The adoption of new terminologies, concepts and categorisations in consonance with developments is a common practice. During the colonial times, the Asian region was sub-divided into Southeast Asia, East Asia and South Asia, and boundaries were drawn to stabilise the spheres of influence. The post-World War II period witnessed a surge in the economic fortunes of the countries in the region. Japan and Australia promoted the term ‘Asia Pacific’ in the 1970s and 1980s to draw them closer to the United States and the economically burgeoning East Asia. India was far, geographically, from the region, and politically, economically and strategically remained uninvolved for inherent reasons.

The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed since the mid-1970s as denoting a bio-geographic region. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, first used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ officially in October 2010, in Honolulu, in a geopolitical sense, to elucidate developments in the Asia Pacific region. But the attempt to replace the concept of the Asia Pacific with ‘Indo-Pacific’ — which encompasses the region spanning from the Western Pacific Ocean to the Western Indian Ocean along the eastern coast of Africa — to describe the emerging Asian maritime strategic system seems problematic.

Unlike the Cold War period, since its economic liberalisation in 1991, India has increased its political, economic and security engagement with the countries of the Asia Pacific, and extended its ‘Look East’ policy to ‘Engage and Act East’. India is also mindful of the evolving security situation in the region, the growing economic and military might of China and its assertive behaviour, and the challenges it might pose for its future. However, negotiating those challenges through the unwitting adoption of a geopolitical categorisation might send a wrong, if not false, signal to other countries about India’s intentions and actions, though some have welcomed it.

Australia initially formulated the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’; the United States advocated it initially, and Japan followed suit. This reconceptualisation of the geopolitical dynamics is appearing to ‘shift the centre of gravity of Indian and Australian security concerns towards the South China Sea as a part of a burden-sharing strategy with the United States’. Undoubtedly, India has formed a valuable partnership with the United States in the economic and strategic spheres. Japan is already a major partner for India in the region. India is also exploring favourable economic and security arrangements with Australia. Moreover, India is aware of its growing interests and multiplying challenges in the Asia Pacific region, and the necessity for cooperation with these states to tackle these challenges. Nevertheless, China is a major stakeholder in the region, who may have reservations about the term and its obvious connotations. This is not to suggest that India should play into Chinese whims.

India’s foreign and security policy objectives remain the same — to protect its interests in the region, but not necessarily through military means. Facilitating its increasing engagement and securing vital interests will require a certain level of protection. India’s cooperation with the countries in the region, such as Malaysia, Japan and Australia, could enable it to redress its issues of security and protect its sea lines of communication. India’s participation in regional organisations such as APEC and the Pacific Islands Forum would also facilitate access to expanded markets and wider resource bases. India has already attempted to become involved in the region through its participation in various regional political, economic and security organisations such as ASEAN, the East Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. India’s association with these cooperative arrangements are more likely to serve its interests than unproductive antagonism.

Another crucial issue is to recognise the difference between India’s intentions and its capabilities. Certainly the Indian navy possesses the ability to protect its commercial and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. But its capacity to engage in either the South China Sea or the Pacific is currently limited, although its navy modernisation process in underway.

India’s foreign policy approach traditionally has been one of engaging other countries on mutually agreeable terms, not at the instruction or behest of another country. Maintaining its strategic autonomy is an integral part of India’s foreign policy process. There is no denying that terminologies have symbolic value, but converting them into tangible outcomes is questionable at times. Hence, the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a mental map to propound emerging geopolitical realities demands a thorough reflection and assiduous employment.

D. Gnanagurunathan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. The views expressed by the author are his own and does not reflect the position of ICWA.