Not many people remember Operation Parakram because escalating events on the India–Pakistan border and around the line of control in Kashmir were eclipsed by others happening on Pakistan’s northern border, in Afghanistan.
The tenth anniversary of Operation Parakram, or the ‘Twin Peaks’ incident, provides a timely reminder that the catalyst for conflict has not yet been removed. In a changed regional geopolitical situation and in the context of Great Power interest shifts, what would happen if conflict over Kashmir erupted again?
Any conflict between India and Pakistan revolves around Kashmir. Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 both nations have claimed Kashmir as sovereign territory. The 1998 Indian and Pakistan nuclear weapons tests exacerbated these existing tensions and for a period of 10 months from December 2001 to October 2002, India and Pakistan came close to engaging in a war centred on the province — a war that could have involved nuclear weapons. That period of conflict came to be known as the ‘Twin Peaks’ incident, so called for two distinct peaks of high tension during the 10-month standoff.
The first peak occurred between December 2001 and January 2002. The major catalyst for conflict was the 13 December 2001 Indian Parliament bombing, carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba (later blamed for the 2008 Mumbai attacks) and Jaish-e-Muhammad. India claimed that these terrorist organisations operated with the knowledge and support of the Pakistan Intelligence Service. India initiated Operation Parakram in December 2001 and a million soldiers were subsequently mobilised by both sides. The two armies engaged in artillery, mortar and small arms exchanges that resulted in loss of life on both sides.
Meanwhile, in a deadly cat-and-mouse game, India and Pakistan moved their respective nuclear capable missiles around the Punjab region. On 1 January 2002, as tensions continued to escalate, India and Pakistan exchanged their lists of nuclear facilities in accordance with their obligations under the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities treaty. Only one day before this exchange was due to take place US intelligence reportedly predicted that war between India and Pakistan would start within days.
In an attempt to defuse tensions, on 12 January President Musharraf made a speech insisting terrorists would not be able to hide in Pakistan. This was far from Indian demands that Pakistan hand over 20 wanted terrorists based in Pakistan. India remained sceptical and maintained mobilisation, as did Pakistan. The gesture marked the apex of the first peak of the crisis.
The second peak occurred between May and October 2002. On 14 May there was a brazen and provocative militant attack on the families of mobilised Indian soldiers at Kaluchak, in Jammu. India blamed Pakistan and once again tensions rapidly escalated. A week after the attack, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed front-line troops in Jammu, and declared that ‘…the time has come for a decisive battle, and we will have a sure victory in this battle’. The US, sensing that war was once again imminent, sent Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage to the region to mediate an expedient resolution to the conflict.
The primary US fear was that India and Pakistan could misunderstand one another’s actions. Mobilisation of troops around the line of control in Kashmir, combined with inflammatory speeches made by leaders in both countries, unclear goals and poor communication, could have spiralled into a nuclear exchange.
It was only after Armitage secured a pledge from Pakistan’s President Musharraf to permanently cease infiltration across the line of control that tension eased. That pledge allowed India strategic wiggle-room — and an important face-saving opportunity — to back down from confrontation and war. India officially ceased Operation Parakram on 16 October 2002. Nuclear war had only narrowly been avoided.
If there were two peaks of conflict in 2001–2, there has been one long trough since. India and Pakistan still see one another as existential threats, and the issue of Kashmir remains unresolved. But the world looks very different ten years on. With US and NATO forces looking to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, the question now seems to be: what level of importance will be placed on continued US–Pakistan relations beyond then?
China has its own ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan and an emerging great power rivalry with both India and the US, which will become especially important as the US pivots to Asia. In this context, could China’s rise be pushing the US and India into a growing partnership? If so, India may ask for greater US support in Kashmir in return for tentatively moving away from its traditional position of foreign policy independence. But can India ever be a reliable balancing partner?
These are questions that need asking because India and Pakistan are still poised for conflict. What would happen if India and Pakistan were to find themselves at loggerheads over Kashmir today, as they did ten years ago?
Ben Moles holds a Master of International Security from the University of Sydney and was recently an International Security Program intern at the Lowy Institute.
This is an extremely ill informed and sensationalist article. I don’t think anyone at that time (during Op Parakram) in the two countries thought there would be nuclear war. The very fact that the two sides exchanged lists of nuclear locations was a sure proof of that.
As for the situation now – India has a no-first use nuclear policy and a democratic and mature polity ensures that policy will remain in place. Pakistan too is sane enough to realise that use of nuclear weapons ensures that it will no longer exist.
So frankly, one doesn’t see how a nuclear war threat exists in the sub-continent. The only fear is that Taliban or Al Qaeda family of terror franchisees manage to get some fusion material for a dirty bomb. The threat from that would however not only be for India but also for the West.
Dear Jayanta, thank you for your comment.
The fact is, and it has been forgotten, that at the time 10 years ago a very real threat and fear did exist that through continued sabre rattling and miscalculation events could easily escalate and spiral to an unintended nuclear exchange — read news reports from the time (many are still available online) a nuclear exchange was a genuine fear. Furthermore, the exchanging of nuclear lists was proof that neither would intentionally seek to attack or target the others nuclear facilities- nothing more.
The main body of the piece is a reflection of events that happened. This was the closest the two states since the Cuban missile had come to a nuclear exchange — there is nothing sensational about saying that.
As for the rest of it, I ask, and wonder, factoring in a decade of geopolitical and strategic change in the region, what would happen if events were to so rapidly escalate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir today, who and what would be the major considerations, how might events transpire differently a decade on?