Earlier this year, in response to Beijing’s assertive policy stance following the Noda government’s September 2012 nationalisation of the islands, the Abe cabinet granted the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) wider latitude to repel a so-called ‘grey zone’ infringement — an infringement on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that does not amount to a full-blown armed attack. The reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution (the ‘peace clause’) further allows the SDF to provide logistics support that is ‘integrated with the use of force’ to the US military in all but the most extreme combat locations. Implementing legislation to give effect to these changes is expected to clear the Diet in the months ahead.
The revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines, which are expected to be released in 2015, will operationally integrate the provision of SDF support to US forces in case of an emergency in the East China Sea. Joint plans to enable the US to assist the SDF in repelling a ‘grey zone’ infringement are also expected to be finalised.
Political pathways to conflict management are seemingly at a dead end. To seek a solution based on international law, as former prime minister Noda’s foreign minister fleetingly floated, also seems hopelessly unrealistic. Beijing does not currently submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and cannot be summoned to the Hague against its will. For Tokyo, as administrator of the islands, to press a case would be an acknowledgement of the less-than-final status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
At this juncture it is necessary for both Japan and China to individually practice political restraint and moderation to avoid further conflict. Both sides must assume important responsibilities so that the prevailing status quo can be maintained.
Beijing must desist from violating the airspace over the Senkakus/Diaoyus as part of its Air Defence Identification Zone patrols over these waters. It should ensure that its coast guard neither conducts boarding operations in the territorial sea of the Senkakus/Diaoyus nor launches helicopters in the islets’ proximity. Inflammatory actions at sea — like the instances of training fire-control radar on a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and helicopter in January 2013 — are also incompatible with maintaining the status quo.
Tokyo must maintain its present policy of ‘not entering, not researching and not constructing’ on and around the islands for the time being. It should ensure that activities, such as constructing a port of refuge for fishing boats, upgrading the islands’ lighthouse or deploying civil servants to manage and preserve the islands’ forestry endowment or survey its marine resources, are deferred until Japan–China relations heal. Provocative activities such as stationing Self-Defense Force members around the clock on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would also escalate tensions.
Once a period of political quiet in the surrounding waters and in the larger (post-Abe) Sino–Japanese diplomatic relationship takes firmer hold, practical and creative ways of cooperation to achieve win-win outcomes on both sides can be contemplated. Tokyo could acknowledge — without prejudicing its legal claim — that an explicable Chinese claim to the Senkakus/Diaoyus exists and, bearing in mind that the stability of the surrounding area is of mutual concern to both countries, resolve to maintain the existing status quo on the islands indeterminately.
Beijing would express its appreciation for this acknowledgement, resolve not to disturb the status quo or peace and stability in the area surrounding the islands and, to the extent that the status quo remains undisturbed, renounce the use of force to alter the administrative control of the islands. Gradually, China’s maritime law enforcement assertions in the territorial sea of the Senkakus/Diaoyus could be withdrawn and the situation would operationally revert to the status quo ante as existed prior to the purchase of the three islands. No scope for joint administration of the Senkaku/Diayou islands is likely to be admitted.
Correspondingly, Japan could remain committed to the absolute maintenance of the status quo on the islands, and any and all measures that reinforce its effective control — such as conducting lighthouse repairs, pier and shelter construction, and temporarily deploying personnel on the islands — could be informally vetted in advance with China. With the passage of time, detailed fishing rules in these disputed waters can be consensually arrived upon and negotiations towards a maritime communication mechanism or hotline, as a confidence-building measure, could follow.
The East China Sea has historically been a sea of peace, cooperation and commerce as ideas and goods have regularly crossed its shores. In 2008 the then leaders, Hu and Fukuda, sought to restore the sea and the wider China–Japan relationship — which had been damaged by Koizumi’s repeated visits as prime minister to Yasukuni Shrine — to this historical norm. Setting the politically sensitive issue of maritime delimitation in the East China Sea aside, the two leaders agreed to jointly develop the sea’s bounty in overlapping zones without prejudice to their respective sovereign rights and jurisdiction claims.
Rather than focusing on the sovereignty dispute itself, Beijing and Tokyo should concentrate on the opportunities arising from the islands’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction by jointly prospecting for oil and gas in seabed areas in the islands’ vicinity.
Indefinitely shelving the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands ownership issue, while jointly formulating win-win economic and political arrangements, would be in line with this cooperative spirit that has underwritten peace, prosperity and stability in East Asia for extended periods of time. The East China Sea would be transformed into a ‘sea of peace, cooperation and friendship’.
Sourabh Gupta is a Senior Research Associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc., Washington.
A longer version of this article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘A Japan that can say ‘yes’‘.
“””‘ Tokyo could acknowledge — without prejudicing its legal claim — that an explicable Chinese claim to the Senkakus/Diaoyus exists and, bearing in mind that the stability of the surrounding area is of mutual concern to both countries, resolve to maintain the existing status quo on the islands indeterminately.””””””
The Chinese claim was invented in the early 1970s. It did not exist prior to this time. In all official maps and communications from both Taipei and Beijing until 1969, the Senkakus are always shown as Japanese, the Japanese names are used to represent them, and no controversy is identified. In 1971 both Beijing and Taipei changed their maps to reflect this historically novel claim. Ultimately Beijing was forced to recall 700,000 maps that had the “wrong” information. For a detailed look at how Taipei altered its maps, see The Diaoyutai Islands on Taiwan’s Official Maps: Pre- and Post-1971 (Asian Affairs: An American Review, 39:90–105, 2012) by Ko-hua Yap, Yu-wen Chen, and Ching-chi Huang.
In other words, Japan’s position is the correct one.
“”””””Gradually, China’s maritime law enforcement assertions in the territorial sea of the Senkakus/Diaoyus could be withdrawn and the situation would operationally revert to the status quo ante as existed prior to the purchase of the three islands.””””
The writer does not appear to understand that the status quo that existed prior to the ‘nationalization’ of the Senkakus was the same as it has been since — cycles of Chinese encroachment with fishing vessels, aircraft, and occasionally, naval vessels. The status quo the author desires last existed in the 1990s.
Michael Turton
Please follow this link: and check out Point#5 ‘Evaluation under International Law.’
You will note that there are wider – and robust – legal perspectives beyond your claims and statements, which cast a deep shadow over the terra nullius basis of Tokyo’s incorporation of the islands. These perspectives are substantiated in detail and are by no means flimsy or eccentric.
Please have a look.
Sourabh
Sorry, forgot to append the link in the previous response. Here it is:
http://taiwandiaoyutaiislands.tw/EN/History.aspx
Some of the links on this page are equally informative too – particularly the one which discusses ‘Japan’s claim of “discovery and occupation” of terra nullius …’
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/NewsNoHeadOnlyTitle.aspx?n=ABA0E972C185726C&sms=3B2BEAC05849AD8C
Sourabh
I would like a reasonable analysis of the facts rather than a moral judgement as is presented here. How about a good academic argument Mr Gupta rather than having to read what ought or ought not to be done.
peter vertannes
The article is not about moral judgments … in fact it is quite the opposite. Its about providing a policy prescription for a tense situation where moral clarity is lacking.
There isn’t space within this format to discuss the academic argument – which I presume is your interest in a discussion of the legal bases of either sides’ claim to the islands. I have briefly touched upon this aspect in the longer version of the piece. You can find it here:
http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/whole4.pdf
Sourabh
////territory’ in the shadow of imperial
victory—cognisant that its terra
nullius claim was false and wouldn’t
withstand legal scrutiny. ////
Sourabh, there was no Chinese or Manchu control of the islands in history. Hence the Japanese claim that they were terra nullius is correct.
*The Ming official history defines the limits of the empire. The boundaries don’t include the Senkakus.
*At no time were they ever administrated from Taiwan or any other holding of the Qing/Manchu empire. The Taiwanese did not routinely fish there until the Japanese gave them motorboats after 1895.
*The Qing draft official history does not mention them.
*The Qing official in charge of the handover of Taiwan in 1895 asked the Japanese representative if they wanted the islands belonging to Taiwan clarified. The Japanese said no. Surely if either side had thought the Senkakus belonged to Taiwan, they would have said so, especially the Qing side. But the Qing empire did not even know they existed.
*No official text after 1895 issued from any Chinese government shows the Senkakus as controversial territory or territory awaiting “reunification.” All confirm the Senkakus as Japanese and use Japanese names for them.
*No “ancient” text says the Ming owned the islands. All simply mention them. As I said, the Ming defined the limits of their empire — it didn’t include the Senkakus.
*No 19th C western maps of Taiwan include the Senkakus under Taiwan’s administration. Westerners were sophisticated in their understanding and knew as early as the first decade of the 19th C what the Qing controlled and what they didn’t. In major works on Taiwan of the 19C, no one ever mentions Qing control of the Senkakus.
*If you’re basing your claims on Han-yi Shaw, you’d best rethink. Shaw is a rabid Chinese nationalist and simply. makes. stuff. up. Like all Chinese nationalists, in fact.
*The spat began in 1970 after oil was announced in the shelf around them. It didn’t exist before that. Taipei and Beijing had numerous negotiations with Tokyo, but the islands were never mentioned or pressed for. Because no one thought of them as Chinese.
This spat is invented in the early 1970s. It is pure territorial expansion on China’s part, and it can only end in war because China isn’t going to grow up on this issue (or any other). That is why this article is just a dream. A pleasant one, but a dream. If you want to see what the Chinese are dreaming about, google “maps of national humiliation” and China and take a look.
Michael Turton
While I agree that China has territorial ambitions on its neighboring States how sure can you be that it will lead to war? China is fully aware that its Navy is no match for the US Navy and that its military in general is hardly a match for the might of the US Military. Also China isn’t like Imperial Japan, where the latter while aware of their shortcomings in industrial might still embarked on war. If you ask me Japan is safe as the US-Japan Security Treaty guarantees Japan’s protection. The ones who are at risk are the South East Asian nations who lack similar protection
Short of Japan giving up the Senkakus, I don’t see any resolution short of war. The issue isn’t really who could win, but whether someone emerges in China who can convince the CCP and PLA that war is possible, whether a domestic consensus on the advisability of war emerges…
The CCP’s interest is retaining domestic power at all costs. A shooting war with Japan and the US would threaten this. Currently I don’t see the CCP embarking on an adventure that would threaten their political rule.
Japan is indeed getting relatively weaker with each passing year, and China getting stronger, but the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the bilateral defense treaty. Together, the U.S. and Japan possess ample deterrent power. A Senkakus contingency provoked by Beijing will not go unanswered. Hitokiri Dom’s point on Tokyo’s relative security within the alliance shield (and sword) is entirely correct.
Sourabh
Why would China want to maintain the status quo? They want to change the status by force if necessary, and it is China that’s growing stronger while Japan’s growing weaker each passing year. This is why both sides expect a war, it is a matter of when, not if. China has no hesitation of starting the war to reclaim that islands because this is the first step in righting past wrongs.