For Abe, joining the TPP negotiations is an integral part of his growth strategy, which is ‘the third prong’ of his economic policy. The first Abe administration of 2006–07 also emphasised the importance of making progress on Economic Partnership Agreements with other countries in East Asia in order to bolster economic growth in Japan by drawing in overseas demand for goods and services.
Politically, the TPP is all about shoring up Abe’s reform credentials rather than being based on any deeply held economic reform convictions that Japan must open up for its own good. Abe wants to project this image and achieve political success through his performance on the economy. At present his administration is buoyed principally by expectations rather than by the delivery of any real economic growth, although this may come later. Its plan for reinvigorating agriculture, for example, is a carbon copy of the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration’s, which at the time amounted to no more than a statement of good intentions that were never realised.
Abe’s two-stage political strategy for achieving Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations has now been revealed. First, he wanted the recent summit with President Obama to deliver some kind of statement that exceptions to tariff abolition were possible, which would enable him to honour the election pledge of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on the TPP whilst at the same time opening the door to Japan’s participation. Second, he wanted to use the summit’s achievement as leverage to persuade the members of his own party to accept participation and have the ruling party entrust him to make the decision to join the talks.
Abe appeared to overcome the first hurdle in his meeting with Obama. The wording of their joint statement read: ‘The two Governments confirm that should Japan participate in the TPP negotiations, all goods would be subject to negotiation’ and that ‘as the final outcome will be determined during the negotiations, it is not required to make a prior commitment to unilaterally eliminate all tariffs upon joining the TPP negotiations’.
A superficial reading of this statement would suggest that Japan could enter the TPP negotiations without violating the LDP’s election pledge. However, there never was a requirement for participants in the TPP talks to make a prior commitment to unilaterally eliminate all tariffs. The statement set up a straw man, misrepresenting the TPP in order to eliminate a domestic political obstacle facing Abe.
The prime minister followed up at a post-summit press conference at which he outlined stage two: ‘First, I will report the results of this meeting to the party and explain it to the Komeito as well. Then I will get the parties to entrust the government with the decision on whether or not to participate as its exclusive right. I would like to make a decision as soon as possible’ (NHK News 7, 23 February 2012). Reference to the government’s ‘exclusive right’ reflected his desire to exclude the LDP from the TPP decision-making process. Using the momentum of his summit success, Abe obtained the permission of LDP executives for him to make the crucial decision on the TPP.
The question now is whether the summit wave will be sufficient to carry Abe over the domestic political threshold. The problem is that those opposed to the TPP are reluctant to be reassured. They are pointing to the deficiencies in the joint statement: it does not guarantee exceptions from tariff abolition nor the other five items listed in the LDP’s election manifesto, including protection of food safety standards; it declares that all items will be subject to negotiation; and it asserts that the final outcome will be ‘determined during the negotiations’, which also means that exceptions will not necessarily be allowed.
Stage two of Abe’s political strategy is on similarly rocky ground. In meetings on 26 February of the three formal agriculture-related committees of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council dealing with the issue — the Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry Strategy Investigation Committee and its Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Trade Countermeasures Committee, and the Agriculture and Forestry Division — as well as the LDP’s informal Diet members’ league (Group that Demands Immediate Withdrawal From TPP Participation to which more than 60 per cent of the LDP’s Diet members belong), members stated that they ‘cannot entrust Prime Minister Abe with the judgement on whether or not to participate in the negotiations under the current circumstances’. When a member asked if the other participating countries approved of a statement that was made just between Japan and the US, bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were at a loss to answer.
The LDP’s agricultural groups are demanding that the government and prime minister listen to the party’s opinions and deal with the matter in accordance with the LDP’s tradition of emphasising discussions within the party. They want more time, more information, more debate and more account taken of their views. The longer Abe leaves his decision, the more the domestic opposition will build. The fiercely anti-TPP Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) may gear up for a fully-fledged anti-TPP campaign as it did in last December’s Lower House election.
Should Abe be worried about the possible impact of his TPP intentions on the July Upper House election? With the most popular opposition parties also in favour of the TPP (Japan Restoration Party and Your Party), with the ‘major’ opposition party, the DPJ, split on the issue and in general disarray, and with ‘Abenomics’ underpinning sky-high approval ratings, Abe might calculate that he can afford to take a political hit in the short term. There are a large number of single-member prefectural constituencies ripe for the taking from the DPJ, such as Aomori, Yamagata, Tottori and almost all of Shikoku and Kyushu, as well as one of the seats in some two-seat prefectural constituencies such as Niigata, Miyagi and Nagano. The LDP stands to gain all of these seats, which would likely guarantee it a much-desired majority in the Upper House in the July election.
The minister of agriculture, Yoshimasa Hayashi, has told Abe, ‘This is a politically sensitive problem. Please make the ultimate judgement cautiously and carefully’. The prime minister responded with a reassurance that he will consider the matter carefully, The expected announcement on the TPP did not come in his policy speech to the Diet on 28 February. Nevertheless, Abe did reiterate that the government would make the crucial decision on the TPP talks based on its own judgement.
Abe’s two-stage strategy may, therefore, be paying off. Indications from the party are that internal opposition within the LDP is slowly capitulating and the focus is shifting to the list of exclusions that Japan will try to negotiate in the TPP talks.
Even if Japan’s participation in the TPP is more or less a foregone conclusion, however, it still needs to gain the permission of agricultural exporters such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to join the talks, and these hurdles lie in wait for Abe, no matter how successfully he manages to jump the domestic ones.
Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.