For some time political philosophers at the centre in China have been focused on this big issue and how to manage its implications. The issue has become a steadily more prominent in the last decade. We now know from Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs (see analysis) that it is an issue that was at the top of politics in the lead up to Tiananmen. And it is now an issue that Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao have highlighted, inadvertently or not, during their celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the creation of the Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen.
This week we feature two essays, one from David Kelly and one from Justin Li, that provide context and perspective on the debate that has erupted across China about the meaning and significance of the Wen and Hu speeches in Shenzhen.
‘Without the safeguard of political reform’, Wen said in Shenzhen, ‘the fruits of economic reform would be lost and the goal of modernisation would not materialise.’ Wen identified an urgent need for political reform, as Kelly puts it, ‘to cement economic gains and steady the ship, which is buffeted at present by widening inequities and imbalances. He called for strengthening of citizens’ rights like freedom of speech and information—long granted in the PRC Constitution but commonly set aside in the nation’s day-to-day political life’.
Hu appeared in Shenzhen on 6 September, some two weeks later, to give a speech of his own in celebration of the 30 years of Shenzhen’s special status. In it there were more cautious allusions to political reform.
Wen’s speech wasn’t given prominence in the official media; Hu’s was. But ever since there has been a raging debate across China about what it all means and about the substance of the issue. Li draws a parallel between Deng’s famous trip to the south to invigorate economic reform and Wen’s promotion of political reform in Shenzhen.
On the day of Wen’s speech, the Southern Daily, came out in open support of Wen and urged Shenzhen to set an example for the country to follow in the arena of political reform. The China Youth Daily also editorialised in favour of political change. The very essence of China’s reform policy, it said, is to free people from shackles of the state and unleash their creativity and productivity. Holders of power under the current political system are enriching themselves under the banner of reform. But ultimately these vested interests won’t hold back the tide of reform.
Guangming Ribao and People’s Liberation Army Daily waged a thinly veiled attack on Wen’s speech, extolling the virtue of ‘socialist democracy’ and pleading China’s ‘special circumstances’ as defence against the introduction of liberal democracy.
Hu Shuli, China’s most influential media entrepreneur, Li reports, wrote in New Century that China has reached a critical moment when political reform must be not be delayed. Major taxation and price reforms in China have been stalled due to lack of political reform. Breakthroughs in cultural and social development are impossible without political change.
As Li concludes: ‘No one better appreciated the inter-dependence between political and economic reforms than the chief architect of China’s reform’, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. ‘The final success of our reform will be decided by political reform’ he argued. This is advice that ‘Beijing could do well to heed if it is to avoid undoing the achievements of the past three decades of economic reform’. And sooner rather than later, it could be added. The task is formidable and success will require patience and care, both inside China and out.