Compared with other countries in the region, Vietnam has been a relative late adopter of this strategy. Its main approach to dealing with China had been engagement.
But China’s more hardline approach might push Vietnam toward a more active hedging strategy, and Vietnam’s diplomatic dynamism following the HYSY 981 incident seems to confirm this. In addition to soliciting support from ASEAN, Vietnam has been trying to enhance ties with important partners such as the US, the Philippines and Japan.
After the oil rig deployment incident, Vietnam’s foreign minister called his US counterpart to discuss the issue. Vietnam also announced its decision to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) after more than ten years of consideration since the initiative was launched in 2003. Vietnam had been reluctant to support the initiative, which it sees as outside the United Nations’ framework. Moreover, as Vietnam has always been sensitive to sovereignty issues, legal loopholes within the PSI raised concerns that the US and major parties would take advantage of and manipulate the PSI for their own purposes.
The announcement by Vietnam’s foreign minister that his country will join the PSI, combined with its commitment to enhance cooperation with the US in maritime security and the US promise of providing US$18 million of aid to the Vietnamese coast guard, signifies an increased level of mutual trust in Vietnam–US security cooperation.
Vietnam has also been getting closer to the Philippines. During the Vietnamese prime minister’s visit to the Philippines for the World Economic Forum, he and his counterpart announced the possibility of establishing a strategic partnership in the face of common maritime challenges. On this occasion, the prime minister also declared that Vietnam is considering all options in the face of China’s action, including legal measures. If Vietnam brings the issue to an international court, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it will also help support Philippine’s arbitration case to challenge China’s ‘nine-dash-line’. An improved Vietnamese–Philippine relationship also helps Hanoi in enhancing its relations with the US.
The rift between China and Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea has made Tokyo as interested as Hanoi in developing new Vietnam–Japan security ties. Bilateral relations were boosted in 2013 when the two nations decided to elevate their ties to an Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.
Recently, during a visit to Japan, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam called for Japan to support Vietnam’s effort in solving the current tension with China. Japan agreed to enhance bilateral maritime security ties with Vietnam and Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida is set to visit Vietnam in June or July this year to promote maritime cooperation, including Japan’s provision of patrol ships for Vietnam to better cope with China’s rising maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. The two countries may also discuss increasing communications with the Philippines and other ASEAN members to keep Beijing’s territorial ambitions in check.
In a 2010 review of Vietnam foreign policy, a top-level Vietnamese diplomat remarked that although its ‘omnidirectional’ foreign policy had helped Vietnam to strengthen its external relations and even form strategic partnerships with many countries, most of these relationships had not matured.
But the situation may improve, as Vietnam’s recent diplomatic dynamism has demonstrated its readiness to exploit a convergence of strategic interests with other countries in the South China Sea to enhance its relationships with these countries and involve them in the South China Sea issue. Besides attracting support and assistance from the US, the Philippines and Japan, Vietnam has also been successful in attracting support from non-ASEAN countries, such as India and Australia, who have publicly voiced concern and urged for restraint on the HYSY 981 incident.
Vietnam is geographically close to China and is dwarfed by its neighbour economically and militarily. In an asymmetric relationship like this, the smaller state can often end up being oversensitive to the actions of the larger state. China’s restraint and commitment to international norms and rules are therefore critical. Unless China tones down its assertiveness in the South China Sea, Vietnam will continue to seek support from other countries while drifting away from its neighbour — a situation that may not be in China’s best interest.
Hoang Oanh is a PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
One issue that these Vietnamese commentators (and international commentators more generally) don’t address is that China (CNOOC) has placed offshore oil rigs in & around the Paracel Islands (Xisha) on several occasions in its ongoing oil & gas exploration of the area in the past decade, without any problems, and certainly no flare up of the type experienced last month. Moreover, China has been in control of most of these islands since the Nationalists took them over from the Japanese at the end of WWII in Oct 1945 (one island remained under S. Vietnamese control until China took that over in 1974), and it is well known that Pham Van Dong in Sept 14 1958 recognised China’s sovereignty over the islands and its 12 nautical mile jurisdiction around each of the islands.
You have to ask, why now? Why did the Vietnamese decide to change their policy towards the Xisha Islands and challenge China’s control over the islands, and take on a much stronger neighbour in the high seas with fishing vessels when they were clearly outnumbered by Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard. The commentators fail to research & examine the reason for Vietnam’s recent change of policy, and the risks involved. The only answer must be the US pivot (with a bit of encouragement and sweeteners recently from Japan).
It is not now that Vietnam “decides to change its policy and challenges China’s claim over the Paracels” because Vietnam has never renounced its claim over the islands.
As China acts more assertive, Vietnam needs to amend its approach. Vietnam calls for talk and emphasizes on peacefully solving the issue but China refuses. As you also notice, not only does Vietnam but others such as the US, Japan, Philippines also make some changes in their policy.
Why change? And why now? I think it’s easy to see that these countries feel worried over China’s increasing assertiveness. China’s lacking of restraint and failing to commit to international norms and rules are constructing a perception that China is unilaterally trying to alter the status quo in the South China Sea, which is going against what it has committed in the DOC.
Your argument in defense of Chinese HYSY981 oil rig violation of Vietnamese EEZ is flawed and your support statements contain several errors:
. Unlike the expansive Chinese 9 dash claim, Vietnamese claim is very clear: territorial sovereignty over both Paracel (Hoang Sa)/ Spratly (Truong Sa) and entitled exclusive economic zones along continental shelf of Vietnam. If China “placed offshore oil rigs in & around the Paracel Islands (Xisha) on several occasions in its ongoing oil & gas exploration of the area in the past decade, without any problems,” like you said, those locations must have been to the north (Chinese EEZ), east or south of Paracel (Hoang Sa) which is international waters. However, according to repeated statements from spokesperson Hong Lei, this is the 1st Chinese drill in this area, while Vietnam has over 30 (?). One of you is not telling the truth.
. “China has been in control of most of these islands since the Nationalists took them over from the Japanese at the end of WWII in Oct 1945 (one island remained under S. Vietnamese control until China took that over in 1974)”: logically and factually incorrect. Logically, if the Nationalists took over in 1945 per your statement, when did the PRC regain control of them and how did the Republic of Vietnam (South) gained control of the area eventually invaded by PRC? Facts are: per Allies instruction, the Nationalists only supposed to disarm the Japanese throughout Vietnam including these islands. After being defeated by the Communists in 1949, they retreated to Itu Aba since. The 1951 San Francisco Conference, addressing the return of Japanese WWII possessions ordered Japan to hand over Paracel/Spratly to France (among others). France reoccupied these islands except for Itu Aba, which Taiwan did not give up. The Geneva Accord in 1954 (which PRC was 1 of the 5 permanent chairs) established 2 states of Vietnam: DRV (North) and ROV (South) which was granted administration of both Paracel and Spratly. Responding to this Accord, the ROV maintained a Navy base and most of Paracel. On several occasions, they had to repel the PRC infiltration into the north eastern part of Amphitrite until 1974, when PRC completed its control of the whole Paracel.
. “it is well known that Pham Van Dong in Sept 14 1958 recognised China’s sovereignty over the islands and its 12 nautical mile jurisdiction around each of the islands.”. Even though Prime Minister Pham Van Dong did issue a Diplomatic Note recognizing Chinese 12 miles territorial rights, he did not 1) mention Paracel/Spratly 2) it did not receive ratification from the DRV’s Congress 3) More importantly, only the ROV (South) had legal authority to address territorial matters of Paracel/Spratly.
After Chinese forceful take over of Paracel in 1974, both the government of ROV (South) and the Provincial Revolutionary government of NLF (Vietcong) protested and took the matter to UN Security Forum. By international laws, Paracel is a dispute area since. After the reunification of the country to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, there has been no change in policies whether influenced by Chinese aggressions nor American’s Pivot to Asia.
Hoang Oanh doesn’t seem to have answered SCS’s questions, which are crucial for understanding (and making judgements on) the current China-Vietnam dispute.
Two important points are worth-noting: (1) The DRV government representing Vietnam as a whole formally and repeatedly announced its recognition of China’s sovereignty over Xisha; and(2) China has been in control of Xisha since 1945.
Point (1) runs counter to Hoang Oanh’s claim that “Vietnam has never renounced its claim over the islands”.
Point (2) implies that it is Vietnam, rather than China, that has “amended its approach”.
The observation that “not only does Vietnam but others such as the US, Japan, Philippines also make some changes in their policy” is clearly valid. The further claim that all these changes are due to China’s alleged “assertiveness” rather than the US “pivot”, however, needs substantiation.
On the Pham Van Dong Letter
– While accepting the 12-nautical-mile (22 km) principle for the limit of territorial waters of China, never mentioned a word about how the territorial boundary was defined or accepting that Truong Sa and Hoang Sa belongs to China.
– The letter needs to be understood given the specific context. At that moment, the Paracel and Spratly islands were under the administration of the Republic of Vietnam(according to the 1954 Geneva Agreements, which China was also a signatory). North Vietnam could not hand in what it was not possessing.
– In 1956, China sent its navy to seize the eastern part of the Hoang Sa, despite its signature at Geneva.
To Hoang Oanh and Henry Winn:
Isn’t it true that the current, SRV government denies the legal status of the RoV? Isn’t it true that the DRV claimed that it represented Vietnam as a whole, and that this claim is recognised by the current, SRV government?
Also, did the DRV – and does the SRV – recognise the legal status of the Treaty of San Francisco, instead of the Potsdam Declaration?
On the Pham Van Dong letter, wasn’t it true that the letter was to express the DRV’s “recognition and endorsement” of China’s 4th Sept 1958 declaration? Note the Chinese declaration explicitly stated that China has sovereignty over Xisha, and this declaration was published in the “the voice of the Party, State and people of Vietnam”, the Báo Nhân Dân, on 6th Sept 1958.
By accepting the 12 nautical miles you accepted the territories the 12 nautical miles encompasses, otherwise the 12 nautical miles would be meaningless. The 12 nautical miles without territories boundaries would be meaningless or even silly.
If Pham Van Dong disagrees with any items in the Chinese’s aforementioned declaration (which stated Xisha and Nansha islands belong to China), he is obligated to point them out, without mentioning these islands he accepted all territories in China’s declaration.
It couldn’t clearer than that. The more effort you (the Vietnamese) try to discredit Pham Van Dong note the weaker your positions are, so in fact it’s strengthen China’s legal position.
SM Lo and Hoang:
Please find the related information on the Pham Van Dong letter as well as evidence of Vietnam’s sovereignty over Paracels and Spratlys in the links below:
http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/20385/vietnam-rejects-chinas-false-statements-on-sovereignty-illegal-oil-rig
http://www.vietnamembassy-thailand.org/en/news_object_view?newsPath=/vnemb.vn/tinkhac/ns140709054112
In the Postdam Treaty, there was no mention of the Paracels or Spratlys
After all, there are two very important facts that you could not deny:
– China used force to seize the Paracels from South Vietnam (1956, 1974) and later Spratlys (1988.
– Vietnam has declared that it considers legal means(international court or arbitration)as a possible option to solve the disputes. If China is confident enough of its arguments and supporting evidence, why does it keep ruling out this option?
The only thing that makes VN change its voice against China in the SCS is China’s increasing assertiveness and aggressiveness in this region.
Arguing that VN is more assertive because of US pivot or Japanese support is ridiculous, if not dummy. VN is an ally of neither the US nor Japan. So how can VN expect them to help?
It is China’s actions that forces VN to stand up. If Chinese big vessels don’t shoot and sink many Vietnamese fishing ships inside Vietnam’s EEZ, if China don’t cut the cable of Vietnamese oil exploration ships inside Vietnam’s EEZ, if China don’t install the oil rig inside Vietnam’s EEZ, then do you think Vietnam will want to go into a conflict with China?