The mission is by far the largest overseas deployment to a single country for the SDF, and the biggest humanitarian relief operation dispatched by the Japanese government in history. Moreover, Japan’s foreign ministry announced an additional US$20 million in emergency grant aid to the Philippines, bringing total monetary assistance to a staggering US$52 million. Tokyo’s assistance is comparable to that provided by Manila’s own treaty ally, Washington. And it dwarfs the less than US$2 million provided by China.

Japan’s overwhelming response in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan is very telling — both of Tokyo’s relationship with the Philippines (and ASEAN at large), and Abe’s ‘Japan is back’ narrative.

First, Japan’s response underscores the dynamic relationship between the two island countries. While the Philippines suffered massive casualties and property damage when Japan occupied the archipelago from 1941 to 1945, the many commonalities, as well as the realities of the present, have made Manila and Tokyo strong partners. The two liberal democracies are treaty-allies of the United States, and Japan is one of only two strategic partners of the Philippines. Both are facing territorial threats from Beijing, and Manila does not share the concerns of some Asian nations, notably China and South Korea, about Tokyo returning to past military adventurism. While Japan is a formidable economic power in the region, the Philippines has emerged as Southeast Asia’s fastest growing major economy.

The strategic partnership between Tokyo and Manila has been most notable recently on the security front. On the one side, Tokyo has promised 10 coastguard vessels to Manila to better guard its vast coastlines. And Japan has declared its support for the Philippines’ decision to file a claim against China with the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration, as provided for by the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), to invalidate Beijing’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. The move sits well with Japan’s emphasis for greater rule of law in East Asia, given that a number of other countries seem easily intimidated by China’s sheer economic might. On the other side, the Philippines is the most vocal supporter among East Asian countries of Japan’s military normalisation and overall regional leadership. The Philippines is also considering whether to allow Japanese forces to use Philippine naval bases facing the South China Sea on a rotational basis (similar to the ongoing negotiations between Manila and Washington). With all these developments, the bond shared by the two countries is becoming more critical in the evolving geopolitical and security landscape in East Asia.

Second, Typhoon Haiyan has provided Japan with a platform to articulate one of the most important elements of the ‘proactive pacifism’ strategy that Abe has been trying to sell to East Asia and the rest of the world: Tokyo’s desire for its military to play a greater role overseas in the name of peace and stability. Japan’s deployment of 1,200 soldiers, backed by warships, planes and helicopters, to Leyte, together with the Philippines’ welcoming acceptance, can reduce concerns about the country’s alleged return to militarism that have resurfaced in South Korea and China since Abe came to power. Furthermore, Tokyo’s aid package sent a clear message to the region about the kind of power and leadership Japan is willing to provide to East Asia at a time when China is on the rise and seem to be dominating. China’s modest aid package, on the other hand, raises questions about Beijing’s regional leadership, given that it seems to be prioritising politics over an urgent humanitarian cause. Beijing’s first response to the disaster was to offer only US$100,000, a decision that attracted widespread international criticisms. Although China has recently increased its aid efforts by adding US$1.75 million worth of relief supplies and by sending its hospital ship, the Peace Ark, to the disaster area, those appeared more as an attempt to contain a damage to Beijing’s global reputation rather than a sincere concern. It is no secret that Sino-Philippine relations are at their lowest point since the government of President Aquino filed a claim against China to a UN Court earlier this year over disputes in the South China Sea.

Lastly, the SDF deployment to Leyte Island suggests yet another significant event in Japan’s evolving security strategy. The first major overseas deployments of the SDF, outside of the framework of a UN peacekeeping operation, happened when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ordered Maritime SDF ships to the Indian Ocean to help refuel US ships en route to Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The first SDF boots on the ground soon followed with 600 SDF troops sent to Iraq from January 2004 to July 2006 for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes as well as a massive deployment of SDF troops to several Asian countries in the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean tsunami for disaster relief purposes. Those deployments were rather controversial and divided the nation given the restrictions on the SDF as per the Japanese constitution’s Article 9 peace clause. Such controversy, however, is absent this time, and may represent a shift in the Japanese public’s perception of the overseas role of the SDF. A positive image of the SDF deployment to the Philippines may help smooth the way towards greater public acceptance of Prime Minister Abe’s ultimate goal of easing legal restrictions on the SDF.

Jeffrey Ordaniel is a PhD Student at the School of Security and International Studies, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.