No less importantly, Hugh leaves out the rest of Asia, which, as is obvious, has reacted to China’s new assertiveness by hedging their bets and bandwagoning with the US and, increasingly, with each other. This is a profound testimony to the region’s reluctance to accept the implications of China’s self-defined new role – as suggested by the former foreign minister Yang Jiechi’s remarks at the 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi.
It is not parity when China pronounces that the entire South China Sea lies under its sovereignty, as sketched in its mysterious nine-dash line. It is not parity when China announces it has created a capital on one of the Spratly Islands from which it will administer the South China Sea territories. It is not parity when China claims the Diaoyu/Senkakus because it has determined that the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki is an ‘unequal treaty’. (What treaty signed by the loser of a war has not been unequal?)
It is not parity that China is pursuing so much as irredentism. If we follow Hugh’s logic, the United States should accept whatever sort of 21st century neo-tributary system or version of an Asian ‘Monroe Doctrine’ China seeks. This is unlikely to be a basis for a new order of peace and stability. And certainly, the worst fear of most actors in Asia is being forced to choose between the United States and China.
Moreover, Hugh is simply wrong in saying US policy is containment. Counterbalancing is very different than containment. In fact, the United States, ever since Deng Xiaoping opened China’s economy, has been instrumental in facilitating China’s remarkable economic transformation, as one of its largest trading partners, investors and, now, debtors. These are the foundations of China’s comprehensive national power. How is this containment?
Hugh has a point when he says that the emphasis is on primus more than inter pares. But that is a reflection of reality: the US economy is twice the size of China’s and its technological base and military capacity also dwarfs China’s. But the process of redistributing power is clearly underway both regionally and globally. The rise of the G20 is a good example of this, and the East Asia Summit allows heads of state to meet as equals. US active participation in Asia’s evolving multilateral institutions reflects an evolving adjustment to the diffusion of power. And it must be said that China and other emerging economies continue to free ride on the international system far more than they act as stewards of it.
To be sure, China seeks a larger voice in shaping rules. And this is happening, though one could argue about the pace and scope. But in areas where new rules are urgently needed to be written for governance, such as cyberspace and outer space, it is less a question of ‘sharing power’ than pooling resources. But to do so a nation must see itself as a steward of the global and regional order, one that those in the Indo-Pacific see as mutually beneficial and preferable to any alternative being offered. So far, in Asia, China behaves more like a bully with a chip on its shoulder.
Robert A. Manning is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
James J.Przystup is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU). The views expresses are his alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the NDU, the Department of Defense or the US Government.
Mr Manning, et al, write:
“the US economy is twice the size of China’s ”
Though I am certain the authors have got it right, with due respect, there are others with a different assessment of facts:
From Financial Times (citing an OECD report):
March 22, 2013 7:26 am, “China forecast to overtake US by 2016”, By Simon Rabinovitch in Beijing, at:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a3f5794-92b3-11e2-9593-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cLUiOVsx
From The Guardian (citing an IMF report):
Wednesday 27 April 2011 20.30 BST, “2016: when China overtakes the US” by Mark Weisbrot, at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016
Both OECD and IMF reports are public documents
Seems to me that the ball is really in South, South-East and East Asia (Asean countries) camp. Until they get their act together and make up some sort of common military alliance, the US will have to stand as guarantor of free movement in the China seas area
This seems a strongly self-serving and self-centered peace, not the least because it fails to address some basic issues at the core of China’s mindset.
This at its core is about Chinese security, insecurity from the fact that the US navy can sail up to China’s coast and potentially interdict Chinese commerce should it choose.
Beyond that the constant use of the term stewardship smacks of a cynical paternalism as does the mocking the nature of unequal treaties, the whole article smacks of a barely constrained contempt for China and its political culture and interests rather than anything remotely fair and balanced, better suited for rags like the diplomat to feed internet trolls than anything of real substance.
“This at its core is about Chinese security, insecurity from the fact that the US navy can sail up to China’s coast and potentially interdict Chinese commerce should it choose.”
Well …what about the Chinese navy sailing down to Vietnam’s, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei to potentially interdict their own commerce should it choose?
Call it counterbalancing or call it containment, at last it simply comes down to who controls which location.
I do not agree with the author that the US aims a rules-based order in Asia. The US engagement in Asia, as in the rest of the world, is goal-oriented; rules can be flexible and revised when necessary they no longer meet the practical objectives on the ground. The m ilitarization of the region with a larger US naval presence does not suggest a rules-based engagement. Neither does the now-forgotten heated rhetoric of Hillary Clinton. It is perfectly natural for an author hailing from the US NDU to act as a mouthpiece of the official US line; but reality is that the US engagement has thus far made only one contribution, which is a further division of the region and growing distrust between contesting blocs. I wonder how the author interprets the calls from various US politicians for Japan to “act as a normal (re-militarized)” state?
The author opines: “If we follow Hugh’s logic, the United States should accept whatever sort of 21st century neo-tributary system or version of an Asian ‘Monroe Doctrine’ China seeks. This is unlikely to be a basis for a new order of peace and stability.” Two assumptions are made here: One, China aims for a Monroe Doctrine; two, it will not bring about peace in the region. For the first assumption, it is unlikely that China does not want a US-style back-yard policy whereby it would interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and orchestrate regime change when required–this is what the Monroe Doctrine really is. For the second assumption, if China asserts leadership and limits US-incited militarization, then this will likely lead to a greater peace and stability in the region. The least Asia wants is a confrontation between China and the US. As the actor which has decided to re-militarize its presence, the ball is on the US court, not that of China, in order not to create a dyadic competition.