In this context, a recent statement from Rajnath Singh (president of the NDA’s largest constituent, the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) that there would be ‘no major changes in foreign policy, only some adjustments’ if the BJP came to power, has been interpreted as indicating a lack of vision.

Yet such criticisms may be misplaced. In large democracies like India and the United States, policy choices are constrained by the distribution of power within society, rather than being governed by the whims and fancies of the ruling party. So, those expecting major policy changes if the NDA defeats the UPA lack understanding of the main determinants of policies in large federal democracies.

Consider, for instance, FDI in the multi-brand retail sector. The current policy allows state governments to choose whether to permit FDI in their jurisdictions, requires substantial local sourcing, and only allows investment in big cities. It represents the balance of power between large businesses that need FDI on the one hand and petty traders and small entrepreneurs on the other. The interest groups that bargained for this policy are durable and a major change is possible only if the balance of power between them shifts. But the election of a different coalition would not automatically affect the balance of power. In fact, if the balance were indeed in favour of one of the interest groups backed by the opposition coalition, then it is likely that the present ruling coalition would have already altered the policy in its favour. There are two reasons why national coalition governments in India may not be able to ignore the concerns of interest groups backed by opposition parties. First, the ruling coalition may not enjoy a majority in a sufficient number of states and the Upper House of the Parliament. Second, parties that support the ruling coalition at the centre may be opposed to the leading party of the coalition in state level politics and vice versa. So, even if the ruling coalition has enough support in the Lower House, it may still need to bargain with at least a few opposition parties in the Upper house, and also in opposition-ruled states. Bargaining between parties belonging to different national coalitions can take place because these coalitions are held together on the basis of agreement on a few core principles like commitment to state secularism or opposition to a particular national party, which leaves room for bargaining on a wide array of non-core issues like FDI.

Now consider India’s policies on Pakistan and China. These are currently driven by a longstanding consensus on the need to prioritise economic growth and development, and avoid open conflict as far as possible. Economic growth would generate resources for strengthening the military, while also providing India with other levers to contain international conflict. The BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, depends heavily on the urban middle class for its support, meaning that it cannot afford to pursue its hardline Pakistan policy and upset the economy. But it can still pacify its nationalist supporters by continuing to expand the military budget financed by a growing economy. The large businesses that are sympathetic to Narendra Modi, the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate-in-making, are also in favour of deepening India–China economic relations. It would therefore make little sense for the BJP to radically alter India’s policy approach to either country.

Other policies are similarly governed by factors that are not amenable to partisan treatment. Consider, for instance, India’s Iran policy, which is driven by the need to diversify energy sources, improve access to Central Asian markets, keep doors open to a key player in Afghanistan and West Asia, and counter Chinese influence in Pakistani Balochistan. In such instances, the ruling party’s influence is largely restricted to the rhetoric rather than the substance of policies.

In short, national parties cannot hold divergent positions that are divorced from ground realities. Ultimately, if the NDA wins the next general election, India’s foreign and economic policies are unlikely to change dramatically. Only a major political, economic or demographic upheaval, capable of redistributing power within the country, would necessitate any large changes in existing policy approaches. We should therefore focus on the underlying factors that determine the distribution of political and economic power within the country, and how that in turn affects policies. But this is not to say that election outcomes are irrelevant. On the contrary, the domestic impact of the next election could indeed prove to be unsettling. The third successive victory of the UPA could, for instance, severely strain Indian federalism by restricting the space for non-Congress political players from the provinces. But that is a story for another day.

Vikas Kumar is Assistant Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore.