arguments.
First, you can check the previous Joint Communiques from the past years. It just stated the issue of South China Sean in general that all parties should adhere to DOC in 2002, peaceful settlement of disputes, and UNCLOS. But this time two ASEAN countries strongly demanded to include its specific disputed area of the sea into the draft statement. Having seen that there is no consensus on this, they decided to block the whole Joint Communique that has around 130 agreed paragraphs, except the South China Sea section.
Second, the ASEAN Chair has convened two or three Special ASEAN Foreign Minster Meeting during the 45th AMM/PMC/ARF/2nd EAS FMMs to find possible solutions, which has the same substance of the Six-point Principle of South China Sea issue, proposed by Indonesia’s foreign Minister after the Meeting in Phnom Penh. However, it was flatly rejected by the two countries during that time. So, Cambodia, in its capacity of ASEAN Chair, has tried all possible means to ensure ASEAN unity and centrality. I may recall that the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (DOC)was adopted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2002, when Cambodia chaired ASEAN for the first time. So, it is insane to say that Cambodia have done nothing for ASEAN.
Of course I can provide more explanations on this. I hope that my comment would enlighten your readers who wish to seek the truth on this.
I have been provided the notes of discussions at the ASEAN Ministers Meeting Retrest taken by a participant. They indicate, to the contrary, that Cambodia as ASEAN Chair did not engage the Philippines and Vietnam but resorted with the threat to withhold the joint communique unless it reflected Cambodia’s preferences. We know from the New York Times that Indonesia and Singapore brokered a compromise getting the Philippines and Vietnam to agree on a new form of words. When this was taken to Minister Hor Namhong at an emergency meeting he rejected this compromise outright, gathered his papers and stormed out of the room.
Your source and your position is not credible unless or he/she is prepared to be quoted.