His appointment would be a very positive development for Thailand internally, as well as for Thai–US relations, and we should welcome it’.
Other cables reveal the US Embassy’s strong anti-Thaksin sentiments (Boyce even urged Thaksin to give up his political ambitions) and sympathies with the royalist coup-makers — despite the token sanctions imposed by the US on Thailand following the coup. This was no surprise, since the US has long enjoyed a strong and close relationship with the monarchy–military nexus that has controlled Thailand since the Cold War era.
It was thus striking that President Barack Obama, during his visit to Thailand on 18 November, expressed such unequivocal public support for the government led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Despite her undoubted political skills, Yingluck is seen nevertheless as a representative of her controversial older brother.
How to explain this apparent reversal in the US stance towards Thaksin, and what is its significance for the on-going political conflict in Thailand?
One explanation may be the realisation by the US that, despite having endured a coup, party dissolutions, confiscation of assets and, most seriously, the massacre of around 100 of his supporters in the streets of Bangkok in April–May 2010, the popularity of Thaksin and his political parties at the ballot box remains undiminished. This popularity is likely to continue at least into the near future. The US wants a stable, pro-US government in Thailand, so it may be that it has come to accept that Thaksin and electorally popular governments, rather than the monarchy, offer a better long-term bet for Thailand’s political stability, especially with the upcoming royal succession.
But another reason for the change in the US stance towards Thaksin may be related to its much vaunted ‘pivot to Asia’. China’s increasing regional influence has changed the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to the US. President Obama followed up his recent visit to Thailand with historic trips to Myanmar and Cambodia. Until its recent democratic transition and embracement by the West, Myanmar’s closest relationship was with China. Cambodia, currently chair of ASEAN, is widely viewed as being in the ‘China camp’. At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in July, Cambodia was roundly blamed for ASEAN’s failure to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in its history, purportedly due to pressure from China over the South China Sea issue. Of all Southeast Asian nations, Thailand, the region’s second-largest economy and a crucial member of ASEAN, is widely regarded as enjoying the warmest relations with Beijing.
Much of the media commentary portrays Cambodia as the obstacle to ASEAN solidarity over the South China Sea. It is less well known, however, that Thaksin backed the stance of Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen. Thaksin’s support for Hun Sen needs to be seen in the context of Thailand’s political crisis. Thaksin and Hun Sen are (at least for now) allies in Thaksin’s struggle with the monarchy–military nexus. At one point, Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as an economic advisor to the Cambodian government. He has offered sanctuary to Thaksin and his Red Shirt supporters, even allowing them to stage rallies on Cambodian soil. By contrast, Cambodia viewed the previous royalist Democrat government as supporting the Thai military’s shelling of Cambodian villages in the border dispute over the Preah Vihear temple — which itself had been fomented by royalist yellow shirts. Hun Sen’s opposition to Thailand’s royalist establishment has a long history, going back to the days when the Thai military backed the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian civil war.
If the US were to continue to support its old Cold War allies in Thailand — the monarchy and military — Thaksin would seemingly have no option but to turn to China. Presumably Chinese support for a Thaksin government would be reciprocated by Thailand’s tacit backing for China’s policy of treating the South China Sea dispute as a bilateral issue with each of the claimant countries. Unlike the other Southeast Asian claimants, Thailand and Cambodia have nothing to lose by supporting China.
The US’s recent expression of strong support for Yingluck Shinawatra’s government may thus have major regional implications. Domestically, it is a crucial blow for Thailand’s royalists, who not only cannot win elections but also now appear to have been abandoned by their long-time US ally.
Patrick Jory is a Senior Lecturer in Southeast Asian History at the University of Queensland.
Although General Surayud Chulanont, the current Thai Minister of Defense Sukampol Suwanatat, and Yingluck Shinawatra are all Chinese descendant, the country would not allow Yingluck who has no background or experience in foreign affairs to guide the Thai statecraft on the strategic matter. As a result, when Obama arrived on Thai soil, it was General Surayud Chulanont who received him at the AirForce One, not Yingluck Shinawatra. This is because Yingluck realizes that she is de jure not de facto power in Thailand. If she made any strategic mistake, she would have to go.
The decision makers of China and the United States realize that neither country can afford to have conflict. The U.S. also recognizes that the 21st century world security in the global age is no longer a unipolar world. Both China and the U.S. have put those who intend to promote a workable relationship between the two countries in power to achieve that purpose. Last week, the U.S. sent former President Jimmy Carter to China to pave the way for that desirable result, and hopefully he will coach Obama well.
The US has little interest in internal democracy in their two party system that grovels to the same backers, they also have a long and grubby history of destabilizing foreign governments, assassinating leaders and even launching invasions to get the puppet they want.
The article was quite interesting as I didn’t realize the US was anti-Taksin and backing his enemies. But I am sure that Taksin would never hold that against them, the gradual swing towards China is just a coincidence and means nothing.
Countries may not desire conflict but that certainly doesn’t stand in the way of wanting dominance and influence. I somewhat doubt the US president sets foreign policy, nor obviously financial policy.