Now that the training wheels are off the young Kim has decided he is mature enough to rule the country single-handedly and is about to show the world who he really is and what he is capable of.
The sudden ousting of Kim Jong-un’s military mentor, Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, is indicative of a serious conflict between the two. The 69-year-old veteran was hastily relieved of his duties in the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and deposed from the Workers’ Party of Korea. There are suggestions that Ri Yong-ho defied the dismissal and ordered his men to open fire, leaving some 20 or 30 people dead.
It is possible that Kim Jong-un decided to sack his mentor to remove the last element of guardianship imposed by his late father. In addition to Kim’s numerous positions within the party and military, he has recently been awarded the highest military rank of Marshal, a title previously held only by his father and grandfather. The new title signals that the young Kim is without peer.
Another dimension of the succession strategy was evident in the all-female Moranbong band, which was attended by Kim Jong-un and broadcast nationally in July 2012, a week before Ri Yong-ho’s fall from grace. Rumour has it that Kim Jong-un personally came up with the idea for the concert and selected the performers. The nature of the show — which featured Walt Disney characters and other symbols of Western culture — came as a surprise to many foreign commentators. The dictator and his uniform-clad military attendees warmly welcomed the performers.
The mystery woman who has accompanied Kim Jong-un on most recent cultural functions turned out to be his wife, Ri Sol-ju (who has studied in China and visited South Korea in 2005). This is a new step in promoting Kim Jong-un’s public image. He is now being seen by North Koreans as a mature man and head of the family, rather than as the youngest child of Kim Jong-il.
These are coded signals designed to reassure the North Korean population that they are being ruled by a powerful, shrewd and caring leader. Kim Jong-un presents himself as conservative in style but modern in heart, and though he might be ruthless to subordinates, he is always benevolent to the common people.
The purpose of the recent cosmetic changes and scandalous reshuffles is to diffuse the issue of legitimacy, which the Kim dynasty faces with each succession. Many important questions about Kim Jong-un’s leadership are diverted by the mix of pseudo K-Pop shows, fake Disney parades and bloody shoot-outs between Vice-Marshals.
Relations with South Korea will continue to be strained until the South’s conservative government is replaced by the moderates, who may resume the Sunshine Policy. Pyongyang’s dialogue with Washington will remain muted unless North Korea abandons its nuclear program. Russia is too pragmatic to lend more money to the bankrupt regime. China expects the young leader to embrace economic reform, but any attempt to liberalise North Korea’s economy would leave Kim’s clan vulnerable to a crisis of legitimacy, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the DPRK’s political system. Under any future market-oriented reforms, the roles of elite groups associated with non-productive sectors of the economy (the Party, the Army and state security) would be made obsolete, with their socioeconomic status worsened. Disillusioned masses and angry elites are a recipe for popular uprising and the collapse of the Kim dynasty. This is Kim Jong-un and his advisors’ worst nightmare.
Kim Jong-un is left with few choices, none of which seem suitable. Despite some temporary disagreements and purges, the North Korean leadership will continue supporting superficial change and resisting any attempts at full-fledged reform. Mickey and Minnie Mouse will continue dancing on Korean Central TV, but military-first politics will remain the cornerstone of domestic government and the main impediment to economic and political liberalisation. The dynastic system, however outmoded and ineffective, allows the young Marshal to keep his subjects loyal and competing for his favour.
Ultimately North Korea cannot be reformed, because the state is hostage to its own history. The youngest of the Kims cannot open up the country without betraying his predecessors or jeopardising the foundations of his own rule. Attempts to reform the system will potentially lead to a legitimacy crisis, public unrest, the dynasty’s fall and uncontrolled unification. Attempts to avoid this scenario will only protract the current situation, allowing North Korea to slowly change in form but not in substance.
Leonid Petrov is Lecturer in Korean Studies at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Sydney.
Versions of this article were first published here in Leonid Petrov’s Korea Vision, and here in Asia Times Online.