In contrast to Beijing’s fierce response, however, Seoul approached the visit with a more calibrated and diplomatic approach, urging Japan ‘not to dig up old wounds’. Yet, the absence of venom in South Korea’s response to the visit should not be mistaken with acquiescence of Abe’s move.

Indeed, the Yasukuni issue will further complicate efforts at the bureaucratic level to enhance much needed cooperation on a wide range of international security issues, most notably deterring North Korea. South Korean President Park Geun-hye also wants to avoid an ‘egg on the face’ moment if she risks meeting with Abe before accurately gauging his administration’s approach to Takeshima Day in February. Political risk becomes even dicier for the Park administration after it was erroneously spurned in the South Korean media in December for its alleged complicity in helping Japan promote its goals of reforming its defence and security posture to promote ‘proactive pacifism’.

Yet as the months pass by without meaningful engagement between Washington’s two key allies in Northeast Asia, the region’s geopolitical scene remains dynamic, requiring cooperation rather than division. North Korea continues its cycle of provocations followed by outreach to the West, and it has successfully delayed any resumption of the Six-Party talks or any other substantive negotiations on its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Tokyo’s regional strategic calculus has been evolving rapidly as it tries to meet an increasingly assertive Chinese posture in the East China Sea — a situation that has the potential to lead to miscalculation at best and open conflict at worse. The complete breakdown in bilateral ties between Japan and South Korea therefore is not only harmful to the two countries but also has negative consequences for the region and the US ‘rebalance’ to the Asia Pacific.

Interestingly, this past October, the Asan Institute in Seoul polled South Koreans on whether there should be a summit meeting with Abe — 58 per cent were in favour, 35 per cent opposed and 7 per cent were undecided. Similarly, on the need for a General Security of Military Information Agreement with Japan, which is an agreement on the sharing of classified data, 60 per cent of those polled were supportive, 32 per cent opposed and 7 per cent undecided. These polls provide an intriguing understanding when considered alongside last May’s poll by Genron NPO in Japan, which showed that nearly 80 per cent of Koreans have an ‘unfavourable’ image of Japan. Even more interesting, though, is that the South Korean public already seems to understand the necessity of cooperation with Japan, but that message has not yet pushed Park to mend ties with Abe due to her fear of political risk. While the Yasukuni visit may affect the future numbers in these polls, it will not change the simple fact that most South Koreans understand that improving ties with Japan is important.

Seoul’s confusion on preconditions for improved relations has led many in Tokyo’s policy circles to wonder what Japan needs to do to restore high-level bilateral talks. Yet the prospect of a summit appears unlikely anytime soon. The Abe administration, meanwhile, has rejected the idea of preconditions for a face-to-face meeting with Park. Summits between leaders are particularly important during challenging times such as these, when diplomacy is most valued. Yet it is clear that trench diplomacy is not working and the Abe and Park administrations will need to look at new approaches.

It is crucial for both leaders to avoid further inflaming ties by using historical grievances for domestic political purposes. Specifically, Abe should think critically and deeply about the foreign policy implications of any future visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Similarly, the Abe government should continue to uphold and vocally support the details of the Murayama and Kono statements. Finally, Japan should delicately approach Takeshima Day in February and avoid appearing to lend it official government support.

In South Korea, Park should leverage the views of the South Korean people, who are essentially advocating a pragmatic approach to Japan, in order to deflect sniping from critics at home. Park also needs to part with the extremely divisive and undiplomatic language she is directing towards Tokyo and allow the bureaucracies on both sides to work toward an understanding on differences. Moreover, South Korea should refrain from provoking Japan on Dokdo/Takeshima by maintaining the status quo and curbing any high-level political visits or military exercises.

In the coming year, it will be vital for both sides to recognise that incremental change is better than no change. A ‘grand bargain’ is probably not realistic, but this is not to say that both sides cannot work towards this goal through a reduction of the current trust deficit. In this sense, Japan and South Korea should look at non-sensitive areas for enhanced cooperation, such as counter-piracy, cyber security and energy consultations. These areas can strengthen political-security cooperation between the two without focusing on regional tensions. But efforts to build strategic cooperation at the bureaucratic and business level will suffer if political gridlock continues. Japan and South Korea will first need to put weight behind these confidence-building measures, which will help bring the relationship back from the brink.

Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a fellow on Japan for the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also chairing the Pacific Forum’s Japan-ROK Working Group.

This commentary is an abridged summary of Miller’s article, ‘Still Frosty After All These Years: Politics Cast a Chill over Japan-South Korea Relations’ in the Winter 2013 issue of Global Asia.