This is an important development in US–Japan security relations, as Obama is now the first sitting US president to make this coverage explicit. His statement may even implicitly challenge the traditional US position of not taking sides in territorial disputes.
Why did President Obama make this bold statement?
This question is important as the Sino–Japanese relationship is probably at its lowest point in recent history due to raised tensions in the East China Sea since Japan’s September 2012 nationalisation of three of the five islets that make up the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, this statement undoubtedly risks antagonising China and destabilising the US–China relationship that has been kept on an even keel since the Obama–Xi California summit in June 2013.
The argument proposed here is two-fold: first, Obama’s bold statement was an erudite calculation that was an attempt to gain leverage over Japan in outstanding bilateral issues; and second, it was to restore stability in the East China Sea through eradicating ambiguity in the US role in support of Japan in the event of a conflict over the islands.
In relation to the first part of the argument, the Obama statement on the Senkakus/Diaoyus was exactly what the Japanese leadership has been wishing for since September 2010 following the fishing trawler incident.
For Japan, the strengthening of the US–Japan security alliance is a critical factor in dealing with tensions related to the Senkakus/Diaoyus, along with expanding its defensive capabilities. Though this process started under former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in September 2011, the efforts to strengthen the alliance saw a significant boost when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power again in December 2012. Abe has taken bold steps to resolve outstanding bilateral issues such as the relocation of the Futenma Air Base Station, announced Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, and even started a national debate on revising the collective self-defence restriction (with the intention of giving the Japanese Self-Defense Forces greater operational capacity to assist the US military in limited ways even when Japan’s national security is not under threat). Obama’s statement could arguably be seen as a reward to these significant advancements pertaining to the US–Japan alliance under Abe’s leadership.
At the same time, Obama’s statement was also aimed at extracting Japanese concessions on two issues: Japan’s hardened approach on the history issue and the TPP.
The US expressed its clear disappointment when Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. This explicit expression of opposition surprised many in the Japanese leadership. Obama’s clear statement on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, could be a way for the US to seek a compromise from the Abe government to not raise tensions over unresolved historical issues.
The serious deterioration of Japan–South Korea relations due to the history issue is a serious concern for the US. As ‘quasi-allies’, Japan and South Korea play critical roles alongside the US in ensuring regional stability. To encourage dialogue, Obama initiated a trilateral summit with Prime Minister Abe and President Park Geun-hye at The Hague in March 2014.
With regard to the TPP, Obama’s statement on the Senkakus/Diaoyus was also to extract a compromise from Japan to overcome the stalemate in the negotiations. Though no agreement was reached during this visit, the important point to note is that Obama’s bold statement has certainly strengthened Washington’s leverage in the on-going negotiation process. The Abe government will be under greater pressure to offer concessions in the subsequent negotiations to prevent the deterioration of trust between them and the US.
The second part of the argument is that Obama’s statement contributes to regional stability, even though China has expressed its opposition. The way it enhances stability is by strengthening deterrence by removing ambiguity over America’s position in the event of a conflict in the East China Sea. To be sure, Obama’s statement was a reaffirmation to the statements already made by his two secretaries of state, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, and secretaries of defence, Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel. Even though it does not imply a shift in US policy towards Japan, the president’s endorsement makes the US position crystal clear.
Obama’s statement also clears the lingering doubts that were prevalent in Japan about the US commitment to Japan and Asia, and its ability to realise the rebalancing strategy towards Asia. These questions are founded on America’s preoccupation in the Middle East and seeming weakness shown in international affairs, such as the Syrian and Crimean crises. Obama’s statement makes explicit three important points critical to the Japanese defence planners: the US is committed to Japan as a security guarantor, Japan continues to be the primary US ally in the region, and the US is serious about its rebalancing strategy towards Asia. These points apply to other regional US allies as well. The bold statement made by President Obama that underscored US commitment to fulfil its treaty obligations was a much needed message in the region.
Bhubhindar Singh is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
“Article 5 of the treaty states the two countries will act to meet the common danger of an attack against ‘territories under the administration of Japan’(Diaoyu/Senkaku).”
In case there is any historical doubt, the Senkaku islands were so named only in 1904, nine years after Japan annexed these Chinese islands in 1895, named the Diaoyu, as a war booty in the war Japan started with Qing Dynasty China.
Under the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, signed by the US, UK and Soviet Russia and the terms of the Cairo Conference of 1943, signed by the US, UK and China, all territories Japan had taken by ‘greed and force’ must be returned to China.
After WW2, all territories Japan had taken from China by ‘greed and force’ were returned except the Diaoyu/Senkaku, which the US held under a UN mandate.
If Chiang Kai Shek had won the Chinese civil war in 1949, it is certain that the Diaoyu islands would have been returned to Nationalist China.
But since Mao’s forces held sway, the US deliberately handed the Administration of the Diaoyu islands to Japan, without any sovereignty, in May 1972, barely four months after ‘Tricky Dicky’ Nixon signed the First Communique with Mao, to seal a detente.
This was, ostensibly, to make Japan into a client state to enable the US to continue to station US forces in Japan and to plant a seed of discord with a rising China in the future, a seed which has grown into a tree, which is now bearing fruits.
But what is now forgotten is that when PM Kakuei Tanaka went to China to sign a Normalization of Relations in Sept 1972, he and Zhou Enlai agreed to ‘shelf’ the question of the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes for smarter future generations to decide their fate.
In Sept 2012, China was preparing for a 40 year anniversary celebration of the ‘shelf’ but was greatly shocked when PM Yoshihiko Noda had nationalized the Senkaku after Japan allegedly “bought” over some islands in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Japan did own from a private Japanese owner, never mind that the US only handed the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to Japan to administrate, without any sovereignty in May 1972 and not to any private Japanese owner.
On 5 June 2913, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka said during a visit to Beijng: “As a living witness, I would like to make clear (what I heard), just after the normalization of relations, I was told clearly by the then-Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka that a decision was made on the normalization by shelving the Senkaku issue.”
Uncle Sam winked and closed a blind eye over the Kabuki fraud by PM Noda and viola, the Diaoyu islands became allegedly a sovereign territory of Japan and hence the justification for the fraudulent rationale that “Japan alliance covers the Senkakus”.
But the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are no longer ‘under the administration of Japan’ as originally intended by United States. They have been illegally nationalized by Japan in Dec 2012, without any objection from the untrustworthy Uncle Sam.
In the case of the US-Philippines alliance, there is no mutual defense treaty that covers the disputed areas, in the South China Sea, annexed by President Marcos.
Why? This is too obvious because when the US gave the Philippines its independence in July 1946, the US did not hand over any such islands in the South China Sea.
It was the former President Ferdinand Marcos who annexed 9 features in the Spratlys on 11 June 1978, using a presidential decree and renaming them the Kalayaan islands.
But the Spratly and Paracel islands have already been returned to the Republic of China by Japan, under the Treaty of Peace signed on 28 April 1952, by extension to China, under the One-China policy recognized by the US, Asean, Australia and the EU.
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm
Also the Treaty of Paris of 1898 never mentioned any island in the South China Sea when Spain handed over the Philippines to the US as a colony after losing the Spanish-American war, nor was any mentioned under the 1900 Treaty of Washington and the 1930 Convention between the United States and Great Britain.