— a deal which gives them ‘the most extensive access to Chinese audiences by any Western broadcaster’.

The agreement was due to be signed in early May but has now been pushed back to June, without clear reasons given. The deal will allow ABC International — which runs the Australia Network — to ‘establish an online portal in China through which a range of ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] and other Australian media content and services will be available to partner Chinese media organisations’.

But this announcement comes as a cloud hangs over the purpose, funding and future of the Australia Network. The ABC runs the Australia Network under a $223 million 10-year contract from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).  The Commission of Audit report recommends ‘ceasing’ funding for the Network.

Senior Coalition figures have voiced their concerns about whether the service represents value for money and have made public that they are considering the future of the Australia Network in the context of the May Federal Budget. Most recently, Minister for Communications Malcolm Turnbull questioned whether the broadcasting service had been ‘overtaken by technology’, and equivocated when asked whether the deal was a ‘game-changer’.

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has also pondered whether there might be more effective ways to project Australian soft power, asking if the deal was ‘the best use of taxpayers’ money to project a positive image into the region?’

Yet will the China deal save the Australia Network? Adjunct Professor Richard Broinowski sees this announcement as a ‘major coup’. Even the Hollywood Reporter considers this a ‘major deal’, potentially providing the ABC with better access than the BBC and CNN.

In one of the few analyses of this deal so far, Professor Mark Beeson argued:

Soft power is difficult to measure and utilise. But if the Australian government is serious about projecting a more positive image of this country and possibly influencing the way other countries not only think about us but — even more importantly in the long run, perhaps — themselves, then it ought to put its money where its mouth is.

This deal has the potential to be the most important boost to Australian soft power it has ever had. But the overwhelming question is: does Australia have the strategy to leverage this opportunity? Not yet, perhaps. This deal underscores once again Australia’s pressing need to develop a sophisticated soft power strategy. Australia needs to think harder about how it exercises its soft power. As Beeson acknowledges, the concept is amorphous but real; hard to measure but nonetheless important.

There are three areas of concern to be considered before the ink dries on this deal in early June.

First, does this deal mean the Australia Network budget is safe and is its role in public diplomacy clear?

It is impossible to know until Budget Night, but presumably the timing of the China deal was deliberate, or has had an effect. A Defence White Paper is in the works, and Bishop has made a landmark speech about a new paradigm in development assistance. But as yet, there is no indication that Bishop will announce either a soft power or public diplomacy strategy.

Second, what about the devil in the detail?

It is unclear whether this deal is more about future potential, or whether there are immediate tangible opportunities for Australian content to be seen in China. It is also unclear from the reports how delicate issues of state censorship will be dealt with. There may be risks for Australia in exercising first-mover advantage as the first Western power to achieve mainland broadcasting. Would programs like the Four Corners report on Stern Hu — or allegations of spying on Chinese students — be aired? Will the ABC or the Chinese purchasers of Australian content self-censor?

The BBC’s reputation as a pillar of UK soft power relies on impartial news reporting. The comparative advantage of the Australia Network is not as clear. The importance of China to Australian national interest also suggests that China is not the place to experiment.

Third, what will Chinese audiences respond to?

How does the Aussie backyard fit into the Chinese Dream? If you were hooked on ‘Monkey’ as a child, or today are addicted to the Chinese dating show ‘If You Are The One’, how does this affect your perception of China? In other words, do these cultural experiences somehow translate into foreign policy preferences?

MasterChef was massive in India (the SMH reported in 2013 three million people a week watched), Neighbours was a hit in the UK, and the Dutch loved the Royal Flying Doctors series.

So, what will resonate with Chinese audiences? And how does this link to a broader soft power strategy? If Australia doesn’t want to be the soapy-lifesaver-chef-Wiggles-border-protection nation, then what does it want? What should be its nation-brand in China?

Australia needs to be conscious of crafting the content for this audience to be sure it promotes Australia’s national interest. Of course there is intrinsic value in Australia’s leading cultural products having a global audience. That said, the Australia Network is funded with public money through DFAT and needs to take into account deeper foreign policy objectives.

Public broadcasting is widely considered a cost-effective investment for promoting public diplomacy objectives. The Association of International Broadcasting argues in a recent brief: ‘With other nations investing heavily to influence and lead opinion on major issues of the day, it is vital that Australia maintains and enhances its international broadcasting services, and does not retreat from its position as provider of reliable, unbiased news and information to the world’s most populated region via television, radio and online platforms’.

A potential strategy could prioritise joint current affairs productions like the recent Q&A in China; or debates about doing business in the region, showcasing Australian and Chinese innovation; or producing sophisticated Australian content that showcases multicultural values (perhaps not ‘The Shire’). The important thing is to have a strategy and for Australia to know what it wants out of this investment. It should use the investment to address any cultural misunderstandings, and to strengthen the appeal of getting to know Australia’s different ways of looking at the world.

Because it is not guided by a broader strategy, this deal could be a banana peel. Australia risks slipping on ad hoc initiatives until its soft power objectives are clear. Can you imagine ‘Team Australia’ investing in China without a coherent strategy and before understanding the likely rate of return?

Benjamin Day is a PhD candidate at the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

Susan Harris Rimmer is Director of Studies at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australian National University.