Behind this turbulence is major social change. Over one generation, average real per capita income tripled. The impact was greatest in the lower half of society. Many migrated for work, becoming aware of the great inequities in Thai society. Remittances flowing back to the village were invested in new urban-style lifestyles and consumption patterns — including access to the world through satellite and internet. Values and aspirations changed in parallel. People began to demand a fairer share of public goods like healthcare and education, and equal benefits. From around 2000, they discovered the power of the vote to realise these aims.
Thailand’s old political institutions — the bureaucracy, military and monarchy — were rattled because they had never faced such assertiveness before. They have won support from an urban middle class nervous about being a minority in an electoral democracy, and reluctant to see their taxes used to share national resources more equitably.
This classic social clash has been complicated by personalities. Thaksin Shinawatra, the first politician to respond to the upsurge from below, lacked any ethical hesitation about using power to increase his personal wealth. The moral aura of the monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, enhanced by his seniority and the length of his reign, was invoked as a counter to the power of popular politicians.
The establishment tried to get rid of Thaksin by a coup in 2006. This classic manoeuvre failed because of the social forces behind him. Thaksin’s party rose from the ashes after two dissolutions. The electorate supported him through three more polls. And from exile, Thaksin continued to rally his supporters through new electronic media.
The establishment then changed the rules of politics — reducing the power of the parliament and executive, reviving the political role of the military, and handing a new role to the judiciary. But this again did not fully work, and a Thaksinite party swept back to power in 2011.
Opponents immediately began trying to bring this Yingluck government down — seeking a moratorium on parliament while the rules were changed yet again. Thaksin’s opponents argue that simple electoral democracy has to be qualified to prevent abuse of power — best done by strengthening old institutions, privileges and hierarchies.
Against them, the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts want to protect electoral democracy as a means to do away with those old privileges and hierarchies.
The present phase of protest began in November 2013 after a botched attempt to pass an amnesty bill that would have whitewashed Thaksin, and enabled him to return to Thailand. At first this protest was different from earlier phases. Young office workers mobilised over social media and assembled in mobs over lunch hour or on weekends at hubs of Bangkok’s mass transit system. Their anger was focussed on Thaksin’s manipulation of the parliament for personal ends.
Within weeks, the opposition Democrat Party muscled into the protests’ leadership, changed its aim to overthrowing the government, set up elaborate protest venues at very high expense, and disrupted a general election. The young protesters melted away, leaving a sparse crowd dominated by supporters from the Democrat stronghold in the south and 4000 ‘guards’ paid USD$15 a day.
The protesters called on the army or the palace to remove the government. The palace kept its silence. The army chief bluntly refused. He explained that the 2006 coup had not really ‘worked’, and was clearly sensitive about international censure.
The opposition turned to the judiciary as an alternative mechanism. Ten years ago, Thailand’s judiciary had a negligible political role. Now the judges topple governments, remove ministers, void elections, and issue instructions to governments on what they can and cannot do.
What happens next is far from clear. In the short term, judicial rulings will probably bring down the government, followed by a new election and a package of reforms. Reforms may include changes in the form of elections, improved mechanisms for monitoring the budget, and a reconstituted senate.
Over the longer term, the forces in play will not remain static. Thaksin can probably never return to an active political role. Yingluck may also be neutralised, and the family has no other promising candidates. A succession in the monarchy is looming. So, with a change in personalities, the pieces of the political jigsaw will start to shift.
The social and economic changes underlying politics will continue. The fastest growing areas are now outside the capital, particularly in the north and northeast. Upper secondary and tertiary education will expand in the provinces. Media will continue to develop, while decentralisation also advances.
All these trends will tend to strengthen the forces pressing for a redistribution of social and economic power. The establishment resisting these changes will ultimately be obliged to compromise — and the political system will catch up with economic and social change.
Pasuk Phongpaichit is Professor of Economics at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
Chris Baker is a historian and prominent Thailand scholar.
What we have witnessed in Thailand in the past decade was and has been money politics at work, pure and simple. Thaksin saw the opportunity and capitalized on it, investing huge amount of money in setting up his party, buying veteran politicians and paying them to win election. At the same time his party came up with potent populism to capture support of rural voters, especially in the Northeast. Senior government officials, police generals, and, I suspect even senior military generals, have been co-opted to serve the so-called “Thaksin Regime”. Money can buy virtually everyone in government. They assist Thaksin’s party in delivering the election promises and making a great deal of money for themselves in the process. The corruption-riddled paddy-rice scheme is one prime example of such win-win-lose arrangement: Thaksin’s party wins, his cronies in the government also win, but the poor farmers as well as the Thai taxpayers at large eventually lose.
What we can expect to see is a swing back to freer movement of politicians from party to party, instead of the dictatorship of the party owner right now. But Thailand had gone through that experiment before and suffered the repeated crises of MPs prostituting themselves to a new coalition attempting to topple the ruling government.
After 82 years of fumbling parliamentary democracy in Thailand, as a disappointed Thai, I am tempted to jump to the conclusion that the Thai people, Thai politicians and voters in particular, are not yet ready to make parliamentary democracy work. Thailand is unluck not to have more visionary and dedicated politicians to come to power. We didn’t fight for national independence and political freedom, since we were lucky to escape colonization. But will it be any different if we will soon topple the Thaksin+Yingluck team and uproot the “Thaksin Regime”?
I hope we will care more about our country and be more careful in votting for who will run our government.
But a comprehensive reform in just 18 months? This is definitely unrealistic. Good luck, Thailand!
A clear misconception among a big portion of Thais’ people that democracy is “voting.” Truth to be told, especially when the elected representatives won the majority of the people. Thus, “the will of the people” become the mandate of authority of the government by definition.
In our current history, every evil geniuses manipulated this concept to their advantages. Saddam Hussein was elected time and again through election (by way of referendum,) so does Castro in Cuba.
Bashar al-Assad was elected by the national electorate as President of Syria in 2000 and 2007, following his father who had ruled Syria for 30 years. (a dynasty of sort) He has planned to run again in 2014 this year, despite a continuing civil war that has killed more than 140,000 people, fractured the country and destroyed any chance of a credible vote being held. And of course, we already know the outcome before the voting is began.
Recently, North Korea, Kim Jong-Un’s overwhelming victory to represent his district in North Korea’s parliament — 100 percent turnout, won 100 percent of the vote! (Elections in North Korea are held every five years.) This “dynasty” has ruled North Korea for three generation since his grand father. Is this suppressive regime truly “democratic?”
When people are/were manipulated, by way of fraud, intimidation, vote buying, the elected person claims to be elected by majority, does it mean this is a credible election?
In countries where leaders run political systems in which their interest is not tied to the interest of the people, these countries become vehicles of self-interest. The country improves only when these leaders profit from the improvement. The country deteriorates if the deterioration serves the interest of absolute leaders. Thus in such a system, populations are held captive to the whims of absolute power.
The government of Yingluck Shinawatra and her administration started the process of election and have governed Thailand by way of these process in the named of “democracy.” However, this is not a normal “democracy” but it is so called “totalitarian democracy.” It refers to a system of government in which lawfully elected representatives maintain the integrity of a nation state whose citizens, while granted the right to vote, have little or no participation in the decision-making process of the government, and/or claimed to have the “majority.”
“Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything.” — Josef Stalin
Hi, I’m from Indonesia, and I just want to ask a question. What has happened with Thai rice scheme and its effect to the Thai democracy institution? Thx.