Hugh White points to Japan’s strategic predicament between China and the United States as a reason for his visit. However, these views do not address the Yasukuni issue in Japan’s domestic politics.

The Yasukuni issue has a three-decade history in Japan’s politics. Previously, Japanese prime ministers were constrained by external reactions from visiting the shrine, which were perceived by Japanese conservatives as a concession to China and South Korea. Why has this constraint now weakened?

Postwar Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are not new — 69 such visits have been recorded before Abe’s visit last year. Yasukuni Shrine was established in the middle of the 19th century to enshrine victims of war in Japan’s interstate and civil wars from the end of the Edo Period — an act that appealed to Japanese reverence for their ancestors. The 14 Class-A war criminals were enshrined there in 1978, which has led to controversial political and history disputes, both within Japan and between Japan and its Asian neighbours, over Japan’s responsibility for the Asia Pacific War.

The Yasukuni visits by Japanese prime ministers were only politicised for the first time in the 1980s when China protested the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals. Japanese policymakers at that time avoided escalating tensions with China and South Korea, while allowing for conservative ministers to visit the shrine in a private capacity, which could be distinguished from their official duties.

However, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, a conservative lawmaker who asserted the legitimacy of official visits, suspended his visit after 1985 because of his respect for China’s pro-Japan leader Hu Yaobang. After Nakasone, moderate conservative and liberal prime ministers avoided Yasukuni visits, even in their private capacity. Only Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996–98), former chairman of the Japan War Bereaved Association, which is a pressure group for the Yasukuni visits, visited the Yasukuni once in the 1990s. His plan to visit the shrine a second time was cancelled in response to Chinese criticism. Japan’s domestic politics demanded a cautious approach regarding China’s and South Korea’s criticism and constrained the Yasukuni visits.

In the 2000s, Junichiro Koizumi (prime minister from 2001–2006) challenged this conventional wisdom. He continued his visits by emphasising his personal beliefs, and ignored his critics, though he was not necessarily associated with conservative ideology. Koizumi’s posture obviously worsened relations with China. Critical lawmakers failed to stop his visits because of his popularity, but other conservative lawmakers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were still cautious about the deterioration of Japan–China relations. After Koizumi, Japan–China tensions were moderated, including by Abe himself during his first stint as prime minister.

Abe’s visit is different to those of his predecessors in an important way. His visit was made possible by a favourable political environment within both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japanese politics more broadly, as the domestic constraints have declined. Three points should be noted.

First, the profile of lawmakers in the LDP has changed. The number of liberals has been steadily reduced and a new generation of conservatives has emerged. The Sousei Nippon (Japan Rebirth), which is a cross-party neo-conservative group of lawmakers that Abe leads, has expanded its members from 23 in 2009 to about 200 in 2013. The Abe-led LDP’s election successes in the December 2012 lower house election and July 2013 upper house election resulted in an increase in new backbenchers who support Abe’s policies without criticism. This change was accompanied by the retirement of the old and more liberal minded LDP lawmakers.

Second, liberal and leftist opposition parties have been considerably weakened and do not have effective political leverage against Abe. The influence and popularity of the Democratic Party of Japan has disappeared because of its poor governance during its three-year period in office. Voters who criticised the LDP switched to the Japan Restoration Party which also supports the Yasukuni visits.

Third, Abe’s political and intellectual supporters have succeeded in a political campaign to increase the number of pro-Yasukuni supporters, especially amongst the younger generation. According to a recent survey, a majority of Japanese aged between 20 to 30 consider that Abe’s visit to the shrine is preferable, while the survey for all ages do not. This is not least because Abe and his supporters have conducted a political campaign to justify the Yasukuni visits. This campaign has appealed to Japanese people’s feeling of reverence for their ancestors and emphasised the inappropriateness of foreign protests. One-sided and emotional arguments for the Yasukuni visits have been employed, disregarding rational and balanced debate. The younger generation of Japanese has been influenced by this campaign and the liberal opposition progressively weakened.

As a result, it seems Abe is succeeding in changing the pattern of behaviour where Japan makes so-called concessions to China and South Korea over visits to Yasukuni. This change will clearly exacerbate security tensions in Northeast Asia under a context where Abe asserts that Japan should establish ‘new’ security relations with China and South Korea, without concession over Yasukuni.

A practical solution from within Japan’s domestic politics is necessary, such as the separation of Class-A war criminals from the shrine, which has been proposed but not realised. This may relieve China’s and South Korea’s concerns. In addition, the reconstruction and revitalisation of Japan’s liberal political strand is needed. A lack of political and intellectual rivals to oppose Abe has led to weakening domestic constraints upon the Yasukuni visits. How Japanese politics will deal with this trend will be critical. The key to the solution is in Japanese hands.

Toshiya Takahashi is a PhD candidate at the National Security College, The Australian National University.